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Deleuze, Whitehead, Bergson

Rhizomatic Connections

Edited by

Keith Robinson



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

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Notes on the Contributors

Tim Clark received his PhD from the University of Warwick in 1997 for a thesis on Deleuze and Whitehead. He works as a freelance editor. Previous publications include 'Becoming Everyone: the Politics of Sympathy in Deleuze and Rorty', *Radical Philosophy* 147 (2008).

André Cloots is Professor of Metaphysics at the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium. He has published extensively on process philosophy and the interrelationships of metaphysics, science and religion. His most recent publications deal with contemporary French philosophy, particularly with Marcel Gauchet (on modernity and religion) and with Gilles Deleuze.

Didier Debaise is currently Research Fellow at The Max Planck Institute for the History of Sciences and Visiting Professor at the Université Paris X – Nanterre. He has published numerous papers on Tarde, Bergson, Simondon, Whitehead and Deleuze, and is the author of *Un Empiricisme spéculatif. Lecture de procès et réalité de Whitehead* His current projects include work on the concept of power in Deleuze and Whitehead and a monograph on Whitehead for Belles Lettres, France.

Jean-Claude Dumoncel taught logic and history of mathematics at the University of Caen and is a member of the Academos team at the Archives Henri Poincaré at Nancy.

His doctoral thesis was on 'The System of Whitehead and Analytical Philosophy'. He has published numerous books on Whitehead, Russell and Wittgenstein, and on the history and philosophy of mathematics, including *Le Jeu de Wittgenstein* (1991), *Philosophie Deleuzienne et roman proustien* (1996), *Les 7 mots de Whitehead* (1998), *Philosophie des mathématiques* (2002), *La Philosophie telle quelle suivie de La conversation apocryphe entre Bergson et Russell* (2004). He has a new book forthcoming: *Deleuze face à face* and is currently working on chaos and the use of the computer in philosophy.

Roland Faber is Professor of Process Theology at the Claremont School of Theology and Professor of Religion and Philosophy at the Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, CA, Co-Director of the Center for

Process Studies and Executive Director of the 2007 Whitehead Research Project. His fields of research and publication are poststructuralism (Gilles Deleuze); process thought and process theology; comparative philosophy of religion; inter-religious discourse (epistemological conditions, ontology), especially regarding Christianity/Buddhism; philosophy, systematic theology (the doctrine of God and creation, Christology and eschatology); cosmology, theology and the spirituality of the Renaissance; and mysticism (Meister Eckhart, Nicolas of Cusa, Giordano Bruno) with an emphasis on multiplicity, infinite becoming and theopoetics.

Andrew Goffey is Senior Lecturer in Media, Culture and Communications at Middlesex University. In addition to writing on philosophy, he has written about biopolitics and the relationship between computing science and software. His current research focuses on the concept of experimentation in philosophy and its value for a revised assessment of cultural politics.

Peter Gunter is a graduate of the University of Texas, Cambridge University and Yale University (1963). He is past chairman and Regents' University Professor at the University of North Texas. Gunter's three main interests are process philosophy (especially the philosophies of Bergson and Whitehead), the philosophy of natural science and environmentalism. Still active in the development of the Big Thicket National Preserve in south-east Texas, he participates in the environmental philosophy programme at the University of North Texas. His publications include *Bergson and the Evolution of Physics* (1969) *Bergson and Modern Science* (1987) and *Texas Land Ethics* (1997, with Max Oelschlaeger).

Mick Halewood is a Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Essex. His research interests include the relationship of philosophy to social theory, contemporary theorizations of subjectivity and materiality, and the work of Whitehead and Deleuze. His publications include 'A. N. Whitehead, Information and Social Theory', *Theory, Culture and Society* (2005); and 'On Whitehead and Deleuze – The Process of Materiality', *Configurations* (2007). He is currently editing a collection of papers on Whitehead for publication in a special edition of *Theory, Culture and Society.*

Keith Robinson is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of South Dakota. In 2004–5 he was Senior Research Fellow in the Institute of Philosophy at the Katholieke Universiteit, Leuven, Belgium. He has published books and articles on Foucault, Deleuze and Whitehead,

including *Deleuze, Whitehead and the Transformations of Metaphysics*. He is currently preparing a book on Deleuze and Whitehead.

Isabelle Stengers teaches philosophy at the Université libre de Bruxelles. Her interests first focused on the constructive adventure of modern sciences and the problems born of the association of this with power and claims to rational authority. She is now working on the crucial challenge, both political and cultural, of an ecology that would embed our many diverging practices in a democratic and demanding environment. This orientation manifests the ongoing inspiration she found in both Whitehead's and Deleuze's philosophy. She has written numerous books, among which (in English) are *Order out of Chaos* (with I. Prigogine), *A History of Chemistry* (with B. Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent), *Power and Invention. Situating Science*, and *The Invention of Modern Science*. Her book on Whitehead, *Penser avec Whitehead*, is forthcoming in English translation from Harvard University Press.

James Williams is Professor of European Philosophy at the University of Dundee. He has written widely on contemporary French philosophy. His most recent books include *Gilles Deleuze's Logic of Sense: a Critical Introduction and Guide*, *The Lyotard Reader and Guide* (with Keith Crome), *Understanding Poststructuralism* and *The Transversal Thought of Gilles Deleuze: Encounters and Influences*. He is currently working on a philosophical study of the untimely.

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Introduction: Deleuze, Whitehead, Bergson – Rhizomatic Connections

Keith Robinson

I

Gilles Deleuze, Alfred North Whitehead and Henri Bergson have each been recognized as among the leading philosophers of our age, definitively marking both ends of the twentieth century. At the start of the century Bergson's thought was hailed as 'the beginning of a new era' and yet, under the weight of criticisms which labelled his thought 'intuitionist' or 'irrationalist', he virtually disappeared for most of the middle decades of the twentieth century, only to reappear again in new guise in the 1990s.[1] For his work during the early decades of the twentieth century, especially as co-author of *Principia Mathematica* with Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead's place in the history of twentieth-century philosophy, and the 'imaginary' of analytic philosophy, is already secure.[2] Yet, in ways that resemble the 'forgetting' of Bergson, Whitehead's later thought has been regarded by the majority of professional philosophers for much of the latter half of the twentieth century as simply an irrelevant anachronism, a sort of nineteenth-century or even pre-Kantian speculative metaphysics with little or no redeeming merit. Towards the end of the twentieth century Michel Foucault infamously claimed that the century would be known as 'Deleuzian' (Foucault, 1977, p. 165). Whatever that might mean, a good deal of the early Anglo-American readings of Deleuze's thought, and some of the continuing interest, rely on 'ready-made' codes for the reception of 'French thought' including postmodernism, poststructuralism and continental philosophy generally. These labels tend to blunt the critical force of Deleuze's thought and fail to recognize its creative originality. However, Deleuze's work has not only contributed to a revival of the philosophical fortunes of both Bergson and Whitehead,

it is now the subject of increasing attention across the humanities and social sciences, with numerous commentaries on and applications of his work.

Although Deleuze's own 'Bergsonism' is, in part, responsible for the resurgence of interest in Bergson's work and the 'new' Bergson during the last 15 years or so, the connections between Bergson and Whitehead, Deleuze and Whitehead, and all three together, have rarely been studied. What, after all, could the British mathematical physicist and logician have in common with the French poststructuralist thinker of difference and delirium, or the 'intuitionist' and Nobel prize winner in literature, who appeals to theories of *élan vital*? Yet Bergson and Whitehead read and admired each other's work and each commented on the other in their published books. In numerous instances Whitehead explicitly links his own key ideas to Bergson, connecting, for example, the very idea of 'process' with what he called Bergsonian 'time'. That Bergsonian *durée* might be close to process in Whitehead's sense is worth careful scrutiny and some of the essays in this volume begin this task. In addition, Whitehead often refers to Bergson's ideas of 'intuition', 'spatialization' and 'canalization' to clarify his own use of important terms, such as 'actual entity', 'conceptual prehension', 'feelings', etc. Whitehead also associated some of his famous fallacies with Bergsonian spatialization, especially the 'fallacy of simple location'. If spatialization entails the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness', it is, Whitehead says, an 'accidental' rather than a 'necessary' error. Despite this constant appeal to Bergson as an important source for many of his own key concepts, it is ironic that Whitehead's (and Russell's) arguably erroneous charge of 'anti-intellectualism' against Bergson, and their claim that for Bergson the intellect necessarily spatializes, has also contributed to the dearth of scholarly output on the Bergson–Whitehead connection. For his part Bergson described Whitehead's *The Concept of Nature* as an 'admirable book', and in a footnote said '[*The Concept of Nature*] is one of the most profound works ever written on the philosophy of nature' (2002, pp. 216, 382).

In addition to his well-known work on Bergson, Deleuze has written several significant short texts on Whitehead, and references to Whitehead span the entire range of Deleuze's career and include work in his own name as well as his work with Félix Guattari. These encounters with Whitehead and process thought are rarely mentioned let alone discussed or analysed in the literature on Deleuze or scholarship on Whitehead. Yet, as we shall see in some of the essays, Deleuze's interest in Whitehead

not only throws light on the nature of his own metaphysics, it also illuminates important aspects of Whitehead's thought and process philosophy that are too often narrowly interpreted or rarely commented on. Thus, this collection aims to help displace the forces that have often pushed these philosophers to the margins of philosophy, to begin the task of making visible the overlaps, conjunctions, contrasts and parallels – the 'rhizomatic connections' – between Deleuze, Bergson and Whitehead for those who have already read and appreciate their works as well as those new to them.

The tendency to neglect, distort and marginalize all three philosophers and the relations between them is an outcome of a set of assumptions, attitudes and prejudices towards certain modes and styles of philosophizing that could be said to be characteristic of the divisions and tensions within twentieth-century philosophy. This has not only left each philosopher out of the 'mainstream' canons of Anglo-American professional philosophy, it has also hindered a fuller assessment of their approaches to perennial issues in Western philosophy and obscured the often subterranean connections between them. As this collection shows, the work of all three concerns many of the most important concepts and problems of the Kantian and post-Kantian legacy, modern philosophy and contemporary thought: the end or transformation of metaphysics; the relation between philosophy and science; the place and function of the subject; dualism and the mind–body problem; the ideas of time, memory, becoming and process; the role of the 'event'; the importance of language and perception; the fate of the 'concept' or 'universal'; the continuing appeal to various modified versions of 'realism', 'materialism' and 'constructivism'. Perhaps above all, all three philosophers are intimately concerned with the status of 'life' and the importance of the 'creative' and the 'new' for thinking with and about life.

One of the premises of this volume is that the work of Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson transforms our understanding of these ideas and problems. Thus by bringing them into dialogue on these issues, we release new ways to understand their thought. What connects them, and makes it especially fruitful to bring them together, is the subject of this collection of essays. The 'rhizomatic' connections between Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson offer the potential not only to revitalize ignored and neglected traditions, ideas and ways of doing philosophy, but they also hold out the larger promise of effectively challenging and even redrawing the map of twenty-first-century philosophy, so opening up new futures.

II

There are a number of preliminary obstacles that prevent us from reading Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson together that we need to make visible and challenge, if not clear away completely. In order to accomplish this I would like to situate (albeit briefly and provisionally) each of our philosophers in the context of some of the main traditions of modern philosophy, concentrating on the analytic/continental distinction. We shall finish with an introduction that will function to introduce the essays as well as offer an ideal type or composite picture of some of the basic philosophical ideas – the rhizomatic connections – that link the work of Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson for those new to the three philosophers.

Alfred North Whitehead

As co-author with Bertrand Russell of *Principia Mathematica* published between 1910 and 1913 and forming the foundation of his early work, Whitehead's historical role at the beginnings of the drama of twentieth-century analytic philosophy is clear. Famously, *Principia* attempts to demonstrate that pure mathematics is reducible to a few logical principles. In so doing it provides the logicist foundation and impetus for the inception of the analytic project, developing Gottlob Frege's technical apparatus and refining his formulas through the application of the theory of types. Published in three volumes, *Principia* laid out a foundation and research base that would profoundly influence the course of twentieth-century mathematics, logic and philosophy. However, Whitehead's middle and later texts have been said to 'rumble around in the intellectual history of the English speaking world like a loose bolt in a machine' (Quinton, 1985, p. 52). Whitehead's route out of and beyond *Principia*, including the work on the philosophy of science and nature, but especially the later, more overtly metaphysical work, is rarely appreciated and little understood. His biographer once remarked, 'Whitehead is one of the most quoted philosophers of our century – and one of the least understood' (Lowe, 1991, p. 3). This work is not only poorly comprehended in mainstream philosophy, but it is also marginalized and treated with suspicion. As one commentator puts it: 'outside the sequestered province of the cult, Whitehead is regarded with a measure of baffled reverence, mingled with suspicion' (Quinton, 1985, p. 52). This is taken from Anthony Quinton's review of Victor Lowe's biography of Whitehead. Quinton remarks that although Whitehead was clearly made of what he calls the 'right stuff', his work has been incomprehensible

to professional philosophers. Thus, on this account the 'early' Whitehead of *Principia* had demonstrated the 'right stuff' but, in an almost inexplicable relapse, the 'later' Whitehead is regarded as undertaking a regrettable return to the worst excesses of nineteenth-century speculative metaphysics of precisely the kind that *Principia* and the emergence of 'analytic' philosophy would, it was thought, save us.

There is no doubt that Whitehead's later work has been at times misunderstood and misread, but mostly one suspects simply not read, and treated as an irrelevant anachronism by the majority of professional philosophers. Aside from the difficult but fascinating question of the philosophical relations between the 'early' and 'later' Whitehead, the 'process' traditions that his later thought famously draws on and contribute to are immensely rich and diverse, appearing as a *leitmotiv* throughout the entire history of philosophy. For the most part, however, process philosophy in the twentieth century was kept alive outside academic philosophy on the fringes of literature, in the margins of educational and pedagogical studies, in the interstices of ecological and environmental discourses, here and there in the sciences, but perhaps most especially in theology. Although Quinton's 'cult' is too strong a term to describe his followers, Whitehead's discussions of God and theology, taken up in the works of Charles Hartshorne and others, have created a veritable process theology industry in the United States – 'religion in the making' indeed (to use the title of one of Whitehead's books) – complete with a 'process studies' centre, an assortment of lectures, conferences, high priests and a number of publications. Although this has produced work of undoubted quality, even to a certain extent keeping scholarship on Whitehead in America alive, there is an insularity and narrowness to some of this work.[3] By bringing Whitehead's thought into dialogue with other thinkers and traditions we are better able to focus on it critically, as well as show what is valuable in his ideas and methods. If the neglect of Whitehead among professional philosophers in the latter half of the twentieth century has in part emerged from a suspicion of his interest in theology and his 'relapse' into metaphysics, it is, as we have intimated, through the analytic/continental distinction in twentieth-century professional philosophy that these suspicions are most decisively contextualized and articulated.

Analytic philosophy, as we have noted, has tended to dismiss the later thought of Whitehead. This is in part tied in the first instance to issues regarding commitments to logical consistency, coherence and clarity. Indeed, Whitehead himself famously announced that Bertrand Russell had accused of him of being a 'muddlehead'. (Whitehead in

turn described Russell as 'simpleminded'.) Perhaps another of Russell's remarks – 'it was Whitehead who was the serpent in this paradise of Mediterranean clarity' (Russell, 1956, p. 41) – captures something of the climate of feeling that may have led to this dismissal. However, it is no doubt the predominance of the theme of language and the 'linguistic turn' in the analytic tradition in the latter half of the twentieth century (which Russell also opposed) that has played a major role in marginalizing Whitehead's work. In addition, the influence of 'tenseless' theories of time within logical theory and continuing suspicions over the appeal to metaphysical systems may have played against Whitehead. In the second half of the twentieth century metaphysics survived in professional philosophy in the form of the attempt to describe the actual structure of our thought by clarifying our use of conceptual language. This is the commitment to what Peter Strawson has called 'descriptive metaphysics' where 'conceptual analysis' is taken to a higher level of generality in order to describe the actual structure of thought. 'Revisionary metaphysics' (and Whitehead's metaphysics is revisionary), on the other hand, is in Strawson's view an attempt not to describe conceptual structure as such, but to produce a 'better structure' by re-ordering our view of the world, reorganizing the set of ideas with which we usually think about the world and so effectively redrawing the map of how we think. For Strawson revisionary metaphysics at best can only play a subordinate or supplementary role to description, at worst it is incompatible with it since the actual deep structure of thought is conceptually invariant.[4] However, in the analytic tradition, beginning with Rudolf Carnap and the Positivists and especially among those influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein, there is and has been a more widespread and pronounced tendency to tolerate nothing 'metaphysical' at all. Famously, we need merely to show the metaphysicist 'that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions' (Wittgenstein, 1999 [1922], p.189). In fact, Deleuze himself goes so far as to suggest that Whitehead's work has been 'assassinated', along with a group of other 'very great' Anglo-American thinkers, by a philosophical court presided over by Wittgenstein and his 'analytic' disciples.[5] Whatever the truth of this claim, as Whitehead said, 'a system of philosophy is never refuted; it is only abandoned' (1979, p. 6).

If Whitehead's thought has been more or less abandoned by the analytic tradition, it fares little better in the continental tradition. Determined in part by its response to the science/ philosophy settlement of the Kantian legacy, we may find themes in continental thought that are perceived as placing that tradition in direct contrast to Whitehead, if

not in outright opposition. The relation to the natural sciences is crucial here, especially if Whitehead is loosely perceived as a philosopher of science quite at home with the philosophical assumptions and scientific milieu that produced *Principia*. Contemporary continental philosophers are for the most part deeply informed by the phenomenological tradition, pushing it in one direction or another, radicalizing it, overcoming it, etc. However, the basic thrust of phenomenology is to reconnect consciousness to the natural world which had been split by the modern scientific worldview, showing how subjectivity is bound up with the process of objectivity. Indeed, perhaps the constant theme of all phenomenologies is the perceived opposition to and repudiation of science. From Edmund Husserl's claim that science takes 'for true being what is actually a method', to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's 'phenomenology ... is the rejection of science', to Martin Heidegger's infamous 'Science calculates but does not think', the phenomenological tradition programmes a certain response to science – especially to the project of scientific naturalism conceived in its positivistic and mechanistic forms – which ranges from suspicion to outright rejection. (Whether such a clear-cut opposition to science is truly representative of any of these authors is doubtful. However, this appears to have been the overriding perception and interpretation of their work.)

In the continental tradition Heidegger is perhaps most influential here, linking the 'end of metaphysics' and the completion of philosophy to the triumph of science and technology. Science is here grounded in and finds its conditions of possibility in a pre-theoretical world of human experience, a lived world – 'being in the world' – that has ontological priority over the (albeit very useful) abstractions of science. At best within a good deal of contemporary continental philosophy the sciences are tapped as systems of metaphoricity that can be transposed to other fields, or as models turned against themselves in order to critically examine and deconstruct their own conceptual frameworks (e.g. Jacques Lacan on topology; Luce Irigaray on fluid mechanics). At worst within the Heideggerian-inspired phenomenological traditions the sciences are viewed as instruments inextricably tied to ontic realms, enmeshed within systems of power and domination, unable to see beyond their own technological frenzy and completely incapable of accessing the 'essential' or the 'primordial'. Science encounters other entities as 'present-to-hand', as sets of quantifiable properties in efficient causal relations, yet without any overriding purpose or value. In this view science strips the natural world of meaning and presents it as a barren, mechanical place of 'matter in motion', divorced from human subjectivity, conscious experience and

bodily life. Some working within the phenomenologically influenced traditions of continental thought may view Whitehead, at least the 'early' Whitehead of *Principia* and the philosophy of science texts, as too close to this reductive 'logicism' and 'physicalism'. However, this critique of science found within parts of phenomenology presupposes a fixed and static view of natural science and its limitations, as if the sciences were inevitably and inescapably bound to mechanistic and reductionist models. One innovative aspect of Whitehead's later work has been to offer a new model: the 'philosophy of organism' offers a new metaphysics of science and the philosophy–science relation no longer dependent on a mechanistic model. Indeed, Whitehead's name is invoked by major figures within the continental tradition, who are more distant or critical of phenomenology, including Bergson, the later Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze, not to mention influential figures like Jean Wahl, precisely for his critique of mechanistic, reductionist models and the 'bifurcation of nature' and his preference for an alternative model of being that attempts to fuse subjectivity, meaning and value with objectivity and fact.

Thus, the reasons for the misunderstanding, 'excommunication' and abandonment of Whitehead's system within academic philosophy are complex and tied to the development of various strands of the post-Kantian legacy, especially the science–philosophy settlement after Kant, and their emergence in the traditions of analytic and continental philosophy with their linguistic turns and end of metaphysics scenarios that dominated twentieth-century philosophy. Indeed, although these scenarios are played out somewhat differently in each case, they have real relevance for understanding the reception of both Deleuze and Bergson.

Henri Bergson

A good deal written above about Whitehead, and especially the analytic/continental distinction, is relevant to any discussion of the philosophical fortunes of Bergson. At the beginning of the twentieth century Bergson's thought enjoyed wide currency and international fame. As the philosopher of time, change and difference his ideas were enormously influential for many artists, writers, scientists and philosophers. Yet, as John Mullarkey notes, few philosophers 'have seen such a level of influence dissipate so quickly' (1999, p. 1). Although I cannot give an exhaustive account of the reasons that may have led to his decline here which, like the abandonment of Whitehead, are complex and multifaceted, we can briefly sketch some important critical highlights. For example, Mullarkey refers to the extensive diffusion of Bergson's ideas and their incorporation into other movements as one reason for the

waning of his influence. Bergson's insights have been taken up within phenomenology, structuralism and a range of modernist literary movements and authors. In addition to the ease with which 'Bergsonism' may be appropriated by other thinkers, systems and modes of thought, Len Lawlor has remarked that the generation that grew up with the 'Bergson cult' was the generation of Jean-Paul Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and the existentialists anxious to distance themselves from what went before. Lawlor (2004) has also suggested that 'the lack of archival material is one reason why Bergson went out of favour during the second half of the twentieth century'. In his will Bergson ordered that all of his papers be destroyed and his wife apparently did just that. As a result the Bergson archive in Paris contains only his personal library.

However, any discussion of Bergson's neglect during the middle of the twentieth century must surely mention the role played by Bertrand Russell. If Russell was an important figure in shaping Whitehead's philosophical fortunes this is all the more the case with Bergson, beginning with the now famous Russellian jest that 'intuition is at its best in bats, bees and Bergson'. Despite several commentators pointing to various affinities between Russell and Bergson,[6] it appears that his own prejudices prevented him from seeing them. Indeed, some have suggested that Russell almost single-handedly ruined Bergson's reputation in Anglo-American circles, even waging something of a campaign against him. One of Russell's biographers remarks that Russell's preparations for his Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society in the autumn of 1911, at which Bergson himself was present, 'have about them something of the quality of a boxer's preparations for a title fight against the reigning champion' (Monk, 1996, p. 233). For Russell beating the 'reigning champion' would elevate his own profile and would ultimately amount, as he saw it, to a defence of intellect and 'reason' against the forces of Bergsonian 'unreason'. By some accounts Bergson is said to have come off rather well in the discussion that followed Russell's Address. In at least one report Bergson claimed that Russell's subsequent attacks on him were a direct effect of his engagement with and critique of Russell's Address (Russell, 1992, p. 319). The Aristotelian Society meeting was followed six months later by Russell's famous critical lecture on Bergson, given to The Heretics at Cambridge. It is here, to a packed audience, that Russell poured scorn on Bergson's philosophy, setting out apparently to 'demolish' him. In Alan Wood's account,

> there was an eager audience to hear him [Russell], and everyone had a sense of great occasion. To enjoy the lecture's savour, the reader

> must imagine it delivered in Russell's dry, precise and ironic voice, and punctuated by the laughter and applause which greeted his sallies. It was an event of some importance in Russell's life, helping to re-establish him as one of the leading figures in Cambridge; and especially because it was his first big success as a public speaker.
>
> (1957, p. 89)

Russell's criticisms of Bergson too often amount to little more than the accusation that Bergson is not 'philosophical' since he is too 'imaginative' or lacks solid arguments. In a typical remark of this sort Russell says,

> of course a large part of Bergson's philosophy, probably the part to which most of its popularity is due, does not depend on argument, and cannot be upset by argument. His imaginative picture of the world, regarded as a poetic effort, is in the main not capable of either proof or disproof.
>
> (1992, p. 336)

For Russell Bergson is too much of a 'visualizer' who thinks in images and 'pictures' rather than in words, sounds or symbols, and mistakes his own predilection for the visual as a fault of the intellect. There is nothing 'logically necessary' for Russell about visualizing succession, for example, as spread out on a line. Although Russell finds few 'arguments' in Bergson, he does find some 'doctrines' on number, time and intellect, but all are infected by Bergson's 'picture' view of space, his 'personal idiosyncrasy mistaken for a necessity of thought' (Russell, 1992, p. 330).

Russell's philosophical remarks on Bergson are at times intemperate and excessive,[7] but perhaps symbolize the division in style, temperament and method that developed between the analytic and continental traditions within twentieth-century philosophy. Indeed, Bergson's work is rarely mentioned by those who 'self-identify' with the analytic tradition, despite Bergson's well-known interests in and publications on what are seen as standard 'analytic' issues, like the nature of cognition, the problem of consciousness, mind–body dualism, free will, etc. Bergson's interests in the philosophy of biology, mathematics, calculus and the theory of relativity should also have been of interest to those working in these areas in analytic philosophy, yet it appears that his critique of science as tied to the 'cinematographical method' would merely reinforce Russell's (and Whitehead's) suspicions of his 'anti-intellectualism' and

supposed opposition to science since, for Russell's Bergson, the sciences can only take a 'still-frame' of duration. Following on Russell's heels others have perceived Bergson's thought negatively as too 'literary', as 'mystical' and 'poetic' (winning the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1928 would have counted as proof of this) and as continuing a 'spiritualist' tradition of French philosophy, none of which, I think it would be fair to say – despite Wittgenstein's abiding interests in mysticism – would have been particularly endearing to or well received by either Cambridge (England or Massachusetts) or Oxford philosophers throughout 1930–70, the main period in which the primary gestation of analytic philosophy took place.

In relation to the continental tradition it seems clear that after the Second World War a good deal of attention turned to German philosophy, especially the phenomenological tradition of Husserl and Heidegger and their importation into France. Heidegger's influence on post-war French philosophy was profound and yet his claim that Bergson merely reversed Greek metaphysics and reduced time to space is typical of the short shrift that Bergson is generally given, if given any at all, by continental philosophers after 1925. Although Heidegger credits Bergson with 'the most intense analyses of time that we possess', nevertheless 'he does not succeed in clarifying primordial and genuine time in its essence' (Heidegger, 1992, p. 203). Here Bergson plays a similar role in Heidegger's history of Being as Nietzsche, with one obvious difference: Heidegger dedicated four volumes to establishing and elaborating his claims regarding Nietzsche and only a few paragraphs, scattered through his work, to Bergson.

One notable exception to the tendency to ignore Bergson or read him superficially within contemporary continental philosophy is Emmanuel Levinas. Bergson's work on temporality has been of great importance for Levinas's own thinking on time, the trace and the relation to the other. Levinas has said that 'Bergson's theory of time as concrete duration (*la durée concrète*) is, I believe, one of the most significant, if largely ignored, contributions to contemporary philosophy' (Kearney, 1984, p. 49). Indeed, Levinas not only argues that Bergson's reflections on temporality prepared the ground for the implantation of Heideggerian phenomenology in France, but he goes on to suggest that Bergson's own work directly prefigures Heidegger's celebrated analyses of technology as the culmination of Western metaphysics and its forgetting of Being. Levinas says that 'Bergson's importance to contemporary continental thought has been somewhat obfuscated; he has been suspended in a sort of limbo; but I believe it is only a temporary suspension' (Kearney, 1984, pp. 49–50).

The most notable exception within continental philosophy to engage Bergson and help him escape from this temporary suspension in philosophical limbo is, of course, Deleuze. Deleuze remarks that some philosophers laughed at him for working on Bergson in the late 1950s and early 1960s and yet his encounter with Bergson is now widely recognized as formative for many of Deleuze's own key claims. Equally, Deleuze's work has gone some way to restoring Bergson as a great thinker, making it more difficult to dismiss him as simply an 'intuitionist', a 'vitalist' or an 'irrationalist'. One could argue that Deleuze has helped remove the 'obfuscation' that surrounds Bergson within contemporary continental philosophy that Levinas talks of, almost single-handedly reviving the fortunes of Bergsonism in the last 15–20 years or so. In addition to Deleuze's own texts on Bergson, there are now several studies devoted to him that have been inspired by Deleuze and several on the Deleuze–Bergson connection.[8] If one must give labels, then Bergson, like Whitehead and Deleuze, requires one of his own. It is perhaps by putting Bergson into dialogue with the likes of Whitehead and Deleuze – and revealing some of his rhizomatic connections with them – that a more appropriate context for situating and understanding his thought has emerged and will continue to develop.

Gilles Deleuze

No less than Whitehead and Bergson, the reception of Deleuze's thought has been subject to a complex set of misunderstandings, misinterpretations and investments that are simultaneously philosophical, political, historical, etc. The reception of Deleuze's thought in the Anglo-American context is linked, first, to the appropriation of French theory through phenomenology, hermeneutics, deconstruction, etc. In departments of philosophy this is tied to the analytic/continental distinction and beyond that, more broadly, to interpretive frameworks for importing French theoretical and more generally continental texts into the humanities (e.g. poststructuralism, postmodernism, etc). Deleuze's reception in the Anglo-American academy, and the subsequent development of scholarship on his work, has been predominantly carried out, along with a whole group of more or less unrelated French thinkers, in conjunction with a set of preoccupations loosely related to these labels, especially the 'postmodern'. This reception has effectively distorted the creative and critical force of Deleuze's texts and obscured their deep and complex relation to the Western metaphysical tradition, not to mention non-Western traditions. Few of the French thinkers associated with the postmodern embrace this label (Foucault, Derrida and others distance themselves

from it or actively reject it) which for Deleuze would be a 'cliché', a pre-formed concept tantamount to little more than a marketing device – for Deleuze a shameful advertising and selling of concepts like products where critique and creation are replaced by sales promotion. Like marketing, the claims regarding the 'end of philosophy', 'end of metaphysics', etc., are what Deleuze and Guattari call 'tiresome idle chatter' (1994, p. 9). As they say, 'the death of metaphysics or the overcoming of philosophy has never been a problem for us' (1994, p. 9). Indeed, Deleuze's work, and the work with Guattari, which has received the most negative reaction among Anglo-American philosophers, could be read from beginning to end as an extraordinary exercise and experimentation in speculative metaphysics which, like Whitehead and Bergson, has recourse to both pre-Kantian and post-Kantian modes of philosophy, as much helping themselves to traditional categories as reconfiguring or inventing new ones. Reading Whitehead and Bergson together with Deleuze enables us to take seriously Deleuze's description of himself as quite simply a 'pure metaphysicist' and to locate this in the context of his understanding of the task of the philosopher as simply the creation of concepts, extracting from modernity the '*untimely*' – something 'unthought' that pertains to modernity, but that must be turned against modernity, forcing it to change its nature and reconstruct its 'image of thought' on another plane.

Perhaps because of the association of Deleuze with postmodernism Deleuze studies have too often been superficial or acritical, with a seemingly endless run of 'introductions' and 'primers'. Although there have been a few outstanding introductions and scholarly monographs on Deleuze, there remains a tendency, particularly in journal articles, simply to repeat Deleuzian claims and points in Deleuze's own vocabulary and conceptual framework. The theoretical resources that Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari draw on, the traditions they invoke or 'invent', the questions and problems they pursue are too often occluded or left unexamined. For example, we have already noted that Whitehead, among others, is rarely mentioned in Deleuze scholarship. However, the concept of 'process', most closely associated with Whitehead in the twentieth century, is a constant theme throughout Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari. In this respect there is not only an explicit repetition of Whitehead and the concept of process in Deleuze, but also an implicit encounter with the *process* tradition. But the operation of this latter repetition is barely acknowledged let alone systematically worked through in the works of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari. Deleuze draws on insights from across the process tradition, but never really acknowledges that

tradition or explores the tensions or problems that this appropriation might present in the formulation of his own philosophy. If process philosophy is submerged in Deleuze it is because he avails himself of many of its insights, but in the disguised and masked form of its expression in the major thinkers he likes (Spinoza, Leibniz, Nietzsche, Bergson, etc). In Deleuzian terms there is a 'clothed' repetition of Whitehead *and* the process tradition. One could argue, indeed, that one important but ignored trajectory that unites 'the great Spinoza–Nietzsche equation' (Deleuze, 1995, p. 135) in Deleuze is precisely the presence of process concepts, methods and modes of philosophizing. Indeed, process is a concept that neither Deleuze nor Deleuze and Guattari ever really explicitly theorize or 'create', yet they use as a neutral conduit or vehicle for discussions of many of their own most important concepts including 'difference' 'desire', 'becoming', etc. 'Process' in Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari always appears as subordinate to 'difference', 'becoming' or 'desire', but is never given its 'own' concept, never thought 'in-itself'.[9]

Just as the concept of process tends to be a necessary yet invisible support to the primary terms of the Deleuzian conceptual repertoire, and process philosophy is overlooked as a positive tradition in Deleuze himself (a kind of 'anxiety of influence' since he prefers the invention and creation of his own 'traditions'), recognition of process thought, and the idea that it might play a key role in Deleuze's intellectual formation, is almost completely absent in the reception of his work.[10] A few readers have invoked the concept of 'process' in their reading of his texts, but this is only to include the concept as an empty placeholder within their descriptions and commentaries on Deleuze, without subjecting the concept to a detailed explication or critical analysis. Thus, Deleuze, Deleuze and Guattari and some of their best-known interpreters appropriate and rely on a concept of process for their own theoretical practices and procedures without engaging in a 'genealogy', genesis or 'immanent critique' of this concept or tradition.

However, scholarship on Deleuze is now moving beyond these stages, where Deleuze's concepts and modes of doing philosophy are rarely questioned, and is now entering a new, more expansive phase in search of a more comprehensive understanding of the meaning and value of Deleuze's work and legacy.[11] The essays in this collection will be a major contribution to these wider developments. By placing Deleuze's work (and Deleuze–Bergson) in conjunction with Whitehead and Bergson we release different images of Deleuze's thought, images more in rhizomatic connection with traditions and temporalities that still remain undeveloped and distant from Deleuze's initial and continuing Anglo-American

reception. Placing Deleuze's thought within these contexts opens the texts once again to the possibility of unforeseen and novel becomings, contributing to the ongoing debate over the nature, purpose and scope of Deleuze's thought. Indeed, one measure of Deleuze's importance as a contemporary philosopher is that his own relation to metaphysical tradition enables us to see thinkers like Whitehead and Bergson (but also figures like Alexander, Bradley and the American pragmatists) as offering a viable post-Kantian transformation of metaphysics, an alternative metaphysics that utilizes pre-Kantian modes of thought to disturb and reopen the Kantian settlement, pushing it in new directions and towards new perspectives. By pursuing these directions it seems that the continuing relevance of labels like 'postmodernism' or the 'analytic/continental' distinction is effectively disrupted and challenged.

Analytic/continental

Thus bringing Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson together at this moment appears especially fruitful and productive, but the rhizomatic connections between them have too often been obfuscated and covered over by preformed modes of reception shaped in many ways by the analytic/continental distinction and broader patterns within the humanities. However, the analytic and continental paradigms in philosophy are now in transformation and postmodernism appears on the wane. The analytic tradition has been subjected to a range of internal critiques from the Quinean and Davidsonian to the more recent critiques of Macintyre, Rorty, Rosen and others (interestingly Quine, Davidson and Rorty have all had significant and, early on, positive philosophical contact with Whitehead) as well as a range of 'external' criticisms. In addition, several texts have offered historical accounts of the analytic tradition, and 'post-analytic philosophy' has entered the philosophical vocabulary. If the analytic tradition is not quite defunct it is at least in part fragmenting into a plurality of styles,[12] which may make the time ripe for a reassessment of Whitehead and Bergson as well as open up lines of connection to Deleuze.[13]

Equally, continental philosophy is undergoing revision as previously key ideas, thinkers and movements either pass away, become exhausted and/or look to other sources for renewal. Perhaps most notable here is the declining influence of Heideggerian phenomenology and its displacement in France in the 1980s by those taking the 'theological turn' as well as the emergence of a group of 'post- phenomenological' thinkers committed to a renewed encounter with the sciences and the metaphysical tradition. Indeed, 'post-continental philosophy' has also entered the

vocabulary, indicating, at least in one account, a break with the 'three H's' (Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger) of German philosophy, a rejection of transcendence in all its forms as well as a refusal of the poststructuralist elevation of language. On the positive side there is a 'return' to a distinctively French heritage and a preoccupation with 'immanence' in the form of various non-reductive naturalisms and materialisms. Intriguingly, in this account what is said to characterize the post-continental thinkers of immanence is that they are all 'process philosophers'.[14]

Thus, one can find themes and modes of philosophy emerging from the ruins of both analytic and continental traditions that draw on our three philosophers, or might benefit from doing so. These transformations currently affecting analytic and continental offer real potential for revitalizing scholarship on Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson since they are opening up not only what Deleuze and Guattari call the 'strangest hybrids of Frego-Husserlianism, or even Wittgensteino-Heideggerianism' (1996, p. 143), but also new and creative 'crossovers', 'assemblages' or what Whitehead called 'contrasts' and 'contrasts of contrasts'. Thus, contrasting Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson now will enable us not only to see the 'analytic/continental' distinction from a certain distance, perhaps even as increasingly irrelevant, but also make visible the extent to which their philosophies are remarkably similar yet subtly differing approaches to a thinking of thought as process, becoming and movement and a thinking of the new that is in communication with a range of current work within philosophy. Indeed, staging a contrast between Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson, I contend, will not only show the extent to which their work is ready to play a more central role within contemporary philosophy, opening a space in which their ideas become once again a living and creative possibility for thought, but will also offer the possibility of giving a new metaphysical 'image' to the very ideas of 'creativity', 'experience' and 'life' which are currently at the forefront of developments in the sciences, the arts and the humanities.

III

In this final section I briefly lay out some of the basic ideas and rhizomatic connections between our three philosophers as well as introduce the essays that follow.

Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson share the view that the central feature of reality is becoming or process. Experience is a continuity where the immediate past persists into the living future. Although Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson each understand the nature of this temporal

continuity slightly differently, for each reality is a creative streaming of unique ever new actualities. The real is a fluid movement or creative force that expresses itself as a process of occasions (Whitehead), a flow of duration (Bergson) or an activity of differentiation (Deleuze). On this view reality is never complete since each moment gives something new. The relation of the mind to this reality is at one level a relation of distortion, filtering and misrecognition. Whether the distortions of 'representation' (Deleuze), the 'fallacy of simple location' (Whitehead) or the problem of 'spatialized time' (Bergson) continuity is cut into static, geometric points and mathematical instants and the lived experience of dynamic, qualitative and creative becoming is reduced or eliminated. Although each philosopher will disagree over the degree of distortion involved, they all agree that, practically, the tendency of the mind is to recognize only what is useful and it does so through solid perceptions and stable, fixed or 'ready-made' concepts.

Access to the becoming of the real will require a new way of doing metaphysics, a 'method' that dips beneath the pragmatic bent of the intellect, whether we call this the method of 'intuition' (Bergson), 'extensive abstraction' (Whitehead) or 'dramatization' (Deleuze). Our everyday habits of thought must be disrupted and 'reversed' (Bergson) or 'inverted' (Whitehead, Deleuze) in order to glimpse the flowing real. Thus, in Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson, philosophical method, rather than being ignored or abandoned, is rethought in accordance with a new 'image of thought', guided by a new set of open and revisable presuppositions and 'postulates'.

In the first instance one such postulate would be that thought must create fluid concepts capable of following the 'sinuosities' of the real, and so each of our philosophers transforms the concept of 'concept'. The concept can no longer be a stable universal that ranges over particulars, but must form a non-representational 'fit' with each experience that it expresses. The concept is not needed to perform a logical shaping or moulding of experience since experience comes with its own virtual or ideational 'structures' in the making, problem-potentials for development in new and unforeseen directions. Thus on this view concepts are bound to problems and the measure of their success is determined by whether they release something new in relation to the problem. Drawn from various domains of experience, concepts must be constructed that are suitable for expressing the potentials within these problem-structures and inherent in other domains of experience. In Whitehead's words, concepts must 'disclose the very meaning of things', but it is a conceptual disclosure that changes 'the very meaning of things'.

The 'category' as that special form of the concept within the philosophical tradition which is predicable of all experience will also undergo significant revision. For all three philosophers categories can no longer function as Aristotelian metaphysical categories which simply describe the properties of the many senses of being, of things that really are; nor can they function as Kantian epistemological categories that give a priori structure to our knowledge, shaping the form of our experience. Categories here are neither simply ontological predicates of things nor epistemological conditions of cognition. Rather, categories must express the ontological conditions of real experience, where real experience is not restricted to cognition. From Whitehead's own categories of process to Deleuze's 'differential' categories (or the 'categories' found in the conclusion to *A Thousand Plateaus*) and Bergson's 'conceptual images', each will develop revised notions of concepts and categories as part of a new methodological constructivism in ontology and speculative metaphysics. For all three, rather than being simply abandoned as part of the apparatus of representation and 'categorial reason', concepts and categories become part of a metaphysics that is 'constructive' or creative of the new.

For each philosopher concept creation will be a key component in their metaphysical 'constructivism' in order to 'think with' experience and life in novel ways, outside of the habitual and practical. Such a constructivism is no longer counterpoised to 'realism', but is itself a new form of 'speculative' realism. In chapter 1, 'Thinking with Deleuze and Whitehead: a Double Test', Isabelle Stengers, one of the first thinkers to explore the Deleuze–Whitehead connection, develops the thought of 'thinking with' as a way of experimentally approaching and testing the thought of Deleuze and Whitehead without comparing their thought from a neutral standpoint or 'view from nowhere'. This is an 'ethopoietic' experiment that must take care of our abstractions, revise them where necessary and show how they matter. Indeed, each of our philosophers will offer both a critique as well as a more experimental or 'creative' use of forms of 'abstraction'. All three develop their critique of abstraction on the grounds that the abstract does not explain, but must itself be explained. Abstractions are not false but simply present a narrow aspect of the object. On this basis the critique of abstraction in Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson takes place under the sign of a 'superior', 'transcendental' or 'speculative' empiricism that will give access to an immediacy and concreteness that escapes the abstractions of science, perception and common sense.

In chapter 4, 'The Emergence of a Speculative Empiricism: Whitehead Reading Bergson', Didier Debaise tracks the emergence of these forms of empiricism in Whitehead and Bergson. Although both share the critique of representation, for Debaise the empiricisms of Whitehead and Bergson diverge in accordance with their proximity to *durée* or the processual flow. For Debaise's Bergson we must overcome representation by placing ourselves in the immediacy of duration. For Debaise's Whitehead, in contrast, we require an empiricism mediated by abstractions that will guide our interpretations of experience.

In Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson, in addition to critique, the more creative mode of abstraction takes the form of positing an indeterminate abstract space of 'difference', 'process' or 'duration' that submits its elements to creative actualization. This abstract yet real space forms an 'intrinsic genesis' (to use Deleuze's term) of actuality, a genetic production or construction of the real that will require a transformation of our understanding of concepts like subjectivity, language, materiality, events, perception, sense and bodies. In chapter 2, 'Language, Subjectivity and Individuality', Mick Halewood compares Deleuze's and Whitehead's notions of language in order to throw light on subjectivity and the material processes of individuation as activities that make up actuality. As one important mode of the processual activity of individuation, Halewood brings out the similarities between the expression of 'sense' (and the infinitive verb) in Deleuze and the implicitly linguistic aspects of the 'event' (eternal objects and propositions) in Whitehead.

In chapter 3, 'Whitehead and Deleuze: Thinking the Event', André Cloots continues the discussion of subjectivity, language and univocity by critically evaluating Deleuze's and Whitehead's conceptions of the event in relation to key figures in the Western tradition, especially Heidegger. For the later Heidegger *Ereignis* is the 'happening' or event of Being as time through which the ontological difference is expressed. Although Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson are close to Heidegger in their idea of being as an activity of temporalization, Cloots explores their differences in terms of how and whether such an event can be the object of philosophical thinking. Here Cloots argues that Deleuze might be closer to a Bergsonian intuition of being than Whitehead's attempt at a categorical thinking of the event of being.

As is well known, the Deleuzean event of being has both a 'virtual' and an 'actual' component and the relation between them has been disputed by numerous commentators. In chapter 5, 'Deleuze and Whitehead: The Concept of Reciprocal Determination', James Williams shows how the relation in Deleuze between virtual and actual is one of 'reciprocal

determination' where each half of reality is reciprocally dependent on the other for determination. Williams argues that a sufficiently similar concept of reciprocal determination is at work in Whitehead's metaphysical system. By drawing out the differences in the way that reciprocal determination operates in Deleuze's and Whitehead's work, Williams raises important and illuminating questions about the role of dualism, immanence, identity, difference, individuality and relationality in their metaphysical systems.

In a letter to Jean-Clet Martin, which formed the foreword to Martin's book, Deleuze asserted that his metaphysics was a 'system' and that this system must be a 'heterogenesis' which, he claimed, has never before been tried. Although heterogenesis is a somewhat obscure notion, Deleuze seems to want a system that, rather than being in permanent heterogeneity, must itself *be* a heterogenesis, a pure becoming. At the metaphilosophical level Badiou's 'monotony of the same' should rather be seen as Deleuze's heterogenetic 'eternal repetition of difference'. In chapter 6, 'Heterogenesis and the Problem of Metaphysics', Andrew Goffey considers both Deleuze's claim and Whitehead's own metaphysics in relation to heterogenesis in the context of their respective experimental styles of thought and concepts of language. From Deleuze's 'free indirect discourse' to Whitehead's 'redesign' of language in the way appliances in physical science are redesigned, each is better equipped to appropriate the tradition and construct new concepts.

Keith Robinson, in chapter 7, 'Deleuze, Whitehead and the Reversal of Metaphysics', continues the discussion of metaphysics in Deleuze and Whitehead by contrasting their approaches first with Heidegger and Derrida and then with Plato. Rather than the 'end' or 'overcoming' of Greek metaphysics, Robinson finds in Deleuze and Whitehead a transformation that he characterizes as a 'complex reversal', a reversal first intimated by Plato. In complex reversal metaphysics is an immanent doubling or repetition of returning itself. In Deleuze's reading of Plato, complex reversal takes the form of the simulacrum, whereas in Whitehead's reading it is 'simply power', 'being as an energy arising from power' that Whitehead finds at work in the *Sophist* and *Timaeus* –what Deleuze elsewhere calls the 'power of the false'.[15]

Within this new metaphysics the problems of epistemology and perception are also transformed. This rethinking is based on a critique of a range of traditional empiricist and rationalist theories of knowledge and perception where the 'percept' can be understood, at one end of the spectrum, as an isolated yet vivid sense-datum more real than the idea and, at the other end, as a 'confused idea' requiring 'rationalization'. Rather,

Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson, each in differing ways, bring elements from these traditions together and generalize them beyond 'mind' and human perceptual experience by positing a structural field of elements out of which the individual figure of sensation genetically emerges. Although a spatialized and geometric picture or representational perception of the real occurs for all three in developed or 'higher-grade' experiences, Deleuze more consistently portrays this form of perception as variously illusory, barren and superficial, as that which tends more seriously to distort or cover over the operations of the more primitive form of perception. Arguably, Whitehead and Bergson both remain more ambivalent than Deleuze, with both seeing some qualified pragmatic and methodological value in 'common sense' for philosophical thought. Of course, Whitehead's famous fallacies (of 'simple location', 'misplaced concreteness', etc.) are fallacies of common sense, and common sense as it is deployed in science and philosophy, but Whitehead does also appeal to a role for common sense in philosophical thinking, as does Bergson, which Deleuze would not accept since his critique of common sense aligns it completely with the representational field. However, Whitehead also invokes what we might call a more 'hard-core' notion of common sense than Bergson and Deleuze would be close to. His hard-core notion amounts primarily to the recognition that the body plays a huge role in perceptual experience (what Whitehead calls the '*'withness' of the body*'), the conduit between mind and world.[16] In other words, for Whitehead hard-core common sense would recognize that, for example, 'the light made me blink', a vague awareness of the 'causal efficacy' behind presentational immediacy. In feeling our bodies we feel the world, and vice versa. For Deleuze our awareness of differential efficacy takes place in exceptional experience – vertigo, madness, experiences with art or in some drug-induced states – but also in bodily encounters with our world in the form of 'signs' or 'problems', problems that operate beneath the propositions of consciousness and shock us into a constructive response. Across the continuum of nature, in the organic and the inorganic, one finds for Deleuze and Bergson the posing of an ontological question and the development of a corresponding problem field: for example, the eye as a 'resolution' of a light 'problem'. Indeed, throughout his work Deleuze constantly appeals to the radical potential of the body. We are, he says, following Spinoza, simply unaware of what a body can do within the problem field open to it. One source of philosophical 'reversal' in epistemology and perceptual experience for Deleuze would be: 'give me a body then', enabling a new conception of the body–world relation. Each of our philosophers has paid significant attention to rethinking

and overcoming the problem of mind–body dualism – in Deleuze the problem of 'transcendence', in Whitehead the 'bifurcation of nature', in Bergson the problem of 'inner' duration and 'external' or 'outer' space – and each offers a new perspective in the form of 'dipolar occasions', 'neutral monism' or a 'fold' of mind–matter and each perspective requires careful analysis. Thus, transforming the form–matter, concept–intuition, mind–body couples after Kant is something that Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson all attempt by focusing on the implicit aesthetic genesis, order and creative organization of experience, with experience here understood as enlarged and not simply equivalent to human experience. By attempting to overcome the 'wrenching duality' in aesthetics, as Deleuze puts it, all three aim to unify the doubles and bifurcations of the Kantian legacy.

Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson develop their metaphysics not only in relation to aesthetics but out of a sustained encounter with science. For all three philosophy must continue to draw on the sciences, but without being reducible to them. For them philosophy does not transpose a scientific function into a concept so much as create the concept for the problematic event that science then actualizes in functions. If Deleuze and Bergson created concepts by borrowing from biology (as well as numerous other disciplines), Whitehead's preferences related, unsurprisingly, to the extraordinary advances being made in physics during the 1920s and 1930s (although his concept of 'organism' has influenced biologists). However, all three were deeply influenced by mathematics, borrowing both concepts and methods and creatively redeploying them in relation to their own philosophical problematics. Here one can cite Whitehead's development of a 'generalized mathematics' or an 'algebra' of process, as well as Bergson's well-known appeal to 'modern mathematics' as that method of investigation that substitutes 'for the *ready-made* what is in process of *becoming*' (Bergson, 2002, p. 275) and Deleuze's effort to deploy a 'nomadic', 'minor' or 'problematic' mathematics against 'royal', major or axiomatic mathematics. For each the work of the philosopher closely resembles that of the mathematician and for all three metaphysics cannot be reduced to an axiomatics (as, for example, one finds in Badiou).

Pete Gunter, in chapter 9, 'Gilles Deleuze, Deleuze's Bergson and Bergson Himself', illustrates how Bergson defines intuition in accordance with infinitesimal calculus so that duration can be understood as a hierarchy operating 'qualitative integrations and differentiations'. Gunter finds that Deleuze's 'Bergsonism' not only eliminates the role of integral calculus in favour of differential calculus as the key part of Bergson's

method of intuition, but that Deleuze also reads Bergson's hierarchy of durations with too great a latitude, especially in the application of the concept of the 'virtual' to Bergson's 'actual' durations.

Many quote, and quote the same lines ('difference is not the phenomenon, but the noumenon closest to the phenomenon', Deleuze, 1994, p. 222), from the opening of the great chapter 'Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible' from Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*. Few, however, quote the lines that immediately follow where Deleuze explains that 'God makes the world by calculating'; however, the world that is made is 'inexact' and 'unjust', the result or remainder of an irreducible inequality. The inexactitude of the real can be understood in terms of fractional or incommensurable numbers. In chapter 8, 'Whitehead and Deleuze on Creation and Calculus', Jean-Claude Dumoncel calls this Deleuze's 'thesis on the odd calculus' and sets out to explain this odd calculus in relation to Bergson and Deleuze–Bergson and then compare this with Whitehead.

The last two chapters deal with the concepts of the cosmos and chaosmos, which operate in Deleuze and Whitehead; and both refer to the role of theology in understanding these concepts. This is interesting not least because of Deleuze's repeated insistence that atheism is the achievement of philosophy, its break with theological transcendence and 'the judgement of God', luring us towards a philosophy of pure immanence. As soon as immanence is thought immanent *to* something we are in transcendence and the self-actualizing novelty, difference and creativity of the world are lost. As Deleuze would say, in transcendence we can no longer believe in the world – *this* world has been taken from us. Philosophy must at all costs avoid the 'illusions of transcendence'. Indeed, as Deleuze asks, 'why is philosophy so compromised with God?' Part of his answer, perhaps surprisingly, is that the theme of God has often freed the concept from the (representational) constraints imposed on it. In other words, philosophy's compromise with God, for Deleuze, offers the potential to think beyond the limits of possible experience. What, then, should we say here of Whitehead's own enormously complex theological apparatus? And what might we make of Bergson's 'dynamic' religion? Do they offer new possibilities for thinking philosophically, or is there too much of a compromise with God in Whitehead or with religion in Bergson? Can the Whiteheadian God (of *Process and Reality* at least) be reconciled with pure immanence or thought consistently with what Deleuze calls the chaosmos: a self-organizing system that creatively advances through the immanent construction of its own generative principles?[17]

Tim Clark, in chapter 10, 'A Whiteheadian Chaosmos', addresses these issues by arguing *contra* Deleuze that a Whiteheadian God has no place in a Deleuzian chaosmos worthy of the name and that this leads to somewhere other than to a naturalism, to a 'polytheism' no less, underpinned by 'little divinities' that function as 'modes' of a divinized 'One-All' or Spinozist 'Creativity'. The question for Clark is whether this is closer to a Bergsonian vital force or Whitehead's own 'universal of universals' understood as an ultimate principle. On this latter view creativity is the principle of novelty and rhizomatic connection itself.

Rounding out this volume, Roland Faber, in chapter 11, "'O bitches of impossibility!" – Programmatic Dysfunction in the Chaosmos of Deleuze and Whitehead', offers an affirmation of the rhizomatic connections and sheer dysfunctionality of the chaosmos found in Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson. In terms of the options proffered by Clark, Faber's 'programmatic dysfunctionality' is the very process of creativity and difference, the vital force that is the 'dada' in the heart of life.

Notes

1. *The New Bergson*, ed. J. Mullarkey (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 19. Also John Mullarkey's *Bergson and Philosophy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999). The key text is Gilles Deleuze's *Bergsonism* (London: Zone Books, 1988).
2. Perhaps more than any other style or tradition in philosophy, analytic philosophy understands itself as philosophy precisely by refusing the 'poetic', the 'mythical', the 'intuitive' and the whole domain of the image, in favour of a conception of the *logos* as purely conceptual and based on logic and mathematics. Such a conception owes a good deal to the work of Bertrand Russell and Russell is not shy of dismissing the work of others in accordance with such criteria. For example, his main arguments against Bergson seem to amount to little more than saying that he is too imaginative (see Russell, *The Philosophy of Bergson*, 1992, pp. 320–37). In this sense, *Principia* plays a key role in the 'imaginary' self-understanding, development and history of analytic philosophy. For an original development of the concept of the 'imaginary' in relation to philosophy, see Michèle Le Doeuff, *The Philosophical Imaginary*, trans C. Gordon (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989).
3. For example, a great deal of this work is almost exclusively focused on *Process and Reality* and a good deal of that work too often narrowly concerns Whitehead's concept of God and the development of process theology. For more on this, see my interview with *The Leuven Philosophy Newsletter*, 14 (2005–6), pp. 63–70,
4. See P. F. Strawson, *Individuals* (London: Methuen, 1959). Susan Haack has suggested in 'Descriptive and Revisionary Metaphysics', *Philosophical Studies*, 35, pp. 361–71, that there is a deep ambiguity throughout Strawson's work in the

distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics. Strawson's 'official' view is that revisionary metaphysics has a supplementary role to play and he says this role is of real value. However, his descriptions of 'our' conceptual schemes as fundamentally ahistorical, insofar as they form the indispensable and unchanging core of any human being's 'conceptual equipment', leaves one wondering exactly what role, if any, revisionary schemes might play given that proposing new schemes is the core activity of revisionary metaphysics.

5. Deleuze says, 'En ce sens j'accuse la philosophie analytique anglaise d'avoir tout détruit dans ce qui était riche dans la pensée, et j'accuse Wittgenstein d'avoir assassiner Whitehead, d'avoir réduit Russell, son maître, à une sorte d'essayiste n'osant plus parler de logique. Tout ça fut terrible et dure encore'. See Deleuze's course on Leibniz – cours Vincennes , St Denis: l 'évènment, Whitehead, 10 March 1987 @www.webdeleuze.com.
6. For example, Keith Ansell Pearson, *Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual*, (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 25. G. Dale Adamson, 'Science and Philosophy: Two Sides of the Absolute', *Warwick Journal of Philosophy*, 9 (2000), pp. 53-86. See also Pierre Cassou- Noguès, 'The Unity of Events: Whitehead and Two Critics, Russell and Bergson', Th*e Southern Journal of Philosophy*, XLIII (2005).
7. For example, at one point, Russell says, 'as a rule he [Bergson] does not give reasons for his opinions, but relies on their inherent attractiveness, and on the charm of an excellent style. Like the advertisers of Oxo, he relies upon picturesque and varied statement, and an apparent explanation of many obscure facts' (Russell, 1992, p. 327).
8. There have been numerous book-length studies devoted to exploring Bergson's work in the last few years, including books by Keith Ansell-Pearson, Leonard Lawlor, F. C. T. Moore. Several book-length introductions are now available with more on the way. There has been an explosion of scholarship activity on Bergson published in journals, a good deal of which has been inspired by Deleuze. The *Continental Philosophy Review*, *Philosophy Today* and *Angelaki* among others have published papers on Bergson. *Process Studies* (see 28/3-4 [Fall–Winter], 1999) has published an interesting special focus section on Bergson and Whitehead. Influenced by Deleuze's *Cinema* volumes there have been several articles on Bergson and film in film and cultural studies journals as well as several monographs and edited collections.

   Most of Bergson's own works have now been reissued and are available with various publishers, including Palgrave Macmillan. Some texts, for example, *Creative Evolution* and *Matter and Memory*, have been reissued with new translations by several publishers. There is also now a 'Bergson: Key Writings' anthology (ed. K.A. Pearson and J. Mullarkey, Continuum, 2002). In addition, and perhaps surprisingly, a number of commentaries written in the early twentieth century have also been reissued, including texts by H. Wildon Carr, Jacques Chevalier and Edouard le Roy.
9. This claim would need to be elaborated at length and given detailed support, which I do not have space to do here. Just one example: in *Anti-Oedipus* process is used ubiquitously and deployed as a synonym for the sub-representative order of temporalization and its expression as the three syntheses of time (developed in Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*). This takes

the form of a threefold concept of univocal process as production (present), as 'producer-product' (past) and as a process without a goal or end in itself (future): the three syntheses of process. Desire is the process of passive syntheses (connective, conjunctive and disjunctive), the primary order of process, working themselves out in the secondary order of the real as product. Thus, production as process is the immanent principle of desire accounting for the movements and activity of the unconscious syntheses. For Deleuze and Guattari whether we invoke social (political, economic or labour) processes on the one hand, or libidinal processes on the other, desiring production is one process of reality. In my view process does a lot of work in these distinctions and discussions but that work – *precisely as a process* – is not examined as such.

10. Although there is no reflection on the concept of process in Deleuze or Deleuze scholarship some Deleuze commentators, apart from those represented in this book, have talked briefly about Deleuze and Whitehead. John Rajchman, for example, in a discussion of Deleuze's adherence to a 'radical empiricism', mentions the importance to Deleuze of Whitehead's 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness' in the claim that the abstract does not explain but must itself be explained. See his *The Deleuze Connections* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). More recently Brian Massumi, in his *Parables of the Virtual* (London: Routledge 2004), suggests that there is a 'close kinship' between Deleuze/Guattari and Whitehead, especially in relation to a shared commitment to an expanded empiricism. Although Manuel Delanda does not explicitly reference Whitehead, his own 'ontology of the virtual' is also, in my view, close to a certain naturalist understanding and interpretation of Whitehead.
11. Although they have been criticized (and rightly so) for their sometimes narrow and misleading focus, the texts by Badiou and Hallward (and to some extent Slavoj Žižek) are also provocative and worthwhile for their value in disturbing and challenging a certain doxa around Deleuze scholarship. Both books deserve measured appraisal (rather than dismissal, as seems to be the majority case). See Peter Hallward, *Out of this World* (Verso, 2006) and Alain Badiou, *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). In *Truth and Genesis* (Bloomington, IN: Indiania University Press, 2004) Miguel de Beistegui invokes Deleuze (and Heidegger) in an attempt to renew philosophy as a thinking of the event of being as difference that requires both 'truth' and 'genesis', a thinking that is both 'poematic' and 'mathematic'. In so doing his book becomes one of the first in English to begin the task of properly locating and situating Deleuze's thought within the context of the Western philosophical and scientific traditions.
12. Brian Leiter, in his edited collection *The Future for Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, , 2004), claims that analytic philosophy is 'defunct' and has been replaced by a 'pluralism' of methods and topics held together under the umbrella of 'naturalism' and the naturalistic turn.
13. There are some indications that this has already begun. Manuel Delanda's *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy* (Continuum, 2002) attempts to 'present the work of the philosopher Gilles Deleuze to an audience of analytic philosophers of science' (p. 1). Also, see the interesting collection *Process and Analysis*, ed. George Shields (New York: SUNY Press, 2003).
14. See John Mullarkey, *Post-Continental Philosophy* (London: Continuum, 2006).
15. In the foreword to Clet-Martin's book, where he first mentions heterogenesis, Deleuze claims to have 'totally abandoned the notion of simulacrum, which

is all but worthless'. This seems curious, perhaps even disingenuous, since the notion clearly becomes the 'power of the false' in the *Cinema* volumes and the text on Nietzsche. Indeed, in the same letter Deleuze talks of concepts as multiplicities where each is a passage to the other. See Gilles Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness*, ed. D. Lapoujade (New York: Semiotexte, 2006), pp. 361–3.

16. David Griffin develops this notion of 'hard-core common sense' in relation to Whitehead in his *Unsnarling the World Knot* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998).
17. For more on these issues, see my 'Lure of Multiple Contrasts', *Theory and Event*, 8(2) (2005).

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1

Thinking with Deleuze and Whitehead: a Double Test

Isabelle Stengers

The challenge of reading Gilles Deleuze and Alfred North Whitehead together may be characterized as the challenge of resisting the temptation of comparison. Comparison always entails the risk of reducing philosophical thoughts to a matter of opinions to be compared from an outside, apparently neutral, standpoint, that is by an unmoved reader, and this risk becomes lethal when, as is the case with both Whitehead and Deleuze, the philosophers explicitly define their own enterprise as challenging any neutral judgement. Deleuze characterizes thought as an exercise of bad will, and Whitehead never stops emphasizing that public, consensual matters of fact, precisely because we are able to characterize them in a consensual way, are shaped by language, and as such are the worst starting point for philosophy. For Whitehead, philosophy demands experimentation with language, knowing that any ready-made use of words means failure.

If 'to think is always to follow the witch's flight' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p. 41), as anyone who has enjoyed reading Whitehead can testify, reading either Deleuze or Whitehead while remaining on the ground means misreading them.

However, if we cannot compare two witches' flights, we may eventually try to contrast the experiences produced when mounting the witches' brooms those two philosophers propose. Indeed, reading both Whitehead and Deleuze produces very interesting effects, as if each flight were testing the other. Testing, not judging. The relation between thinking and testing has its origin in alchemy and does not refer to a knowing subject, but to a concrete operation. Does this metal, which is presented as gold, resist the attack of aqua fortis? Will this idea resist the attack of time? When we say 'time will tell' we are not thinking with the Greeks, but with the alchemists. We are not referring to a set of transcendent

criteria allowing judgement, but to an immanent process requiring the action of something which has the power to dissolve, to separate what resists its action from what does not.

In our case, the test is not about those philosophers, it is rather, as I will try to have you feel, the reader who is tested. I propose putting this immanent testing experience in relation to what I would call, with deliberate anachronism, a 'pragmatic' tradition – that is, a tradition that demands and implies the ethopoietic character of knowledge, the production of which transforms the knower. The ethics of Spinoza, or Nietzsche's eternal return, the hammer-thought which is meant to crush any resentment, would probably be the first examples that a Deleuze reader would think of. However, Whitehead's readers would probably be rather circumspect here, sensing the possible poison in those references, that is, the possibility that they may be the occasion for what Whitehead called the 'trick of evil': insistence on birth in the wrong season (Whitehead, 1979, p. 223).

The trick of evil in this case refers to the insistence of the pure figure of Great Men – Spinoza, Nietzsche, Deleuze himself – to define the rupture between those who 'make it', who take flight from the ground, and those who remain grounded. The readers are then transformed into judges, evaluating the rupture. In order to resist this trick I shall address the most likely target for such a judgement, the diplomatic figure of Leibniz, a central figure of Deleuze's *Logic of Sense*. It is against Leibniz that Deleuze pronounced an unforgiving condemnation, denouncing as 'shameful' Leibniz's proposition that philosophy should create concepts, but on the condition of not attacking established ways of thinking (Deleuze, 1969, p. 141).

Indeed for Leibniz (who was never venerated as a Great Man) the point of what can be called ethopoiesis was not a rupture but an inflexion, to be experienced at any moment of a life, for any decision, great or small. 'Dic cur hic' was Leibniz's counsel, 'say why here'. This does not mean 'state the true reasons for your decision', since for Leibniz those reasons cannot be known as they are nothing but the world your choice will express. The Leibnizian 'dic cur hic', say why you choose to tell, or to do, this, on this precise occasion, means do not shield yourself behind general justifications that block pragmatic imagination, the envisagement of the kind of difference this choice is liable to make here and now. And Leibniz, with Whitehead, would probably ask which difference the attack on the established ways of thinking is liable to make.

As you may have realized, the testing process has already begun. My proposition is not to choose between Spinoza, Nietzsche and Leibniz,

just as it is not to choose between Deleuze and Whitehead. The point is to try to learn to feel affinities and divergences, which are not psychological, but are related to the very exercise of thought. The starting point I choose is Leibniz and the saving, pacific operation this philosopher may be associated with, because the Deleuzian indictment against saving what ought to be attacked applies equally to Whitehead.

Leibniz is a central figure in Deleuze's *Logic of Sense*. He appears as the creator of concepts Deleuze clearly loves, but he is also the one who exhibits the danger specific to what Deleuze calls a surface thought: not a thought that remains at the surface of things, but a thought that is creating this surface, refusing both the height, the high point from which things can be judged, and the depths, which subvert and destroy any order.

An art of surface is never a neutral operation, because it is an actively neutralizing one, and Deleuze indeed describes the art of surface as akin to both humour and perversion. But where Leibniz is concerned, Deleuze has no humour at all. Again and again, in a quasi-obsessive way, he returns to the same judgement: Leibniz missed, or domesticated, the concept of series, restricting it to converging series; he used it in order to exclude incompatibilities, that is, to save from destruction the harmonious unity of the world and the continuity of the individual. As such Leibniz embodies the specific danger of perversion, its much too clever lack of resistance.

To save what should be destroyed, the exercise of thought Deleuze describes as perverse, is also an exercise proper to mathematicians, as were both Leibniz and Whitehead. Saving is a mathematician's technical achievement. It was the achievement of the pre-Copernican astronomers who saved astronomical phenomena, exhibiting the perfect intelligibility of circular eternal motion enfolded in the empirical, observable displacements of celestial bodies. For both Whitehead and Leibniz, saving was reproducing by artificial means, means that exhibit their own artificiality, what we experience, what we believe in, what eventually puts us at war. 'Herr Leibniz glaubt nichts' complained people of faith, when they discovered that the way Leibniz saved their convictions mysteriously demobilized them, deprived them of their power to clash with other convictions.

I shall address later Whitehead's own critique of Leibniz, that is, his critique of the shortcoming of the Leibnizian saving operation. But first I turn to Leibniz's remarkably haunting presence in *Logic of Sense*. It could be said that he appears in this book as what Deleuze and Guattari came to call, in *What is Philosophy*?, a 'conceptual persona'. A conceptual persona

is not a person but rather the embodiment of a particular exercise of thought, each with its peculiar style. Leibniz inhabits *Logic of Sense* as the repulsive conceptual persona who exhibits the danger of a style of thinking that saves the landscape of established feelings with such a perverse art that the difference between the art of surface and an art of submission becomes imperceptible. Leibniz is the conceptual persona against whom Deleuze creates the concept of diverging series and the disjunctive synthesis affirming together (this and that; and ...) terms that established feelings would ask us to recognize as incompossible (either this or that).

I would claim that it is the very question 'what is philosophy?' that is at stake in Deleuze's repulsion at Leibniz 'shameful' refusal to attack established feelings, but that condemning Leibniz may not be sufficient. Indeed, the eventual 'shame of being a philosopher' resonates again when Deleuze affirms that he would not give one page of Antonin Artaud in exchange for the entire works of Lewis Carroll, the master of the logic of sense and the art of surface. Leibniz, as a conceptual persona, is the perverse thinker Artaud would loathe but, while his whole book is about contrasting surface and depth, Deleuze suddenly writes that Artaud and Lewis Carroll do not meet; it is the commentator who has them meeting, and only by a thought operation, freely changing dimensions, that is crossing with impunity what cannot be connected. And this, Deleuze adds, is the commentator's, or the philosopher's, weakness, the sign that he inhabits none of these dimensions, that he is thinking by proxy. (1994, p. 114). You cannot read *Logic of Sense* without feeling the haunting question: how can one be a philosopher after Antonin Artaud?

'What is philosophy?' is a question that must resonate between Whitehead and Deleuze, as it did between Leibniz and Deleuze. We may safely infer that if Deleuze had read, at the time he was writing *Logic of Sense*, Whitehead's description of the patience of God tenderly saving the world, of God as the poet of the world and the great companion – the fellow sufferer who understands – he would have felt first and foremost the absolute and violent refusal of Artaud to be tenderly saved or understood. What is philosophy if a philosophical God is able to include Artaud's rage in his calculation of the best, or is able to save Artaud's violent refusal to be saved?

We may indeed feel the obscenity of the commentator, or philosopher, who would play by proxy, in the name of Whitehead's God, 'the fellow sufferer who understands', in order to address Artaud's rage and suffering. But the same obscenity threatens the one who would try to have the Deleuze of *Logic of Sense* meet Whitehead.

As we know, however, Deleuze returned to Leibniz, and in *The Fold* Leibniz's sentence is no longer a shameful declaration but has become a vow, part of the baroque art of façade, with its extreme tension between openness and closure, between Leibniz, on the one hand, answering his many correspondents, never contradicting them but shrewdly transforming them into cases of his system, and, on the other hand, the closed system itself, the functioning of which is precisely its transformative power. The conceptual persona has become a philosophical friend belonging to a time that is no more. At the end of *The Fold*, Deleuze comes back to his own concept of diverging series, but it now signals a change of what I would call, with Whitehead, an epoch. The world now is made up of diverging series, Deleuze writes, but we remain Leibnizians because thinking is still folding, enfolding, outfolding.

I take Deleuze coming back to Leibniz at the end of his life as an event, which has nothing to do with reconciliation or with regret about having mistreated a great philosopher. In one way or another, the question 'what is philosophy?' has changed for Deleuze. Artaud has certainly not been forgotten, but it would seem that philosophy, as a creation of concepts, has gained its own necessity, distinct from, while related to, Artaud's 'théâtre de la cruauté'. It may be that Deleuze has come to accept that the question 'how can one be a philosopher after Artaud?' has become part of his philosophical creation as such, which means also that he has come to accept that the witch's flight, which this creation imposes, is the only answer, a purely positive, not defensive, answer, against the shameful possibility that a philosopher would be no more than a parasite, commenting by proxy on somebody else's creation. The witch's flight, not a secure thought operation, creates the dimensions the philosopher will inhabit. 'Every thought is a Fiat, expressing a throw of the dice: constructivism' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p. 75).

If Deleuze's haunting question has been 'how can one be a philosopher after Artaud?', it may well be that the way he came to accept it as such, free of psychological anxiety, also led him to accept Leibniz's own question, which I would formulate as 'how can one be a philosopher after God has become a tug-of-war, authorizing hate, war and destruction?' God would not be what Leibniz decided to cautiously respect in order not to attack the established ways of thinking, but a component of the question that made him a philosopher, transformed by the necessity of throwing the dice again. This hypothesis allows me finally to think Whitehead with Deleuze, that is to address the problem of the throw of the dice that produced Whitehead as a philosopher.

The dice are indeed thrown, in *Concept of Nature*, under the guise of a formidable demand: 'We may not pick and choose. For us the red glow of the sunset should be as much part of nature as are the molecules and electric waves by which men of science would explain the phenomenon' (Whitehead, 1964, p. 29). And again, 'All we know of nature is in the same boat, to sink or swim together' (1964, p. 148). This is a commitment for creation, not the demonstration of some matter of fact justifying a claim. The witch's broom is already twitching; the witch is not flying yet, but she is reciting the magic invocation that will commit her to the adventure of leaving the ground.

Just as the witch is never the author of her invocation, leaving the common ground is never a philosopher's decision. It comes from the question that produces him as a philosopher. I would propose that the determinate refusal to pick and choose is necessitated by our modern epoch with its freedom to select some values that matter while others may be blindly defaced and derided. In the final chapter of *Science and the Modern World*, Whitehead writes: 'A striking example of this state of mind in the middle of the nineteenth century is to be seen in London where the marvellous beauty of the Estuary of the Thames, as it curves through the city, is wantonly defaced by the Charing Cross railways bridge, constructed apart from any reference to aesthetic values' (1967, p. 196). Thirteen years later, in *Modes of Thought*, when the witch's broom is in full flight, concepts have been created that bring this protest to its highest intensity: 'we have no right to deface the value experience which is the very essence of the universe' (Whitehead, 1968, p. 111)

Whitehead, while expressing the deepest trust in the return of a more balanced epoch, also wrote that 'it may be that civilization will never recover from the bad climate which enveloped the introduction of machinery', when 'the workmen were conceived as mere hands, drawn from the pool of labour' and when, 'to God's question, men gave the answer of Cain – "Am I my brother's keeper?"' (Whitehead, 1967, p. 203). It was neither machinery that turned Whitehead into a philosopher, nor human cruelty as he saw it everywhere in history. My conjecture is that it was the fact that those who gave Cain's answer, who contemplated with a blind eye the destruction of the values of both the Thames and human life, were not only greedy industrialists, but also honourable, even kind-hearted men, devoted to human progress. They were the very people Whitehead would meet in Cambridge as colleagues.

This may be the most direct affinity between Deleuze and Whitehead, the one that designates them as thinkers of the same epoch, which is also ours. In his *Abécédaire*, Deleuze emphasized a very dramatic change

in the problem philosophers have confronted since the classical age. At that time, the time of Descartes, the problem worrying philosophers was error, and how to prevent it. But in the eighteenth century, a different cause of worry emerged: illusion. Enlightenment was not thinking against error but against superstition. And since the nineteenth century, a new problem has arisen, as exemplified by Flaubert and Nietzsche: 'de la bêtise'. *Bêtise* is usually translated in English as 'stupidity', but the Deleuzian *bêtise* is not 'stupor', as that term may be associated with some kind of sleepy quality. It is quite active, even entrepreneurial, as were Bouvard and Pécuchet. It refers to the rather horrifying experience you can have, for instance, when talking to so-called 'neoliberal' economists, when they turn a blind eye to any argument implying that the market may well be incapable of repairing the destruction it causes.

What Deleuze calls *bêtise* may be related to what Whitehead calls a nineteenth-century discovery, the discovery of the method of training professionals, or what he calls 'minds in a groove' (Whitehead, 1967, p. 197) and to the epochal fact that 'professionalism has now been mated with progress' (1967, p. 205). Whitehead's colleagues at Cambridge were not only specialized thinkers, they were spokesmen for progress, justifying destruction as its legitimate, even desirable price, and in doing so, they displayed the characteristic professional's 'restraint of serious thought within a groove. The remainder of life is treated superficially, with the imperfect categories of thought derived from one profession' (1967, p.197). We are now used to the professionals' arrogant *bêtise*, condemning without paying any attention to what their judgement destroys. But such *bêtise* was a nineteenth-century novelty. Comparison between typical eighteenth-century production and modern university production is sadly eloquent here.

Resisting *la bêtise* is not resisting what would be identified with fate, some kind of an original sin, allowing for a narrow and heroic path to salvation. Philosophy is not to be confused with salvation, and Whitehead never tired of emphasizing that we should not exaggerate, that we may even say that mankind has made progress:

> Even if you take a tiny oasis of peculiar excellence, the type of modern man who would have most chance of happiness in ancient Greece at its best period is probably (as now) an average professional heavyweight boxer, and not an average Greek scholar from Oxford or Germany. Indeed the main use of the Oxford scholar would have been his capability of writing an ode in glorification of the boxer. Nothing does more harm in unnerving men for their duties in the present,

> than the attention devoted to the points of excellence in the past as compared to the average failure of the present day.
>
> (Whitehead, 1967, p. 204)

While Deleuze's fiat marked the necessity of throwing the dice again, Whitehead saw himself as simply trying to do his duty in the present.

If Whitehead was turned into a philosopher by the question of *la bêtise*, it was because he did not understand his 'duty in the present' in terms of denunciation, but as imposing a question that would include him in the problem. He would not denounce his colleagues but ask, why are 'we' vulnerable, unable to resist professional categories?

Whitehead's demand that we do not pick and choose – do not have what we know of nature bifurcate into what would be objective (molecules blindly running) and subjective (the glow of the sunset) – is a call to resist modern vulnerability. The bifurcation of nature indeed means that the divergent ways in which the world and ourselves matter become oppositions, and as such food for professional judgement. Why indeed pay attention to what lies outside your groove if the abstractions that have you thinking and working oppose any connection anyway? Why not deface the beautiful estuary of the Thames if poets are entirely mistaken, if they should address their lyrics to themselves and turn them into odes of self-congratulation about the excellence of the human mind, while nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless, merely the hurrying of matter, endlessly, meaninglessly? Why not also, after God has been triumphantly relegated to human illusion, deride human values as well, reducing society to the haste of egoistic interests, endlessly, meaninglessly, blindly making up what we call progress?

However, connecting the question that produced Whitehead as a philosopher to the defacement of the value experience which is the very essence of the universe,[1] as exemplified by the defacement of the Thames estuary, means to activate the test of reading Whitehead with Deleuze. Indeed, it exposes Whitehead to a predictable objection: is it the business of philosophy to defend human values, our sense of the beauty of the world, or our trust in the possibility of restoring harmony?

Is not Whitehead's 'duty in the present' a return to the past dream of rationality bringing order, repairing the wound thought suffered when time came out of joint? – a wound a Deleuzian philosopher would happily affirm, denying any duty and celebrating concepts such as diverging series, affirmative disjunctive synthesis and chaosmos.

Such an objection is in fact a double test: it is a test of Whitehead certainly, and here we face the danger of a 'good will' thought bringing

peaceful, harmonious convergence where ostensible oppositions rule; but it is also a test of the way we inherit Deleuze, because it implies the possibility of a new common ground for judgement, arming a new generation of judges in the name of a new definition of what we may still recognize as progress since it sounds like: 'after Deleuze we no longer can dream of . . .'

Whitehead throwing the dice against the bifurcation of nature means challenging formulations that sound like 'after X, we no longer can Y'. The fiat, as an event, escapes the progress of history. Moreover, the Whiteheadian challenge is not produced in the name of a superior source of authority. The bifurcation of nature itself has no other authority than the one given to our abstractions as they have come to rule the distribution between what we are entitled or not entitled to think. In order to be able to affirm coherence against the bifurcation of nature we do not have to discover a deeper truth but to remember that any abstraction is equally a saving device. Here may be the Whiteheadian ethopoietic test: if we need to do what our abstractions imply we cannot do, our duty is to revise our 'modes of abstraction' (Whitehead, 1967, p. 59).

In order to pass the test, to resist the temptation of identifying Whitehead with a 'conceptual instrumentalist' claiming the freedom to change his modes of abstraction at will, it is important to remember that he was a mathematician. For Whitehead, as for any mathematician, abstractions are not opposed to concrete experience. They vectorize concrete experience, they make it matter in a selective way. They are not the product of abstract thought. Thinking, as well as the thinker, is lured into existence by abstractions.

Forget about a logical abstraction, such as 'all men are mortals', and think about the adventures associated with the ratio between the side of a square and its diagonal or with the value of π, or more recently, about Cantor's divine madness or Andrew Wiles' magnificent obsession. Then you may understand that Whitehead, while creating concepts that are among the most abstract in the history of metaphysics, claimed that 'philosophy is sheer disclosure' without meaning getting access to something closed, that is veiled or hidden. The Whiteheadian disclosure, rather, marks the coming into existence of a new thinker, together with a new mode of abstraction. Mathematicians know very well this experience of transformative disclosure, and it may well be that this is the experience Spinoza associated with his famous *more geometrico*.

The test associated with our reading of Whitehead, and the condition for the witch's flight he proposes, may well be the experimental character of our duty when our modes of abstraction are concerned: experimenting

with how to modify them is also experimenting with their ethopoietic power on the experimenter. This is why the worst mistake in relation to Whitehead is to confuse his cosmos, apparently so remote from Deleuze's chaosmos, with the object of a theoretical visionary unification reconciling what the modern epoch divided. Any identification with what Richard Rorty would characterize as an attempt to mirror nature would be fatal. Mirroring aims at neutrality, at the production of an image as devoid of distorting interpretation as possible. There is nothing less neutral than Whitehead's speculative philosophy. His concepts are explicitly and actively situated. They explicitly exhibit the selective, interpretative, luring role of abstractions, against the consensual, descriptive ideal that takes as its fulfilment that 'the cat is on the mat, and everyone that is able to look at the mat will confirm that statement'.

Whitehead himself defined his conceptual scheme not in terms of contemplation but in terms of 'applications', that is active use. Its advantage would be that 'experience is not interrogated with the benumbing repression of common sense' (Whitehead, 1979, p. 9). Very often, this is read as if common sense was the repressive agency. I would argue that, like Leibniz, not only did Whitehead refuse to equate the creation of philosophical concepts with a subversion of common sense or 'settled instincts', but that this can no longer be confused with shameful cautiousness or diplomacy. The very aim of Whitehead's concepts is to protect common sense (we already know that the poet is not responsible for the beauty of the world) against the benumbing repression of what I would globally call 'theory', that which defines what we are entitled to accept and what we are bound to repudiate.

This does not mean that common sense must be obeyed. As a direct consequence of his very abstract metaphysical scheme, Whitehead wrote, for instance, and seemingly against common sense, that 'no thinker thinks twice' (Whitehead, 1979, p. 29). Each thought, any thought, entails a new thinker. The audacity of the proposition may be compared to any Nietzschean or Deleuzian attack on the continuity of personal identity. But the divergence is disclosed by the way in which Whitehead produces such a proposition: without any frightening noise, any tug-of-war advertisement. Whitehead's proposition is not dedicated to the shattering of our illusions, of our established ways of thinking of ourselves as living continuities. Living continuity is something that matters, an important aspect of our experience. But the way it matters is not a given on which we would be authorized to lean, in order to organize everything else. In other words, the task of philosophy is to interpret common sense, not to follow any commonsensical claim in

particular, because as soon as it is given doctrinal authority it will lead to the repression of other commonsensical claims.

This attitude to common sense or instincts designates Whitehead as a post-Darwinian thinker. What we call common sense for him is not an anthropological static feature to be opposed to high-level speculation, it is a marvel, always escaping identifying frames as it speaks of our ability to meaningfully interpret and orient ourselves in a fluid, ever-changing plurality of situations. For Whitehead, it was the touchstone for any realist doctrine that it continues the adventure of common sense, enfolding the bewildering variety of what it means to be both in touch with and touched by 'reality'. The applications of his conceptual scheme had to unfold and make explicit the dynamics of having things matter and having the way they matter matter, which is the continuous, maddening adventure of what we call common sense.

In *Science and the Modern World*, Whitehead wrote that it would be going too far to claim that omitting mathematics from a history of thought would be like omitting Hamlet from the play which is named after him, but that it would be like cutting out the part of Ophelia. 'For Ophelia is quite essential to the play, she is very charming – and a little mad' (Whitehead, 1967, p. 20).

Whitehead's own speculative ambition is openly 'a little mad' and this may indeed be the test Deleuze would activate: a reading of Whitehead ascertaining whether he was 'mad enough', that he never 'tamed' our maddeningly discordant experiences, that he never pacified in the name of a unitary theory a world where 'the fairies dance, and Christ is nailed to the cross' (Whitehead, 1979, p. 338).

This test is relevant for the mathematician's art, the art of surface, the art of saving phenomena in an openly artificial manner, a manner that exhibits the constraint the saving operation has to fulfil. As it was the case for Leibniz, saving for Whitehead means producing interpretations artfully deprived of their power to contradict each other, but the constraint he adopts – that is, the charming madness of Whitehead's operation – is that it also demands that common sense should never be frustrated, however discordant its demands. While all common-sense doctrines, whether of the physicists or of the moralists, will be equally interpreted by Whitehead in terms of unilateral doctrinal exaggeration, common sense itself can only be enriched by new habits of thought.

This is why, in contrast to Leibniz, Whitehead's saving operation will refuse any 'as if' interpretation that clashes with common sense. It is striking that, while Whitehead humorously saved Descartes, Hume, Locke and Kant, he criticized Leibniz as a mathematician, sharply

assessing the technical achievement of another mathematician. Leibniz's 'as if' saving strategy was not good enough; it conserved one standpoint, however inaccessible, in relation to which he was able to eliminate what should have constrained his operation. Leibniz may well have succeeded in saving our conflicting experiences in a way that deprives them of their connection with truth as a tug-of-war, but he did so at the price of denying to them all their insistent, common-sense claim for irreducible importance. The reasons we may give for our choices or decisions, the responsibility or revolt we may feel, are explained away, together with their power to contradict each other.

Whitehead was not a Baroque thinker; optical illusions, labyrinths and tricky perspectives did not interest him. Whitehead was an empiricist: he fully accepted the constraint that what we feel as mattering must irreducibly matter. For example, he would side with actors affirming that Hamlet and Ophelia, whose characters they try to enact, are not just figments of human imagination, for they cause us to feel and think. They question us. Shakespeare was the first of a long series of interpreters who were all affected in diverging ways, and with all those ways testifying for the real, insistent importance of the questions Hamlet and Ophelia induce, as a long series of mathematicians testify for the real, insistent importance of a mathematical problem. This is the constructivist touch, which is the signature of Whitehead's speculative concepts, that they include the adventures of interpretations in the very adventure, the very 'worlding', of the world. Our interpretative abstractions do not separate us from the world, they do not make Hamlet and Ophelia sheer pretexts for theoretical interpretations. Hamlet and Ophelia insist, the multifariousness of this world insists, even if they are devoid of the doubtful power to confirm and reward a particular abstraction by giving it the power to defeat others.

Creativity was the 'ultimate' of Whitehead's metaphysics. Any new thought or feeling having Hamlet and Ophelia matter is equally a creature of creativity. Each time the contrasted abstract pattern that is associated with their names inhabits another experience, something new has entered the world. Whitehead's metaphysics escapes the verdict on metaphysics pronounced by the reflexive, critical Hamlet through the affirmative move of a wandering and wondering Ophelia.

The crucial invention that creates the specific space for this move is the disjunction between the demand that our decisions or reasons matter, that they must be respected, and the not to be respected claim that we should be the masters of how they will matter. Creativity implies that any claim to matter is to be answered with the question: 'Yes, but how?'

Whitehead's concepts are articulated in such a way that no cause, even God as a cause, has the power to define how it will cause. Nothing has the power to determine how it will matter for others. Leibniz's injunction, 'dic cur hic', say why, on this occasion, you have your situation mattering in this way, has become, for any and every actual entity, 'decide why here', decide how what must be taken into account will enter into your constitution and become the reasons why you will be what you will be. 'How an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity is' (Whitehead, 1979, p. 23).

Even God as a cause: I have now finally to confront Whitehead's God, since its patient functioning as tenderly saving the world is probably the *salto mortale* when reading Whitehead, and all the more so since Whitehead, in the last part of *Process and Reality*, is notably allusive. We may well be told that 'God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification' (Whitehead, 1979, p. 343), the way this God exemplifies those principles is not a matter of sheer disclosure, to say the least. Whitehead's style here may be associated with that of teachers who leave to their students the task of solving a particularly hard problem, telling them they have all they need to do so. I would personally guess that Whitehead discovered that in order to fully implement this new application of his scheme, he would have to revise it again. Maybe he was tired of having to do so and decided to trust the trained instincts of his readers. Such a trust would indeed be that of a mathematician: when a mathematician knows there is a solution, he also knows that outlining the way the problem may indeed be solved is sufficient. Others will come, fill in the blanks and verify the solution.

I will not present here the revisions I felt were implied by the final description of God's functioning, as it requires technicalities about initial aims, eternal objects and satisfaction. I will concentrate instead on the perplexing question any Deleuzian reader of Whitehead may experience. Why did Whitehead need God?

The most direct answer is that God is needed to give a metaphysical account of this world as a cosmos. And this account is necessary for reasons of sheer coherence. The Whiteheadian cosmos is not a matter of harmony transcending conflicts. It is required in order to save the common-sense empirical experience that a new idea matters, not only because it is new, a creature of creativity, but because it may produce new relevant contrasts, that is, new possibilities of understanding, of questions, of relations. No philosopher, not even Deleuze thinking the chaosmos, may coherently deny that thinking requires the eventuality

of the production of something relevant. Thinkers may well deny the need for coherence however; they may shrug and go their way. But the name for Whitehead's witch's broom was coherence, saving together, and his system had to include what is required by relevant novelty. Any original thought is thus a witness for the cosmos, whatever the eventual indifference or hostility of the thinker.

The point, however, was how to include this requirement without destroying the system's central constraint: the ontological principle that actual entities are the only reasons. What is required is a particular actual entity that would be the reason why actual occasions are 'occasions' for a new relevant novelty, a particular actual entity that would relate occasions to opportunities.

Whitehead's solution, as formulated at the end of *Process and Reality*, was an audacious one, since it demanded introducing just one distinction between God and all other actual entities. While all actual occasions originate in what Whitehead calls a physical experience, that is in the initial prehensions of the many they have to appropriate as their one experience, God is to be conceived as originated by conceptual experience, the experience of eternal objects, its physical experience being the consequent one. This seems very technical but induces a dizzying witch's flight when you understand that, at a technical stroke, Whitehead has parted company from all religious, theological and philosophical traditions describing, variously, God as a mind, a soul, an intellect, in brief a mode of existence we would be able to approach by analogy. We have no experience that offers any analogy whatsoever with that of Whitehead's God. If none of our decisions can fulfil or disappoint any divine plan or will, it is because God depends on those decisions to produce what it is functionally unable to anticipate. Anticipation, plan, will, knowledge refer to our experience and cannot apply to God.

However, the perplexed reader may insist: if Whitehead's system really needed such a functioning, why did he call it God? And why did he use deliberately religious images, such as God tenderly saving the world, to characterize it?

Independently of any technicality, a small point must first be emphasized. All those images are saving ones, in the mathematical sense of the term. Indeed, we can say that Whitehead's God 'saves' the world, but this salvation does not concern us, as individuals who may look for salvation; it concerns actual occasions only.

> In the foundations of his being, God is indifferent alike to preservation and to novelty. He cares not whether an immediate occasion be old

> or new, so far as concerns derivation from its ancestry. His aim for it is depth of satisfaction as an intermediate step towards the fulfillment of his own being. His tenderness is directed towards each actual occasion, as it arises. (Whitehead, 1979, p. 105)

Whitehead's God's is not only indifferent, it is unable not to be so. It is unable to fill the role that is demanded from any religious God – that it helps us in our trials, confirms our faith or listens to our prayers. Here is the ethopoietic test which made it interesting to use the name of 'God'. It is addressed first to those who need God as saviour and judge, but also to those who look for a substitute warrant that will ground the opposition between good and evil, right and wrong. Whitehead's God is technically unfit to be mobilized, put to the service of those aims. God is the Goad that is never satisfied, but that equally and impartially admits into its experience whatever actual determination has been produced in the world. Every decision is a new one under the divine Sun.

Calling God that mode of functioning, which he has technically forged, would be odd if Whitehead's problem had been 'does God really exist?' But the ethopoietic test put to the reader is precisely that the point is not God's existence but the lure associated with this name, as part of the abstraction he forged. To name God a functioning needed for reasons of coherence is first of all to give full scope to Whitehead's initial problem, the incoherence plaguing modern thought, as exhibited by the bifurcation of nature. Such an incoherence cannot be solved 'by the way', as if a process of complexification would lead from molecules to the experience of relevant novelty. You have to be 'mad enough', as charmingly mad as Ophelia, to ignore Hamlet's dark misgiving and associate with the name of God this wonder, which we take for granted when we think that our thinking may be the occasion for the production of relevant novelty.

As for the religious images associated with God's functioning, they may be compared to a mathematician's verification of the solution of his problem. Whitehead's problem was to characterize the functioning of God in such a way that it is deprived, as is every other actual entity, of the power to define how it will cause. That is also to conceive the actual production of something novel in such a way that it is irreducible to the realization of an already framed possibility. This is why the pitfall of Christian theology, the poisonous dilemma confronting the all-powerful and omniscient God and human freedom, had to be mobilized in order to verify that they had been 'saved', stripped of their power.

However, the verification goes still deeper as it also concerns the way God saves actual occasions, includes them in its consequent experience.

If a meaning may be assigned to the 'love' of God, as the great companion who understands, this meaning is in itself a test of the way we demand to be understood, our grand decisions as well as our most frivolous experiences.

Not only does God not love 'us', since His tenderness is directed towards each actual occasion as it arises, but what will be 'understood', included in God's consequent experience, will disappoint any claim that God is on one's own side. Indeed, Whitehead's God understands any decision together with its price, that is, together with everything which has been excluded from feeling in order for this decision to be produced. No either/or disjunctive alternative which the actualization has ratified is final. The testing nature of the understanding love of Whitehead's God is not that it would be an impartial judge, transcending our own partial, biased understanding of what is good or right. The test is that our judgements, our reasons, will indeed be saved, included in the divine consequent experience, together with what they exclude, producing the determinate physical experience 'yes, and?' God may well be the companion who understands, but understanding here results only in the necessity that the dice be thrown again, in the eternal return of the divine question 'how?' – how what an actual occasion has achieved can eventually be put into play again.

We may experience here a strange affinity with Deleuze's *amor fati* and its accompanying themes of the Event, counter-effectuation, the ideal, or divine, throwing of the dice, the eternal return, an interweaving of themes that already appear in *Difference and Repetition* and *Logic of Sense*, and again in *What is Philosophy?*, each time 'happening' in the text: planted as a dark, unchanging monolith, or repeated as a *ritournelle*, with nothing behind, no place from which to contemplate and interpret; confronting the reader with what I dare call Deleuze's knowledge of the third kind. Thinking s*ub specie aeternitate*, 'all mortal events in one Event' (Deleuze, 1969, p. 179).

I would not use Whitehead to explain what Deleuze did not, could not or would not explain, but I would propose that it is at the locus of their most obvious divergence, the Whiteheadian God as the condition for a cosmos, that they communicate. But they do so in a way that does not overcome the divergence, does not create a common ground where we can imagine them in discussion together. They have nothing to discuss, nothing to negotiate. We can just imagine a small smile playing on their lips, a tender smile, when experiencing the efficacy of each other's conceptual flight, and assessing their respective vulnerability to any comment by proxy.

Notes

1. Essence of the universe and not of human experience: a contemporary expression of the bifurcation of nature is the temptation, very alive in France, to 'pick and choose' a 'phenomenologized' Whitehead, centred on his enlightening poetic rendering of living experience. The safe subtlety of phenomenology allows us to forget about both the question of 'nature', as it entails a confrontation with the authority of science, and the question of God, as it entails a confrontation with the consensual judgement that speculative philosophy is part of the past.

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2

Language, Subjectivity and Individuality

Mick Halewood

It is clear that within Deleuze's and Whitehead's work there is an important redescription of the time, place and status of all subjectivity, a subjectivity that is not limited to the 'human'. Both writers provide compelling reasons as to why and how contemporary analyses should avoid positing the human person as either an object or a subject. Rather, 'human' individuality is to be envisaged as an aspect within the wider, processual effectivity whereby the virtual becomes actual (Deleuze), or the solidarity of the extensive continuum becomes actualized into individuality (Whitehead). It may appear that I am eliding or confusing the distinction between subjectivity and individuality here. However, one of the arguments I wish to set out in this chapter is that the validity and complexity of such a distinction can be helpfully rethought through a sustained engagement with the work of Whitehead and Deleuze.

Broadly speaking, the invitation is to analyse those processes by which subjectivity and matter conspire to instantiate actuality. Neither subjectivity nor individuality is simple an effect of former processes; nor are they creative forces in themselves. For both Whitehead and Deleuze, enduring 'objects', insofar as they are substantial items of existence, are 'persons'. For Whitehead, 'Societies of the general type, that their realized nexūs are purely temporal and continuous, will be termed "personal"' (1967, p. 205). Further, 'a dog is a "person"' (1967, p. 206), as long as it is remembered that such persons (or objects) are not self-identical, self-sufficient, Newtonian entities. Deleuze puts it thus:

> All objects = x are 'persons' and are defined by predicates. But these are no longer the analytic predicates of individuals determined within a world which carries out the *description* of these individuals. On the contrary, they are predicates which *define* persons synthetically, and

> open different worlds and individualities to them as so many variables or possibilities.
>
> (1990, p. 115)

So, as stated, both Whitehead and Deleuze have very specific conceptions of that which constitutes individuality. Further, they insist that to render humans as the only mode of personhood is to falsely render the processual character of the universe. But, Deleuze suggests, something of language or the linguistic (through the 'predicate') will also be implicated in this. And it is this that I wish to approach in this chapter.

Whitehead on language

Although Whitehead does not develop a specific theory of language in his work, there are four points that I would like to raise with regard to the place and status of language and the linguistic in his writing.

First, towards the end of his first detailed discussion of his own version of propositions in *Process and Reality*, Whitehead uses examples of 'verbal' propositions to illustrate his point concerning how 'the actual world . . . enters into each proposition' (1978, p. 194). For, of the ('linguistic') proposition 'Caesar has crossed the Rubicon' (1978, p. 195), Whitehead states: 'this form of words symbolizes an indefinite number of diverse propositions.' That is, if uttered roughly 2051 years ago, 'Caesar' would have referred to a contemporary structured society and 'Rubicon' to a contemporary society which were in the actual world of both the person who made the statement and the person for whom the proposition was an element to be judged.

> one of Caesar's old soldiers may in later years have sat on the bank of the river and meditated on the assassination of Caesar, and on Caesar's passage over the little river tranquilly flowing before his gaze. This would have been a different proposition.
>
> (Whitehead, 1978, p. 196)

Whitehead's conclusion is that 'Nothing could better illustrate the hopeless ambiguity of language since both propositions could fit the same verbal phraseology' (1978, p. 196). Whitehead then goes on to list other possible propositions to which such a verbal statement could refer, and his general conclusion is that he has demonstrated 'the futility of taking any verbal statement . . . and arguing about *the* meaning' (1978, p. 196).

Second, Whitehead is keen to distinguish between language and 'philosophical' propositions. So, once again, he states: 'Language is

thoroughly indeterminate, by reason of the fact that every occurrence presupposes some systematic type of environment' (1978, p. 12). This statement, made in *Process and Reality*, establishes the core of Whitehead's attitude towards language. However, at this point of the argument he is discussing 'propositions' as usually understood in philosophy, for example, 'Socrates is mortal'. He does not believe that such propositions immediately represent, express or correspond to the facticity of the world. However, the reason why he does not believe this is of some importance is because every 'occurrence' (i.e. actual entity or event) in itself can only be understood in relation to the environment from which it proceeds. So: 'A proposition can embody partial truth because it only demands a certain type of systematic environment, which is presupposed in its meaning. It does not refer to the universe in all its detail' (1978, p. 11). However, this does provide a first indication of the manner in which Whitehead envisages language or the linguistic as implicit in existence.

Third, although Whitehead does not discuss the materiality of the signifier in relation to language and propositions, he nevertheless insists on the physical manner in which vocal language is encountered. In this sense, spoken language is an aspect of the 'withness of the body', although Whitehead does not put it in these terms. Rather he states that:

> A single word is not one definite sound. Every instance of its utterance differs in some respect from every other instance: the pitch of the voice, the intonation, the accent, the quality of the sound, the rhythmic relations of the components sounds, the intensity of the sound all vary. Thus a word is a species of sounds, with specific identity and individual differences.
>
> (1978, p. 182)

So, like actual entities themselves, words are different among themselves, but they also obtain a level of 'identity'. Hence: 'the meaning of the word . . . [is] . . . an event' (1978, p. 182). This tantalising reference to the relation between language and events is not developed by Whitehead but is by Deleuze, especially in *The Logic of Sense*, and it a reading of this which will make up much of the development of this chapter. For Whitehead does not develop a specific theory of such linguistic events; they are simply, *qua* events, another manifestation of the eventfulness of the universe.

It would seem, on this analysis, that Whitehead understands meaning as cohering within individual words. But this is not the case. Meaning comes not from individual words but from their locus within a

wider linguistic environment. But this does not explain the means by which language functions as a communicative device, within Whitehead's more general understanding of process. In order to accomplish this, Whitehead describes language in terms of symbolism.[1]

Fourth, 'a word is a symbol' (Whitehead, 1928, p. 12). This seems clear enough; but such a statement begs the question; 'Why do we say that the word "tree" – spoken or written – is a symbol to us for trees?' (1928, p. 13). Given Whitehead's previous refusal of the subject/object division and his rigorous attempts to avoid any notion of 'primary substance', this is likely also to be found in his work on symbols and symbolism.

So he distances his version of symbolism from those which predicate a world of distinct objects and subjects in the following way: 'Both the word itself and trees themselves enter into our experience on equal terms' (1928, p. 13). Whitehead thereby retains the democratic element of his general theory of becoming and hence the principle of univocity. In this sense 'it would be sensible . . . for trees to symbolize the word "tree" as for the word to symbolize the trees' (1928, p. 13). The difficulty is in explaining what the role of symbolism is. If Whitehead is simply reasserting the primacy of the interrelation of items of matter in his philosophy, then symbolism, as a way of explaining the precise role of language, has lost its purchase. That is to say, Whitehead is quite clear that 'Language itself is a symbolism' (1928, p. 73), the importance here being the word 'a'. Language is an example of the wider mode of symbolism.

Thus, although language is not of interest in itself for Whitehead, it should be noted that his later account of human consciousness is phrased in terms that resonate with a theory of language or of components of the linguistic within existence. For example, he writes: 'all forms of consciousness arise from ways of integration of propositional feelings' (1978, p. 256) and, ultimately, such propositional feelings rely on the dual terms ' "logical subjects of the proposition" . . . and the "predicates of the proposition"' (1978, p. 186).

So, Whitehead has an implicit rather than an explicit conception of the role of the linguistic within existence, but it is one that can be drawn out through a comparison with the work of Deleuze. Further, such a reading can develop novel approaches to thinking about subjectivity, human individuality, materiality and actualization.

Deleuze on language

Deleuze argues that language itself is intimately tied up with becoming and materiality. More particularly, it is 'sense' which becomes the most

important element in the discussion of the relation of bodies, states of affairs, events and language. So it is the question 'What is sense?' that needs to be focused on.

Deleuze would make no simple reply, but his position could be summed up as follows:

> *Sense is both the expressible or the expressed of the proposition, and the attribute of the state of affairs*. It turns one side towards things and one side towards propositions. But it does not merge with the propositions which it expresses any more than with the state of affairs or the quality which the proposition denotes.
>
> (Deleuze, 1990, p. 22)

Deleuze is using the term 'sense' here in a very specific way. Sense is that which forms the boundary between things and words, but is reducible to neither. Deleuze makes the point that there is nothing about theories of truth, when dealing with the relationship between words and things, that enables them to explain the sense which inheres in propositions, be they true or false. Any theory of the conditions of truth must 'contain *something unconditioned*' (Delezue, 1990, p. 19) which enables the three relations of the proposition to subsist. There must be a fourth relation of the proposition. And this unconditioned something, the fourth relation, is 'sense'. In keeping with his wider philosophical outlook, that which comprises such an 'unconditioned something' cannot exist in itself as substantial, for then it would exist as an individual and, therefore, would be limited in its ability to operate, as individuality is a temporary effect of the mixing of bodies. But nor can sense be purely conceptual; it cannot be an abstract idea which forms and informs the world as, according Deleuze, such ideas are effects rather than causes. Instead,

> Sense is the fourth dimension of the proposition. The Stoics discovered it along with the event: sense: *the expressed of the proposition*, is an incorporeal, complex and irreducible entity, at the surface of things, a pure event which inheres or subsists in the proposition.
>
> (1990, p. 19)

Sense is 'the expressed of the proposition'. It is not what the proposition expresses; it is not limited to the proposition. If it were, then sense would remain within the circle of the proposition and would have to be explained in terms of denotation, manifestation or signification. At the same time, sense is not a simple property of things as they are.

Finally, sense is not reducible to the perceptions or judgements of subjects confronted by either propositions or things. Sense as 'that which is expressed by the proposition … [is] irreducible to individual states of affairs, particular images, personal beliefs, and universal or general concepts' (1990, p. 19).

Deleuze then comments on the difficulty of this notion. 'It is difficult to respond to those who wish to be satisfied with words, things, images and ideas' (1990, p. 20). Sense does not 'exist' with regard to Deleuze's understanding of the conditions of existence, 'For we may not even say that sense exists either in things or in the mind; it has neither physical nor mental existence' (1990, p. 20). Furthermore, sense is something that cannot be grasped; nor can it be named as such: '*in fact* we can only infer it indirectly' (1990, p. 20). And it is this final statement which provides the best clue as to how an understanding of 'sense' can be furthered with reference to Whitehead. According to Whitehead, that which cannot be named, that which only exists insofar as it partakes of other things, that which is never encountered but must be inferred from the stubborn facts of experience, is an eternal object. It is not eternal objects as expressions of potentiality that are being alluded to here, but eternal objects in their role as that which provides definiteness to the experience of becoming a subject. Deleuze's usage of the term 'sense' could be seen as a way of explaining what goes on in such occurrences. Indeed, it could be argued that Deleuze's notion of sense is a development of the notion of the term 'event' which Whitehead used in his early work but which he moved away from in *Process and Reality*. For sense is that which accompanies an event in that it describes not how the subject makes sense of the world but how the world *makes* sense. It is this process of 'making sense' (or, perhaps, 'constructing' sense) that enables the creation and completion of subjects and individuals. That is to say, the world creates (or constructs) sense as an effect of the interrelation of singularities within the virtual. Given that all subjects are part of this world they are also created within such creativity. And this is precisely Whitehead's point in his critique of Kant:

> Thus for Kant the process whereby there is experience is a process from subjectivity to apparent objectivity. The philosophy of organism inverts this analysis, and explains the process as proceeding from objectivity to subjectivity, namely, from the objectivity, whereby the external world is a datum, to the subjectivity, whereby there is one individual experience.
>
> (1978, p. 156)

For the moment, with Deleuze, it is the tracking down and unfolding of experience which is of interest (as it is throughout *Process and Reality*), and his hunt starts with the Husserlian notion of the 'noema':

> when Husserl reflects on the 'perceptual noema,' or the 'sense of perception,' he at once distinguishes it from the physical object, from the psychological or 'lived,' from mental representations and from logical concepts. He presents it as an impassive and incorporeal entity, without physical or mental existence, neither acting nor being acted upon – a pure result or pure 'appearance.
>
> (1990, p. 20)

In Whitehead's terms, settled actual entities have objective existence, as opposed to the formal existence of the entity which prehends that object as part of its becoming constituted as an entity.[2] So, 'perceptual noema' or 'the sense of perception' could be seen as referring to the immediate process of the combining of prehensions within an actual entity or subject, in its genetic phase (Whitehead, 1978, p. 283); that is, in its becoming (i.e. before it has become). This is a description of the very moment or moments (which are not yet in time) of the sub-representative[3] creation of individuality which neither relies on nor proceeds from an individual.

So, noema are not the passive reception or perception of static objects; they are not 'given' in the traditional sense. Rather, the noema constitute 'an ideational objective unity'. This relates to Whitehead's notion of the act of experience of an entity, comprised through the combining of elements into a unity; where such elements do not immediately correspond to perception. Noema are that which are somehow related to the objective existence of objects but are also distinct from them. 'We distinguish between green as a sensible color [*sic*] or quality and "to green" as a noematic color [*sic*] or attribute. "*The tree greens*" ' (Deleuze, 1990, p. 21). Whitehead puts it in the following way: 'the prehension of a sensum, as an apparent object qualifying a region, involve[s] ... for that prehension a subjective form also involving that sensum as a factor. *We enjoy the green foliage of the spring greenly*' (Whitehead, 1967, pp. 250–1; emphasis added). Or, as Andrew Marvell puts it in *The Garden*:

> Annihilating all that's made,
> To a green Thought in a green Shade.
> (Marvell, 1972, p. 257)

Both Whitehead and Deleuze are attempting to describe *how* subjects or individuals occur amid their non-essential ontological multiplicities, in a way that allows for the world to be received, and for sense to be made, without relying primarily on visual perception. This is the role of 'sense' in Deleuze; it is not something that the subject confers on the world; rather, it is something that is created; the world *makes* sense: '"*The tree greens*" – is this not finally the sense of the color [*sic*] of the tree . . .?' (1990, p. 21). However, it is not simply that the world *is* sense, or that the world is *sensible*, and all that is required is the proper rendition of its given elements to produce subjectivity. It is the complex relation of sense to language and events which Deleuze uses to preclude such determinacy.[4]

> Sense is indeed attributed, but it is not at all the attribute of the proposition – it is rather the attribute of the thing or state of affairs. The attribute of the proposition is the predicate – a qualitative predicate like green for example. It is attributed to the subject of the proposition. But the attribute of the thing is the verb: to green, or rather the event expressed by this verb .... 'Green' designates a quality, a mixture of things, a mixture of tree and air where chlorophyll coexists with all parts of the leaf. 'To green,' on the other contrary, is not a quality in the thing, but an attribute which is said of the thing. This attribute does not exist outside of the proposition which expresses it in denoting the thing.
>
> (Deleuze, 1990, p. 21)

Once again: 'Sense is the expressed of the proposition'.

For Deleuze, sense does not exist as such, as it occurs only through its expression ('what is expressed does not exist outside its expression'). This is not to say that sense is an attribute of a proposition ('what is expressed has no resemblance whatsoever to the expression'). Usually, trees are said to be green. They are seen to be static objects which have certain essential properties which define what they are, and one of these properties is that they are green. In such accounts, trees are passive, enduring entities which are perceived or talked about by subjects which are independent of them. As has been seen, both Whitehead and Deleuze are sharply opposed to such approaches. Instead, they both emphasise the processual aspect of reality, the primacy of bodily relations, and the individual moments whereby actuality arises out of this more general field. Thus 'greenness' is not a static property; rather, it is an active element which expresses the constitution of each specific tree ('the attribute of

the thing [or state of affairs] is the verb': 'to green, or rather the event expressed by this verb'). Deleuze thus 'agrees' with Whitehead that there are subjects of propositions (logical sets of actual entities) and that these are surrounded by a range of predicates (complex eternal objects). Where he is, perhaps, clearer than Whitehead is in associating such predicates with the linguistic through his positing of verbs as elemental. It is not that Deleuze envisages language as the harbinger of existence; rather, that the notion of the verb best evokes the activity which comprises the real existence of the world. This is the germ of the relationship of language or the linguistic, subjectivity and individuality that I wish to draw out here.

As stated earlier, it should be noted that early on in his philosophical career, Whitehead too attempted to use parts of speech as elements within the facticity of the universe, for example: 'It is an adjective of events which to some extent conditions the possibilities of apparent sense-objects' (1922, p. 34). And Whitehead's theory of propositions does coincide, at points, with Deleuze's view of the world in terms of activity and events as quasi-effects of the prior mixture of bodies and qualities (logical sets of actual entities and predicates – in terms of complex eternal objects). However, for Deleuze, it is verbs that express the activity of the universe; this activity is reducible to neither subjects nor objects, for both are involved within and yet escape the formation of sense. 'Green' or the greenness of a tree is one thing; it *is* the mixing of bodies, it is a state of affairs. 'To green', the activity or expression of greenness is not inherent in such a state of affairs, it is not an essential property of a thing. Instead, 'To green ... is said of the thing.'

So, the thing does not say, 'I am green so perceive me as green or assert that I am green.' The greening of a tree is 'said of the thing'. But it is not said by a subject. In fact, it is not said by anyone. It should be noted that Deleuze uses the passive tense here. However, insofar as such an attribute 'does not exist outside of the proposition which expresses it', it must be expressed. This is closely tied to Deleuze's usage of the 'univocity of being', where 'Being is said in a single and same sense ... *of* all its individuating differences' (1994, p. 36). Thus being is 'spoken' in that it enacts sense. But this is not a unified sense; for within the very instantiation of being is that which creates difference. Given that there are no universal concepts or propositions, Deleuze is arguing that each moment of being is accompanied by a proposition. These are not verbal propositions but, at the same time, each becoming does entail that some position is taken with regard to the world or state of affairs; and such positioning is implicated in what has been called a 'statement'.[5] It is the

making of this statement, which is the making of sense, which itself produces the subject and enables the designation of an 'exterior' world after the event (that is, the possibility of signification, denotation and manifestation comes after the event and sense). In reality (i.e. in terms of becoming), sense, propositions, attributes, events and their relation to verbs are not strictly separate. But, as with Whitehead's analysis of the combination of prehensions into a substantial entity, it is possible after the event to analyse or divide that which is not in itself divided; 'the region is, after all, divisible, although in the genetic growth it is undivided' (Whitehead, 1978, p. 284).

However, it should be noted that it is not specific verbs, or the 'meaning' of verbs, which is of interest to Deleuze. Instead, he isolates two distinct aspects of the verb. There is 'the present, which indicates its relation to a denotable state of affairs' (1990, p. 184). Under this aspect falls the triad of denotation, manifestation and signification which form 'the aggregate of times, persons, and modes' (1990, p. 184). The other is 'the infinitive, which indicates its relation to sense or the event in view of the internal time which it envelops' (1990, p. 184). Under this aspect falls the range of potentiality which each specific occurrence of that verb relies on for its sense. But the sense of the verb is not exhausted by these occurrences, it retains it own indeterminate form. 'The Verb is the univocity of language, in the form of an undetermined infinitive, without person, without present, without any diversity of voice' (1990, p. 185). Thus, the verb replicates the role of eternal objects in Whitehead's work. It will be remembered that eternal objects express the infinite potentiality which permeates the universe through its ongoing creative process. In this way they are eternal, out of time, in that they are not determined by, or limited to, the present. As such, they link the past and the future. For Deleuze, 'The pure infinitive ... permits no distinction of moments, but goes on being divided formally in the double and simultaneous direction of the past and future' (1990, p. 185).

Yet, one of the main roles of eternal objects is to ingress in the becoming of actual entities. In Deleuze's reading of Whitehead: 'eternal objects are ... pure Virtualities that are actualized in prehensions' (1993, p. 79). It is only because of such ingressions that definiteness is granted to actual entities, to individuals. Thus, under the first aspect of Deleuze's version of the verb ('its relation to a denotable state of affairs') are created 'times, persons, and modes'; that is, the present with all its punctuations of time, space and individuals. Unlike Whitehead, Deleuze thus views language, in the form of the verb, as integral to the formations of (human) individuals. This is not language as an epiphenomenon,

or supplementary explanatory device, or creation of the human 'subject'. Language is coextensive with becoming, with the event, with the creation of sense itself. Further, language is not solely a human affair, it is not reducible to a 'cultural intelligible'. On Deleuze's account, the verb 'inherits . . . the communication of events among themselves' (1990, p. 185). The universe is not 'shivered into a multitude of disconnected substantial things ... [where] substantial thing cannot call unto substantial thing' (Whitehead, 1967, p. 133). Instead, language, sense and events are all interconnected effects of the mixing of bodies which do thereby communicate with each other. Language is not to be seen as words here; rather, it is a mode of interaction, which is an integral element of the coming to be of all items of existence. Language does not represent, reflect or create states of affairs, it is made possible by them and expresses particular actualities and delimits them. 'It is language which fixes the limits' (Deleuze, 1990, p. 2). And it is here that we move on to the notion of language and individuality more directly. Language keeps singularities and actualities in touch with the infinite, with the unbridled process of becoming: 'it is language as well which transcends the limits and restores them to the infinite equivalence of an unlimited becoming' (Deleuze, 1990, p. 3). Language does not make (create) sense; it is only one element in the process in which individuals become actualized, their sense created, and whereby events occur. 'As it expresses in language all events in one, the infinite verb expresses the event of language – language being a unique event which merges now with that which renders it possible' (1990, p. 185). So, describing the verb as infinite is a philosophical device. It is an abstract characterization of the universe in terms of process and becoming. But the verb is also implicated in the 'present', in the actualization of individuals; it is important to recognize this distinction, that is, to accept the force of the philosophical approach, but then to delineate the operations of such infinitive verbs in their present and personalizing actualizations. It is also important to note a distinction between Deleuze and Whitehead at this point, even though this might turn out to be no more that a terminological one.

Subjectivity, individuality and language

For Whitehead, subjectivity is superjectivity, that is, it is the combination of diverse elements into a single unity. It is the process of this concrescence that constitutes its 'formal' existence. Once it has become, it perishes, becomes a datum for other becomings. This is its 'objective' existence whereby it gains its immortality (Whitehead, 1978,

pp. 219–20). Whitehead emphasizes the processual aspect of becoming and hence the formal aspect of existence. Deleuze, on the other hand, distinguishes between that form of subjectivity which is 'real', which exists, but within the realm of singularities. As Ansell-Pearson puts it: 'subjectivity is never ours but always virtual' (2002, p. 168). Thus the present, or the 'world-as-it-is', is populated not by subjectivities but by individuals which are actualized out of the virtual. Such actualized individuals are also 'real', as real as the virtual. However, they are in some way delimited or controlled; they are the implicated in the operations of force or power. Clearly, Whitehead does not view the shift from formal to objective existence in precisely these terms. However, it would seem possible to equate his distinction between these modes of existence to Deleuze's notions of virtual subjectivity and actual individuals.

So, it has been seen how Deleuze introduces language into his ontology through an analysis of the status of the verb as infinite. It was also pointed out that this is only half the story in that the verb is also implicated in the actualizations of the present. Deleuze (1988) elaborates this second point by building on the work of Foucault (though he goes beyond him very quickly). In doing so, he makes use of the term 'statements'.

Statements are not produced by individual speakers or subjects; they do not harbour the intentionality or creativity of individual humans; 'no originality is needed in order to produce them' (1988, p. 3). On Deleuze's reading, statements inhabit the realm of the already decided, of the real (in the sense of the actual). Statements will delimit the utter facticity of the moment within which subjects find their place; they are, in this sense, 'social' insofar as they substantiate the actual conditions and consequences of the contemporary world. Hence, they are also resolutely implicated in the material.

Statements are not purely linguistic. They imply and require, for their operation, 'the *complementary space* of non-discursive formations' (1988, p. 9). Deleuze identifies such formations in relation to institutions,[6] for:

> Any institution implies the existence of statements such as a constitution, a charter, contracts, registrations and enrolments. Conversely, statements refer back to an institutional milieu which is necessary for the formation both of the objects which arise in such examples of the statements and of the subject who speaks from this position (for example the position of the writer in society, the position of the doctor in the hospital or at his [sic] surgery, in any given period together with the new emergence of objects.)
>
> (1988, p. 9)

If medical discourse is derived from a relation of statements which enables it to talk intelligibly about specific objects and employ specific practices, then one example of the non-discursive, the visible, might be the hospital considered as an architectural entity. However, this is not to consider the hospital as a Newtonian, physical object, for 'they [hospitals] are not just figures of stone, assemblages of things ... but first and foremost forms of light that distribute light and dark, opaque and transparent, seen and non-seen, etc.' (1988, p. 57).

So, Deleuze uses the terms 'the articulable and the visible' to distinguish and to link the realms of the discursive and the non-discursive. In some respects, the articulable and the visible are analogous, but they are not isomorphic. It is, perhaps, Whitehead's work which can best elucidate these terms and their interrelation. At the metaphysical level, every actual entity is 'dipolar, with its physical and mental poles' (Whitehead, 1978, p. 239). This 'mental' aspect does not refer to the psychological or to consciousness as originary. Rather, it refers to the conceptual as that potential which is instantiated within all items of being or matter; this is what grants all materiality its subjectivity. This account, therefore, avoids envisaging the universe as replete with simple, inert objects, only occasionally punctuated with the searing light of human subjectivity.

So, consistent with Whitehead's insistence on the priority of becoming over being and his epochal theory of time (and space), it is the pulse of becoming that creates time and space; so to speak of relations within such becomings is to pre-empt actuality. The visible and the articulable do not exist within time and space, they create it. And this goes for the hospitals, prisons and so on, which literally[7] fabricate their own spatio-temporal systems.

However, Deleuze (and Whitehead) would not want to over-emphasize the heavy, stratified, domains of discourse and institution (the articulable and the visible), or the rigidity of such institutions and the final completion of each bounded creation (or subject). The co-workings of power and knowledge do not completely render their material as subject, or object, so that there is nothing beyond or left over.

Conclusion: language, individuality and materiality

For Deleuze, human language is not creative in any originary sense; nor is it unique. 'Events make language possible' (Deleuze, 1990, p. 181). Human language is only one of the elements within the constitution of humans as individuals. It is the realm of sense which informs and surrounds such temporary individuality and proscribes the events within

which they occur. There are other diverse languages: 'There is even a white society and a white language, the latter being that which contains in its virtuality all the phonemes and relations destined to be actualised in diverse languages' (Deleuze, 1994, p. 206). Such languages are not limited to humans as they can arise from the communication of non-human singularities. This notion builds on Whitehead's assessment of eternal objects as those potentials which inform the creation and definiteness of all subjects. A white stone is not only white because human language calls it white. It is white because whiteness is one of the defining elements of its becoming. It feels itself to be white. Whitehead's choice of colours as his preferred method of explaining the role of eternal objects takes on renewed importance with Deleuze's analysis. Deleuze is also clear in linking colour, matter and subjectivity:

> Included in the notion as subject is forever an event marked by a verb, or a relation marked by a preposition ... (and if things had the gift of speech, they would say, as might, for example, gold: 'I will resist melting and nitric acid').
>
> (1993, p. 52)

Or, as Whitehead puts it (quoting Locke): 'Thus we say, fire has a power to melt gold; ... and gold has a power to be melted' (1978, p. 57).[8] Thus subjectivity or individuality is not solely a human affair. And the actualization of individuals is not entirely separate from the singularities which enable actualization: 'singularities are actualized both in a world and in the individuals which are parts of the world' (Deleuze, 1990, p. 110). In 'fact', in *actuality*, each individual entity is presented with its own world, its own history, its own grouping of singularities or objectified entities as it is 'somewhere in the continuum, and arises out of the data provided by this standpoint' (Whitehead, 1978, p. 67). And with regard to the body, this entails, as Deleuze puts it, that:

> In each world, the individuals express all the singularities of this world – an infinity – ... but each monad envelops or expresses 'clearly' a certain number of singularities only, that is, *those in the vicinity of which it is constituted and which link up with its own body*.
>
> (1990, p. 111)

With which Whitehead concurs: 'the animal body is nothing more than the most intimately relevant part of the antecedent settled world' (1978, p. 64).

Thus, it is possible to view Deleuze as a continuation of Whitehead's project. As he and Guattari state of his philosophy of organism: 'Interaction becomes *communication*' (1994, p. 154). Hence, it is possible to outline an approach which includes 'nature' (in the sense of the physical world of the natural sciences and philosophy) as a cohesive and yet infinite milieu within which individuality and subjectivity are not simple constructions, representations or epiphenomena. Instead, they comprise the limited, physical and social actuality of the 'world-as-it-is' but do not fully exemplify, incarnate or exhaust its potentiality.

Notes

1. See Whitehead (1978: 168–83; also 1928).
2. See Whitehead (1978: 219–20).
3. 'Anyhow "representative perception" can never, within its own metaphysical doctrines, produce the title deeds to guarantee the validity of the representation of fact by idea' (Whitehead, 1978: 54).
4. See Ansell-Pearson (1999: 132).
5. The status of such 'statements' will be taken up later in this chapter.
6. This demonstrates Deleuze's continuing interest in the relation of philosophy to immediate, social concerns from Empiricism and Subjectivity to his later texts (e.g., Deleuze, 1991 [1953]: 47).
7. This word is overused but seems pertinent here.
8. The citation is from Book II, Chapter XXI, Section 1 of Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Locke, 1988: 105). In the original the word 'power' is in italics on both occasions.

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3

Whitehead and Deleuze: Thinking the Event

André Cloots

A few years ago, I was asked to review a book by the French philosopher Claude Romano, entitled *L'Événement et le temps*.[1] The title intrigued me, especially the concept of the 'event'. It is a concept we are all familiar with in a sense, even in philosophy, since it is so central to much of contemporary thought. It plays, for instance, a central role in Whitehead's process philosophy, but it is also a key concept for postmodern philosophers like Jacques Derrida and Jean-François Lyotard. The meaning of the concept, however, is not always the same (to say the least) and Romano makes it even more complicated. For him, *l'événement* seems so extremely exceptional, while for Whitehead it is constitutive for all that is, and in that sense not at all exceptional. Romano's way of dealing with the event, however, fits quite well within a phenomenological perspective. As the phenomenologist tries to describe all forms of *phainesthai*, all the ways in which things manifest themselves to consciousness, so there are also these 'exceptional events' we sometimes experience, like falling in love, or even like the Holocaust (which for Lyotard is a kind of archetype of an event). Such events indeed are extraordinary – they take us by surprise, they overtake us, outside of any context. It is as if the world explodes and time is suspended, Romano says. They come from 'nowhere', and all of a sudden they are here, almost an existential version of Butler's *Erewhon* (to which Deleuze loves so much to refer), turning everything Around.

But there is more. Such events seem to disclose something that is essential to all *phainesthai*, namely, the fact that something comes to us that is given and is not just the result of our constitution. In that sense, such a description of an 'event' breaks open the Husserlian notion of 'constitution', and moves towards the Heideggerian 'es gibt' (something is given to us). And precisely that awareness has been the basis of a second way of dealing with the notion of the event within the phenomenological

movement, from its 'es gibt' character, its character of 'being given'. That has led Jean-Luc Marion, for instance, to a whole philosophy of the donation and the gift, leading in his book *Étant donné* to a kind of philosophical theology: the event as a way to the divine. This approach, of course, is a tribute to Heidegger, as for him each new way of *alètheia*, of unconcealment, is itself a 'remittance' of Being ('ein Seinsgeschick').

All of this is to say that there are many ways of dealing with the event in contemporary thinking and the reference to Heidegger in this regard is not accidental. Without doubt Heidegger has been one of the main inspirations for many so-called postmodern thinkers, including Derrida or Lyotard. And precisely his notion of the event ('das Ereignis') is important here, and centrally so for Heidegger in his book *Identität und Differenz* (1957). There, 'das Ereignis' (which Richardson [1974, p. 614] translates as 'the coming-to-pass of an event') is referred to in the chapter on the principle of identity, in which Heidegger is dealing with the 'identity' of Being and thinking (Heidegger, 1957, p. 24). Das 'Ereignis' concerns the correlation between Being and thinking, which is described as a mutual appropriation ('eignen') but also, since 'Ereignen' originally means, according to Heidegger, 'Eräugen' (to look) and in that way to appropriate as a mutual 'Erblicken' – a mutual 'eye-ing'. As Richardson says: 'Being casts an eye on man (appeal) and There-Being [Dasein] catches Being's eye in turn (response)' (Heidegger, 1957, pp. 24–5; Richardson, 1974, p. 614) – Being as an appeal and Dasein (or more specifically here, thinking) as a response. But that response is not always authentic, an authentic seeing or listening ('noein') or speaking ('legein'): immediately before discussing 'das Ereignis' Heidegger refers to 'das Gestell' (Heidegger, 1957, p. 23). In a second chapter, then, he develops his famous notion of metaphysics as onto-theology.

What is the importance of this? Well, it seems to me that Deleuze's *Différence et Répétition* has much to do with it. First of all the title; and in this regard two things seem important:

- First, the fact that the title is reversed or turned around – instead of 'Identity and Difference', Deleuze has 'Difference and Identity'.
- Second, the concept of 'identity' is replaced by the concept of 'repetition'.

Indeed, for Deleuze the real concepts to consider are not difference and identity but difference and repetition. And this is true not only at the level of 'Being' (which eventually for Deleuze is the repetition of difference), but also at the level of thinking. For Deleuze thinking can never claim any identity with Being and never should claim it,

since that is not the concern of thinking. To think is not to reach an identity with being (as in a philosophy of representation), nor does thinking aim to think the identical (again as in a philosophy of representation), but thinking should think difference and repetition. Thinking difference, thinking the event, is exactly what a classical metaphysics of representation – or 'a metaphysics of presence' as Heidegger would put it – does not do. That is the reason why a real thinking of Being for Heidegger should return *to the ground* of metaphysics, into the soil in which metaphysics has found the possibility of growing. Heidegger refers to Descartes' tree of philosophy, which has physics as its trunk and metaphysics as its roots. Heidegger's 'Schritt zurück', 'in der Grund der Metaphysik', his step back into the ground of metaphysics, is a return to *physis*, into 'the self-blossoming emergence' as he calls it (Heidegger, 1959, p. 14), in which all talking, all thinking and all acting – in other words, all *alètheia* – finds its ground. I have the impression that what Deleuze wants to do is very similar: he too wants to go back into the ground out of which representation, or a metaphysics of identity, has been possible. In that sense, Deleuze too wants a new way of thinking and a new way of listening to the soundless voice of Being, as Heidegger says.[2]

In this way, as several authors have suggested, *Difference and Repetition* is, among other things, dealing with Heidegger, and it would be difficult to disagree. When Deleuze wrote *Différence et répétition* at the end of the 1960s, Heidegger was omnipresent in French academic philosophical circles (even if it were only to get rid of him), and *Identitat und Differenz*, with its notion of 'Ereignis', had been published only ten years earlier.[3] So, it would be almost unimaginable that Deleuze, writing about difference, would not also be addressing the way Heidegger dealt with it.[4] But, on the other hand, Deleuze's *Différénce et répétition* is at the same time an attempt to get even with him. Deleuze's event certainly is not identical with Heidegger's event. On the contrary. Let me concentrate on just one basic difference (which allows me at the same time to relate it to Whitehead) and that is the following one.[5]

Thinking the *event*

For Heidegger, 'das Ereignis' has to do with the mutual correlation (or relation) – a mutual appropriation or a mutual 'eye-ing' – between Being and thinking, or more generally between Being and Being-there. Actually, in the later Heidegger, Being-there is at the same time the There-of-Being: it is in human acting, in human thinking and in human speaking that beings manifest themselves, come to the fore, come to their

truth, that *alètheia* happens (and hence Being 'happens'). That means that even for the later Heidegger, Dasein remains very important. It no longer is exactly the same subject it was in *Sein und Zeit*: the happening of Being from now on is more the initiative of Being than the initiative of man. Nevertheless, it remains true that without Dasein there is no Sein (in the strict sense). In other words, Heidegger never really abandoned the central role of subjectivity, even when it comes to the happening of Being. That is evidently the Kantian heritage. One might expect Deleuze, schooled in this Heideggerian and more generally continental tradition, to remain true to that Kantian heritage, but he does not. It is, on the contrary, Whitehead, working in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, in collaboration with Bertrand Russell and his student Ludwig Wittgenstein, who is at the base of analytic philosophy; it is Whitehead who continues to refer to this Kantian heritage, especially when it comes to the notion of subjectivity and the Copernican turn.

At one point in *Différence et Répétition* Deleuze says that the Copernican Revolution is not central: the central divide is not whether a philosophy is pre- or post-Kantian. In continental philosophy that divide always has been crucial and that is certainly one of the main reasons why many European philosophers find Whitehead so difficult to accept, the main objection being that Whitehead is a 'pre-Kantian'. In a sense, there is an affinity here with Deleuze: the authors Deleuze is 'reading' and commenting on (albeit in 'a free indirect style' as he says) are mainly philosophers before Kant or philosophers for whom the Kantian heritage is not central. But one has to be very careful here. In a sense it is true that Whitehead himself writes that he is going back to pre-Kantian modes of thinking. But, on the other hand, things are certainly not that simple. In 1997, some course notes, taken by Susan Langer in one of Whitehead's classes at Harvard, were published in *Process Studies* (Lachmann, 1997). In this text there is a short sentence that sheds important light on Whitehead's relation to Kant. It was already known that Whitehead knew large sections of the *Critique of Pure Reason* by heart. But he said he was returning to pre-Kantian modes of thinking. How could these two facts be combined? Whitehead himself gives the key in the course notes. There he compares his notion of an actual occasion (which in a sense replaces the earlier talk about events)[6] to what he calls 'the Kantian process'. In fact, for Whitehead an actual occasion (or let me loosely use here the word 'event') is first of all a process of integration, just as in the *Critique of Pure Reason* knowledge is a process of integration of the 'Anschauungen' (coming from outside – what Whitehead calls 'physical prehensions'); and this process of integration is realized under the guidance of mental

activity ('mental prehensions'), that is to say, under the working of the free activity of the subject. A process of integration (a 'concrescence'), therefore, is the working towards unity, towards a satisfactory way of dealing with what is given, by relating it to mental or ideal elements and by integrating it through this mental input. In Whitehead's words, it is the integration of physical and mental prehensions, into one unity of feeling. Here the model is Kantian, not only in the sense that a process of integration is a working towards unification, but also in the sense that it always requires mental activity, and in the end it is the unity of physical and mental aspects ('Anschauungen' and 'Begriffe' in Kant; physical prehensions and mental prehensions in Whitehead).

The model thus is remarkably similar. The novelty or the difference, however, is that Whitehead uses it not only for conscious experience, but for all experience and thus for all events, since for him all occasions are occasions of experience: it is the basic structure of all real happening as such. In so doing, Whitehead generalises Kant's theory of knowledge to the whole of reality. In other words, he does not renounce Kant, but he generalizes him to all being. Similarly, he does not renounce the Copernican turn, but also generalizes it by conceiving all experiencing as the experiencing of a subject ('the reformed subjectivist principle' – Whitehead 1929-1, pp.166–7). That is a second Kantian heritage and it leads to a third: the generalization of subjectivity. Whitehead does not abandon the notion of subjectivity as central, but reinstates it at the heart of being and as basis for the notion itself of the event (or, more precisely, the actual occasion). And he does so not in Heidegger's sense, that human subjectivity is central to the unconcealment of things, but by broadening the notion of subjectivity to the whole of reality: every experiencing is the experiencing of a subject (not necessarily of a conscious subject, but of a subject as a process of unification of the physical and the mental), not in the sense that the subject pre-exists the experiencing, but, on the contrary, in the sense that the experiencing leads to and constitutes the subject. (That is a basic difference with Kant and actually with the whole tradition.) As Heidegger would say, we do not come to thoughts, thoughts come to us and make us what we are. The subject is the product rather than the producer of the experience. However, in Whitehead's way of thinking, there is no actuality (and actually nothing) without subjectivity; apart from the experiences of subjects, there is nothing – 'The rest is silence' (Whitehead, 1929-1, pp. 43, 166).

This seems quite different in Deleuze. Standing in the structuralist movement, Deleuze will try to dethrone the subject, or at least he will try not to make the notion of subjectivity fundamental. Deleuze's event

is certainly not a subject in the Whiteheadian sense. On the other hand, Deleuze writes that 'every organism, in its receptive and perceptual elements, but also in its viscera, is a sum of contractions, of retentions and expectations' (1994, p. 73). This sounds extremely Whiteheadian. For Whitehead, an actual occasion is always an organism (Whitehead's term for his own philosophy is 'philosophy of organism') and Whitehead would describe it in exactly the same terms. So, for Whitehead, a singularity is always a subject-superject, which essentially refers to subjective harmony and intensity (as the 7th and 8th Categorical Obligations put it). But in saying this, a basic difference immediately comes to the fore. It is expressed in the notion of 'sum' and of 'harmony' respectively. Since for Whitehead the notion of subjectivity refers precisely to a kind of unity, or at least to a process of *unification*, the world of Whitehead is certainly more harmonious than the world of Deleuze.

The notion of subjectivity, however, also has a broader meaning. At several points Deleuze talks about the subject as the 'I' ('le "je"' or, more accurately, 'l'habitude de dire "je"' [Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, p. 49; 1994, p. 48], where 'habitude' not only refers to a habit, but also to 'habiter', having its habitat in a milieu of divergent series). As such the 'I' does refer to personal identity, or more precisely to a personal repetition. 'Individuals are constituted in the vicinity of singularities which they envelope' (Deleuze 1990, p. 111). This is also an important theme in Whitehead, viz. the personal repetition rather than the personal identity. Actually, for Whitehead, the human person is a society; more specifically a personally ordered society. It is a society characterized by a defining characteristic, a 'habit' as it were, referring not only to the past but also to an open and changing future. Whitehead compares personal identity to a receptacle, a brace in a way, of ever-new events, forming personal identity (where 'identity' does not refer to self-sameness, but to 'identifiability'): our unity as a person is such that we are identifiable for ourselves and for others as *this* person.

Two considerations are important here. The first is that 'personal identity' is not reserved exclusively to a human person. There is personal order, Whitehead says, when the genetic relatedness of the members of a society orders these members 'serially', as if there is genetic transmission as it were. I do not think that is exactly the kind of seriality Deleuze has in mind. Yet, maybe what Whitehead says is not that far from Deleuze either. All the more so – and this is a second important consideration – since for Whitehead consciousness is not the main characteristic of subjectivity. It is rather its power to deal with ('to process') influences in a unified way and, on the other side, to influence and to

have influence. The many become one and are increased by one (Deleuze would say, to affect and to be affected). For Whitehead, as for Deleuze, consciousness is but a highly developed form of being affected and of affecting. In other words, consciousness should be conceived of not as the centre but as a certain development of the rest of nature.

Here again two considerations have to be made. If Whitehead links the notion of subjectivity to the many becoming one, and if he links the notion of personal identity to the notion of a receptacle, that requires greater unity than Deleuze would allow. The main difference seems to lie in the word 'one', in the level of unity that is required or the level of unity that is possible. For Whitehead, 'subjectivity' in both cases (in the sense of an actual occasion and in the sense of a person) always basically requires a real kind of unity. As I said, 'identity' can mean two things: it can refer to self-sameness and it can refer to someone's identity (how to identify someone). Whereas Whitehead undermines and even rejects the first meaning, he certainly does not reject the second. For Whitehead, personal identity foremost is personal repetition, but in that personal repetition a nexus acquires an identity (all the more so through a route of 'dominant occasions'). And that is more than the Deleuzian notion of 'habit' or 'habiter' seems to allow. This comes to saying that when Whitehead refers so explicitly to subjectivity and when Deleuze dissolves subjectivity as much as possible, it has everything to do with the place and the degree of unity and order in both metaphysics.

This brings me to a second set of problems, one that has to do not only with the notion of the event, but also with our *thinking* of the event, that is to say, the problem of the univocity of Being.

Thinking the event

The dissolution of the subject is linked not only to the problem of repetition and seriality, of difference, structures, divergent series or milieus – in a word, to the primacy of the 'event' ('l'événement') – but also to another core topic in Deleuze: the univocity of Being. This is characteristic of Deleuze, but not without extremely far-reaching implications, although I do not yet fully know how to assess its scope and significance. That is why I want to bring it up here for discussion.

The problem of the univocity of Being goes back initially to Duns Scotus of course, but eventually to Aristotle himself. It is linked to the famous sentence, repeated again and again in the *Metaphysics*[7] (it is the opening sentence of Book Z, the core book when it comes to Aristotle's ousiology, but it is also central in the beginning of Book G, following immediately

Aristotle's definition of metaphysics itself): 'To on legetai pollachoos' ('The word "being" is said in many senses'). Aristotle links that phrase to the many ways of predication and thus to the categories (the Greek 'kategorein' means 'to predicate'): the word 'being' is used multivocally for the different categories. As he states in Book D 1017a 23:

> The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figures of predication; for the senses of 'being' are just as many as these figures. Since, then, some predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity, others its 'where', others its 'when', 'being' has a meaning answering to each of these. (Ross, 1966, p. 1017a)

On the other hand, all this multivocity refers to one central meaning (the famous expression 'pros hen'), namely the substance (the 'ousia'). Thus he says in Book G 1003b 5 ff:

> there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substances, others because they are a process towards a substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of one of these things or of substance itself. It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it *is* non-being. (Ross, 1966, p. 1003b)

Aristotle compares that to the term 'healthy': healthy can mean that it produces health, that it preserves health or restores it, that it shows health (the colour of your face, for instance), etc. So all forms of predication refer to the being of a substance ('ousia').

All this means that there are two movements in the predication of being: on the one hand, the multivocity of the being of the predicates or categories; on the other hand, a certain unity. Besides that, however, there is yet another element that certainly also has a bearing on the problem of the univocity and that is the fact that for Aristotle there is a hierarchy in the substances, linked to the different levels of the different theoretical sciences. As is well known, the theoretical sciences are physics, mathematics and first philosophy. Their difference does not consist in their method or anything like that, but in the objects or kinds of substances they are dealing with. Substances are 'higher' the more they are separated from matter ('chooristos') and the more they are separated

from time and movement ('akinètos'). Considered from this perspective, physics is the lowest, since it deals with substances that are not separated from matter and are not eternal, mathematics (like astronomy) deals with substances that are not separated from matter but are eternal (therefore mathematics and astronomy are higher than physics), while first philosophy deals with substances (or a substance) that are both separated from matter and eternal. Therefore, first philosophy is the highest science.

All this means that in the problem of univocity, two things seem to come together: on the one hand, a horizontal multivocity of being for the different categories; on the other hand, a vertical hierarchy of being for the different levels of substantiality. Now the problem, when it comes to the univocity of being is to know exactly what one is talking about.

That both elements, the horizontal and the vertical, are intrinsically linked for Deleuze too becomes clear in the following: 'The purpose of division [between genus and species in Plato] then is not at all to divide a genus into species, but, more profoundly, to select lineages to distinguish pretenders; to distinguish the pure from the impure, the authentic from the inauthentic' (Deleuze 1990, p. 254). Actually, the purpose of Deleuze himself in attacking the divisions in genus and species really seems to be similar, namely to eliminate any form of 'pretendership', of distinguishing the pure from the impure, the authentic from the inauthentic, and in that sense to eliminate any form of hierarchy whatsoever. In this sense, the univocity of being seems subservient in Deleuze to the problem of immanence.

Let us take a closer look at both, the horizontal and the vertical dimensions.

Deleuze's philosophy of immanence is indeed a strong reaction to a hierarchical conception of being whatsoever. There are no 'levels' of being, the one transcending the other. A metaphysics of immanence cannot result in a 'theology' (an onto-theology Heidegger would say) as in Aristotle. All being, and thus all 'beings' (if that word can be used in Deleuze), have the same ontological status. Whitehead also wants a 'one substance cosmology' (1929-1, p. 19), in which 'God is an actual entity and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space'. 'In the principles which actuality exemplifies all are on the same level' (1929–1, p. 18). Yet, as Whitehead says, 'they differ among themselves', 'there are gradations of importance and diversities of functions'. This sounds quite Aristotelian. Looked on from Deleuze's philosophy, there seems to be a form of hierarchy or transcendence in Whitehead related not only to God's place in the system, but also, for instance, to the status of consciousness.[8] Here we are back to our former problem of subjectivity

and consciousness. For Whitehead there are gradations of subjectivity, expressed in the level of feelings and integration that is attained. In a sense, the whole of *Process and Reality* is an analysis of all these grades. It is first of all an analysis of all kinds of feelings and of all kinds and gradations of integration. But is this only a matter of gradations, or do these gradations also mean a difference in kind and so different levels? Differences in gradation seem to be central in Deleuze too: grades of intensity, of affecting and being affected, grades of will. But for Deleuze this does not seem to imply, at a certain level, a difference in kind, while for Whitehead that implication does seem to follow. It is true that Whitehead calls consciousness a matter of subjective form (and thus related to how things are felt) but, on the other hand, 'The distinction between men and animals is in one sense only a difference in degree. But the extent of the degree makes all the difference. The Rubicon has been crossed' (Whitehead 1938, p. 27).

That means that for Whitehead the distinctions between levels of feeling, levels of complexity and intensity, are more than *just* a matter of degree. Whitehead wants to retain real differences, and yet, against Kant, he wants to think the continuity. Being is not divided into two worlds: not the two worlds of Platonism, not the two worlds of classical theism, but not the two worlds of Kant either, whether one calls these worlds the worlds of nature and mind, or of subject and object or of man and nature. Yet for Whitehead there are not only formal differences but real differences, and in that sense different forms of 'being'.

That Deleuze wants to do away with any hierarchy in being seems evident. But the problem is how far one goes in this regard. As I have said, it seems that the horizontal problem of univocity is subservient to the vertical problem of hierarchy or immanence. Yet, that univocity of being – even in its horizontal dimension – seems to be very important to Deleuze. But I must confess that I am still hesitant as to how to interpret this or to judge its range.

On the one hand, there is the univocity of being, but over against that univocity of being there is the equivocity of language (or at least the equivocity of names), Deleuze says in *The Logic of Sense*. Because the verb is language brought back to the level of univocity, 'the univocity of language, in the form of an undetermined infinitive, without person, without present, without any diversity of voice. It is poetry itself' (Deleuze, 1990, p. 185).

For Deleuze language itself has to become an event, just like being. He continues: 'As it expresses in language all events in one, the infinitive verb expresses the event of language – language being a unique event

which merges now with what renders it possible' (1990, p. 185). Deleuze certainly teaches you to think in terms of verbs and infinitives and that is a shocking experience, especially when, as Deleuze suggests, one tries to think even the attributes as verbs. That changes your whole outlook. But how far can one go in that direction? Deleuze says – and that's beautiful – that in order to understand a verb, one has to *do* it. Only then will its whole 'drama' stand out. The question, however, is whether the verb is thereby *understood* in all the *philosophical* potentialities of understanding. In what sense can one philosophically understand (which also means to think) the infinitive without any form of predication? Or is (predicative) thinking possible only at the level of the tenses? What, then, about the verb as infinitive? Can that only be 'done', or only be indicated, without being explicated?

Whitehead certainly sticks to categories and even begins his whole systematic enterprise with them.[9] And it is not clear to me in what sense one really can do without them. If there are no longer categorical differences, does that mean that all being is of radically the same kind? That's what Badiou, in his interpretation of Deleuze, appears to suggest. But, as Badiou (and also Smith) rightly indicates, if there are no categorical differences, but only individual differences, how can these really be thought (Badiou 1997; Smith 2001)? And if these individual differences are not thinkable, is the only thinkable difference that they are different? Does one end up eventually in an 'indifferent difference' after all?

Le us take the distinction between virtuality and actuality. If I understand Aristotle's statement 'to on legetai pollachoos' correctly and apply it to Deleuze, Aristotle would say that 'being' is said in a different way when it is said of the virtual over against the actual. For Aristotle this would certainly be a categorical distinction. But if categorical distinctions (as expressions of representation) should be done away with, does that mean that there is no real, no 'ontological', distinction between the virtual and the actual? If understood in this way, it is not surprising that Badiou's reading of Deleuze goes in the direction of a strong monism. What is ultimately relevant is only Being and its modifications; not so much *what* these modifications are (their differences), but the fact *that* they are (their being different).[10]

More is at stake here than just a label. Labels are not at all important and maybe the detailed development of Deleuze's philosophy is not that important either. In addition, the theme of the univocity of being seems to be one that plays an explicit role in Deleuze only briefly, viz at the end of the 1960s. Why then attach so much importance to it? What counts, as Whitehead writes, is a philosopher's 'logical chessboard ... Whether

he makes the right moves is of minor importance' (Lachmann 1997, p. 128). Maybe in the study of Deleuze, the specific moves are of minor importance. Maybe of first importance is his attempt to develop a thinking of Being that escapes both hierarchy and representation, in other words, a philosophy of immanence and differential becoming in line with Heidegger, who wants to overcome 'calculative thinking' as it is found in both technology and classical metaphysics and culminates in the logic of Hegel. Deleuze wants to develop a new way of thinking that does not explain Being, but rather shows it and lets it happen (in line with Heidegger's 'an-denkendes Denken'). Over against Plato, Deleuze wants a thinking that has 'a history' before it has 'a geography',[11] a thinking that goes (as Heidegger would put it) 'back into the ground of [representational, calculative] metaphysics', into that ground that makes representation and metaphysics possible. That is also what Whitehead wants. But Whitehead, I think, wants both the geography and the history. He does not only want to express and to do justice in thought to the wonderful fact *that* things happen. For him philosophy also should ask the *what* question, and in that sense Whitehead is, I think, closer to Plato and Aristotle than either Heidegger or Deleuze would wish to be.[12] Indeed, for Whitehead *what* questions, and thus questions on the level of representation, seem to be as important as *that* question, the question of the happening of being and its expression; in other words, not only the *verb* but also its explication, in its tenses and in its predicates, and thus nouns and attributes, even if these attributes are themselves verbs, as Deleuze so beautifully states. Deleuze (2004, p. 159), however, is afraid that the *what* question will override all the other questions.

Both Deleuze and Whitehead explicitly say that what philosophy has to explain is not the concrete but the abstract. They both want to explain the abstract starting from the concrete, which is the event. But philosophy is an attempt to *think*: to think the concrete and explain how the abstract is an abstraction. For Deleuze, going back to the concrete means to dramatize, to bring to the fore 'a "drama" beneath every logos' (Deleuze, 2004, p. 103). I think Whitehead also wants to point to that drama, but the task of philosophy is to create the right *abstractions* about it. To *express* the concrete, to bring to the fore 'a "drama" beneath every logos' in its concreteness, for Whitehead is the work of art. That's why for Whitehead there is a greater difference between art and philosophy than there is for Deleuze. For Whitehead's thinking is far more categorical and in that sense far more in line with tradition.

Both Heidegger and Deleuze want to overcome the tradition by developing a new kind of thinking related to a new concept of Being. As to

Whitehead, he certainly wants the second, but I am not so sure that he really wants the first. It seems that he tries to achieve a new concept of being, a new metaphysics, by a way of thinking that to a large extent is in line with traditional ways of thinking except in two regards, viz. when it comes to the claims that are made and to the logic of development. For Whitehead, any metaphysics is only an attempt, without any claim to finality, and it is creative and constructive, instead of being the self-development itself of Spirit (as in Hegel). But at the same time it is a creation and a construction that moves and has to move within a logical (and an aesthetic) harmony (as he says in *Science and the Modern World*)[13] that precedes[14] any philosophical creation, explication or speculation. That is why Whitehead refers to God, or why Einstein refers to a Cosmic Intellect, or Anaxagoras to a Nous: there is a logical (and for Whitehead also an aesthetic) order that precedes us and within which all philosophical expression is only possible.

Can the concrete be thought? And if so, can this be done in any other way than by categorical divisions? When Deleuze develops his 'method of dramatization',[15] it is precisely by introducing the categories – when, where, by whom, etc. – and hence the categories of time, place, relation, modality, etc., but not precisely the 'central' category (of 'substance'), i.e. the 'pros hen'. In that way, one certainly comes closer to the differential concrete than by static *what* questions and abstract essences. Yet can one *think* the concrete in such a way?[16] Or can it only be intuited, as Spinoza and Bergson seem to suggest? For Spinoza, the knowledge of intuition presupposes the knowledge of categorical thinking. And referring to Bergson (and others), Whitehead says one of his preoccupations has been 'to rescue their type of thought from the charge of anti-intellectualism which rightly or wrongly has been associated with it'.[17] Can thought *as thought* ever really overcome the level of universality and thus of abstraction? Or is the task of philosophy always to find better abstractions?

All this has not only to do with one's understanding of philosophy and of the place of 'abstract speculation'.[18] As Deleuze writes:

> When I ask *what is this?*, I assume there is an essence behind appearances, or at least something behind the masks. The other kind of question [who? how much? when? etc.], however, always discovers other masks behind the masks, displacements behind every place, other 'cases' stacked up in a case.[19]

In other words, 'what is thinking?' is not unrelated to 'what is Being?' As Heidegger has made clear, on the contrary, our concepts of thinking

and of Being model each other, which in a way would make us start all over again. It is no coincidence that *What is Philosophy?* is the last of Deleuze's books.

But let me conclude. To read Deleuze certainly is an event. It is a force that affects you. It does not leave you the same and it does not leave your thinking the same. As Whitehead would say: 'philosophy never reverts to its old position after the shock of a great philosopher' (1929-1, p. 11). And that is certainly true for Deleuze. He does not leave your thinking unchanged – your thinking about philosophy (*What is Philosophy?* is certainly one of the richest books on philosophy I have read in recent years), or your thinking about philosophers – Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant . . . and without doubt Whitehead too. Indeed, Deleuze makes you read Whitehead in a different light, a light that helps you, for instance, not read Whitehead (and his world of potentialitiy) in a too Platonic way. Or to discover in Whitehead's own philosophy the power of the verbal, of creation and determination, and the continuous dislocation of settled abstractions. On the other hand, the 'ghost' of Platonism may haunt Deleuze's philosophy as well, but in the opposite sense, akin to what Heidegger says about Nietzsche: a reversed Platonism is still a Platonism.[20] While Deleuze seems to think in terms of either/or, and thus in terms of opposition, I have the feeling that Whitehead is much freer *vis-à-vis* the problem of Platonism (in all its aspects), such that his philosophy, instead of being a philosophy of pure difference or of pure immanence, is rather a philosophy of the 'Ideal Opposites' (taking the title from the last chapter of *Process and Reality*): a thinking together of both being and becoming, of 'esse' and 'essence', of the 'that' and the 'what', of value and fact, and even of the authentic and the inauthentic. In addition, Whitehead's philosophy wants to be a *cosmology* of *this* world,[21] while Deleuze's wants to be a *vice-diction* of the chaosmos in all its virtuality. Important here is not only the difference between 'cosmos' and 'chaosmos', but also the difference between 'cosmo*logy* and vice-*diction* – i.e. between *logos* and *dicere*, between thinking and saying. Deleuze, as Keith Robinson once said, wants 'to make reason speak difference'. Whitehead, by contrast, wants to make reason *think* difference – and different forms of unity, as well.

Notes

1. Claude Romano, *L'Événement et le temps* (Coll. 'Epiméthée') Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999).
2. This phrase could well be attributed to Deleuze, it seems to me.

3. Deleuze's *Différence et Répétition* was first published in 1968, Heidegger's *Identität und Differenz* in 1957.
4. That there are clear links between Deleuze and Heidegger is apparent in their way of expressing: when Deleuze says in *Logique du Sens* that 'l'arbre verdoie' (the tree greens) and even that 'l'arbre arbrifie' (the tree trees) (Deleuze, 1969, 33) (unfortunately in the English translation [Deleuze 1990, p. 21] they are both translated by 'the tree greens', with the result that the main effect is lost), the well-known sentence of Heidegger, so ridiculed by Carnap, resonates: 'die Welt welt-et' .
5. There are other very interesting ones, e.g. that for Heidegger 'Ereignis' is more an 'ad-vernire' that an 'e-venire', more an advent than an event, while Deleuze thinks the event rather in terms of the (Leibnizian) 'implication', 'complication', 'explication' and 'unfolding' and thus in terms of 'e-venire'.
6. Heidegger also refers to this in his Introduction to *Being and Time*.
7. In that sense it has to do with the distinction, made after Wolff, between *metaphysica generalis* (ontology) and *metaphysica specialis* (the differentiation between man, world and God). Deleuze seems to keep only the *metaphysica generalis*, doing away the ontological differences between world, man and God.
8. Even if one says, as Smith (2001, p. 182 n. 32) suggests, that he defines them in a new way, 'as differential concepts' – leaving aside the question what that means.
9. Cf. Badiou (1997, pp. 25–30).
10. See Deleuze (1990, p. 127).
11. In the discussion following 'The Method of Dramatisation' in *Desert Islands*, Ferdinand Alquié expresses his surprise that Deleuze so easily sets aside the *what* questions (Deleuze, 2004, pp. 105–6).
12. Whitehead (1925, p. 18).
13. Yet 'precedes' should not be taken temporally here but (onto-)logically: 'God is not before all creation but with all creation' (Whitehead, 1929-1, p. 343).
14. See Deleuze (2004, pp. 94, 116).
15. Deleuze is concerned that the *what* question will override all the other questions. Stanislas Breton, however, remarks that the *what* question has an indispensable regulative function: it cannot override the other questions, but is an indispensable mediation: it is in order to answer the *what* question that I ask the other ones (Deleuze, 2004, p. 113). Whitehead might agree.
16. Cf. Whitehead (1929-1, p. xii).
17. Cf. Whitehead (1929-1, p. xii).
18. Cf. Whitehead (1929-2, p. 76; 1929-1, p. 14).
19. Deleuze (2004, p. 114). Cf. what Zourabichvilli writes, viz. that Deleuze has expressed his programme again and again, to substitute and for is ['substitution du et au est']. Or – which comes to the same, Zourabichvilli adds – to substitute becoming for being (Zourabichvilli, 2004, p. 7). For Whitehead, however, both do not just come to the same: Whitehead would agree with the latter (though with qualifications) but not with the former.
20. Cf. also the critique of Badiou: 'le deleuzisme est un platonisme ré-accentué' (Badiou, 1997, p. 42).
21. *Process and Reality* is after all 'an essay in cosmology' and cosmology is about this cosmic epoch we live in (see also Whitehead, 1929, p. 61).

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4

The Emergence of a Speculative Empiricism: Whitehead Reading Bergson

Didier Debaise

The main purpose of this chapter is to make sense of the homage Whitehead paid to Bergson in his preface to *Process and Reality*: 'I am also greatly indebted to Bergson, William James, and John Dewey.'[1] There are many readers, particularly in France, who have seen this as attesting to a continuity between the two philosophers.[2] This impression seems all the more justified given the similar homage Whitehead had earlier paid Bergson in *The Concept of Nature*: 'I believe that in this doctrine I am in full accord with Bergson, though he uses "time" for the fundamental fact which I call the "passage of nature".'[3] These declarations would seem to point to a similar movement, a shared orientation in thought, which, even if expressed using different concepts, nevertheless derived from the same intuition. The same vision, it is supposed, connects *Creative Evolution* and *Process and Reality*, according to which, as Bergson writes, 'we understand, we feel, that reality is a perpetual growth, a creation pursued without end'.[4] Certainly, the terms differ: where Bergson refers to duration, vital force and the event, Whitehead, in *Process and Reality*, prefers to speak of becoming, creativity and actual entities. But a common trajectory seems to extend beyond the divergent vocabulary.

At first sight this reading seems coherent and has the advantage of asserting a double continuity: from Bergson to Whitehead and from *The Concept of Nature* to *Process and Reality*.[5] It can, however, only be maintained at the expense of the different trajectories followed by Bergson and Whitehead. The homage paid to Bergson, as I shall show, does not designate a continuity, but on the contrary points to a bifurcation. Its starting point is the idea that the different forms of substantialism that have determined the history of metaphysics should be replaced by a thinking that does justice to the 'perpetual growth' referred to by Bergson and that

would form the core element of a new philosophy of nature. Whitehead and Bergson agree on this necessity, but the way in which each makes sense of it gives rise to two divergent paths, whose difference crystallizes around the place and function of the concept of duration.

The speculative inscription of duration

There is *a mode of appropriation* of Bergsonian concepts at work in Whitehead's homage. This mode is defined in the opening lines of *Process and Reality*:

> This course of lectures is designed as an essay in Speculative Philosophy. Its first task must be to define 'speculative philosophy', and to defend it as a method productive of important knowledge.[6]

These lines are fundamental for at least two reasons: first, speculative philosophy does not appear here as a loan whose importance is asserted by way of introduction, but is rather to be articulated in the course of writing *Process and Reality* itself. There is an unambiguous assertion of inseparability between the book's form and content, directly linking Whitehead to the speculative projects of eighteenth-century philosophers such as Spinoza, even if 'philosophy never reverts to its old position'.[7]

Second, speculative philosophy is essentially defined here as a *method*. This constitutes a considerable break with the history of speculative thinking. Speculative thought here no longer allies itself with a search for the first principles of the real, with an a priori ontology, but is rather a *method* of knowledge. It would thus be vain to search in *Process and Reality* for an account of the principles of speculative philosophy that would correspond directly with the cosmology worked out there. Like every method, it is less a theory than an account of the conditions of the production of knowledge. Whitehead states the obligations of this method immediately following his definition: 'to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted'.[8]

Such an aim is all the more risky given that Whitehead submits it to a strict requirement of rationalization. Indeed, the speculative method fulfils a function that entirely determines its nature and use: it is to provide an 'interpretation' of immediate experience. The function of philosophy, according to *Process and Reality*, is essentially an *interpretive* one. The transformation of speculative thought into a method is thus joined by a transformation, at least as surprising, of speculative thought into a

philosophy of interpretation. But we should not be mistaken: if Whitehead can bestow such a fundamental importance on interpretation, it is because the nature of interpretation itself has changed. It neither refers here to a relativism of any kind nor to an endless recursivity of the always multiple perspectives we can have of our experiences. Instead, it becomes extended in an unprecedented way: 'everything of which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall have the character of a particular instance of the general scheme.'[9] All experience, as resistant as it may be to being grasped conceptually, has to be redefinable as a particular instance through the construction of a scheme of ideas.

Whitehead expresses one of the unique claims of speculative thought in a proposition: 'There is no first principle which is in itself unknowable, not to be captured by a flash of insight.'[10] Certainly, we cannot lay claim to a complete interpretation of experience – the break with classic speculative philosophy, notably Hegelian, has long since been achieved for Whitehead – because the 'creative advance' of the universe (the ultimate principle of *Process and Reality*) is associated with the limits of intuition and language, which constitute inexorable obstacles to an exhaustive interpretation. But this does not imply that an adequate technical and conceptual interpretation, under continuous revision, is impossible. This at least is the regulative idea that traverses the speculative project, its very requirement: for every experience, no matter how singular, there must be a corresponding concept. This concept is not given, it is to be constructed, and this construction is guided by the method.

This rationalist confidence forms a striking contrast with Bergson's thought, leading Whitehead to remark that one of his concerns 'has been to rescue their [Bergson's, James' and Dewey's] type of thought from the charge of anti-intellectualism, which rightly or wrongly has been associated with it'.[11] Whitehead does not want to take a stand on whether this accusation is justified or not; that would require him to define the nature of this 'anti-intellectualism' and to relate it to Bergson's thought in order to evaluate its real or imagined presence there. His concern is much broader; it has to do with the possible connections between the rational and empirical dimensions of experience. If Whitehead mentions Bergson in this context, it is because Bergson has an important position on this connection, itself grounding a philosophical orientation with which Whitehead wants to contrast his own thought.

In order to understand this, we first have to examine the starting point shared by Bergson and Whitehead, which marks the beginning

of their divergence. Take Bergson's famous critique of Zeno's paradoxes of movement:

> At every moment, it [the arrow] is motionless, for it cannot have time to move, that is, to occupy at least two successive positions, unless at least two moments are allowed it. At a given moment, therefore, it is at rest at a given point. Motionless in each point of its course, it is motionless during all the time that it is moving.[12]

If the arrow does not reach its target it is because the intellect introduces a translation. It substitutes a 'represented mobility' for the 'original mobility' that is felt in the immediate experience of the movement of the arrow. A simple movement of passage has given way to a spatial translation into points and successions. Whitehead fully agrees with Bergson's claim that it is the spatialization of the movement of the arrow that is at the origin of the paradox. In *Science and the Modern World*, Whitehead calls this the 'simple location' of matter, that is, a way of thinking of matter as situated in a determined space and time without connection to other regions of space and time. Zeno's paradoxes of the movement of the arrow implicitly make use, as Bergson recognized, of the idea of the simple localization of matter: the arrow passes successively through regions of space–time that are independent of each other. This segmentation makes the very idea of mobility impossible, as this last implies that an event in a particular continuum of space and time extends itself and traverses other spaces and times.

Whitehead thus concurs with Bergson, but reproaches him for having made a far too general inference:

> On the whole, the history of philosophy supports Bergson's charge that the human intellect 'spatializes the universe'; that is to say, that it tends to ignore the fluency, and to analyse the world in terms of static categories. Indeed Bergson went further and conceived this tendency as an inherent necessity of the intellect. I do not believe this accusation; but I do hold that 'spatialization' is the shortest route to a clear-cut philosophy expressed in reasonably familiar language.[13]

Whitehead could not 'believe' Bergson's accusation because this would have implicitly called into question the speculative demands of *Process and Reality*. If indeed it were possible to infer from Zeno's paradoxes that it is in the nature of the intellect itself to spatialize and distort experiences such as those of duration and movement, the notion that all experience

can be adequately interpreted by a scheme of ideas would fall apart. Bergson confirms this in *The Creative Mind*:

> In order to avoid such contradictions as those which Zeno pointed out and to separate our everyday knowledge from the relativity to which Kant considered it condemned, we should not have to get outside of time (we are already outside of it!), we should not have to free ourselves of change (we are already only too free of it!); on the contrary, what we should have to do it to grasp change and duration in their original mobility.[14]

Bergson's solution appears in the form of an opposition between an original mobility, accessible only by a transformation of our modes of experience that would insert us into the very immanence of a movement, and a mobility observed from the outside, whose opacity is due to the distance from which we experience it.

Whitehead's criticism is twofold: first, it is inaccurate to say that spatialization is inherent to the intellect. It is historically true that spatialization has been the leading method adopted by philosophy and modern science, but it remains a singular trajectory, and nothing prevents imagining a multiplicity of others – including the one proposed by Whitehead, which we will analyse in more detail below. Second, the solution put forward by Bergson to deepen 'original duration' is based on a premise that cannot be justified a priori. It implies that only a relation of adequation, in the sense of 'deepening', is legitimate for duration. Thus, Bergson writes in *The Creative Mind*: 'We call intuition here the *sympathy* by which one is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it.'[15] Sympathy is distinguished from intuition in that intuition is a 'direct vision of the mind by the mind',[16] while sympathy makes an external object coincide with thought in the form of analogy. The relation is one of coincidence in both cases, but the former tends towards interiority and the latter towards exteriority. It becomes evident, then, that Bergson's notions of intuition and sympathy tend to diminish the distance experience has from itself and thus any separation between duration and its expression. But why would distance inevitably lead to travesty? Why should immanence necessarily be the appropriate perspective from which to think an event or a duration?

Speculative philosophy, on the contrary, is *a philosophy of mediation*. It does not aim at inserting itself, by sympathy or intuition, inside an experience it seeks to interpret. *Rather than diminishing distance, it extends*

it by constructing a scheme that corresponds to nothing in our experience. The scheme of ideas is not an ensemble of immanent concepts rooted in experience, an extension of what experience contains virtually; rather it is something *constructed*, to be invented in its entirety. This implies a leap towards complete abstraction, what Whitehead calls 'an imaginative leap'.[17] It is this leap, along with the invention of a unique syntax, that permits us to leave the paradoxes behind and to approach the speculative genesis of duration.

Becomings and rhythms

Whitehead places the concept of 'actual entities' at the centre of this new syntax. ' "Actual entities" – also termed "actual occasions" – are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real.'[18] These actual entities form a kind of *ontological limit*, which, if crossed, would make the very notion of existence meaningless. To speak of existence means to refer to one or more actual entities. This is why Whitehead compares them to more classical notions such as 'substance', 'monad' or '*res vera*'. This comparison does not imply that these notions have common characteristics; in fact, they are opposed on every level. It means, rather, that they both satisfy the requirement of identifying that which *exists as such*. Whitehead's definition is crucial: an actual entity is 'an act of experience arising out of data. It is a process of "feeling" the many data, so as to absorb them into the unity of one individual "satisfaction" '.[19] Whitehead calls this prehension (the term derives from *prehendere*, which means to take, catch or appropriate). It is the activity by which one thing takes or seizes another. One could also say 'to feel', but on condition of separating the notion from its anthropological or psychological connotations that would make it a faculty among others, like perception or imagination. Speculative philosophy gives priority to existence as such and not to the perceiving subject. All the concepts it mobilizes thus refer to *modes of beings*: prehension, sense, perception and even pleasure are ontological concepts here. Now Whitehead says that this activity of prehension is integral to the coming into being of an actual entity, to its process or becoming. What an actual entity *is* is inseparable from the process it embodies. It is for this reason that I suggest calling it a 'principle of individuation'.[20]

This principle nevertheless distinguishes itself from classical notions of individuation, such as Aristotle's, because it affirms that existence derives neither from an essence nor from a potential being, but rather from other beings in action. There is a radical contingency at the basis

of individuation to which speculative thought aims to give meaning. Beyond the facticity of existence 'there is nothing, merely nonentity – "The rest is silence"'.[21] The origin of every being is another being that came before it and which is itself preceded by an infinite number of others. There is neither beginning nor infinite regression in the search for causes since the question of existence always has to be situated in this or that particular process. Thus Whitehead will write that an

> actual entity has a threefold character: (i) it has the character 'given' for it by the past; (ii) it has the subjective character aimed at in its process of concrescence; (iii) it has the superjective character, which is the pragmatic value of its specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity.[22]

With the notion of actual entity placed at the heart of a philosophy of individuation, Whitehead was able to foreground the relations between the different temporal dimensions of existence. Thus the actual entities that are prehended – Whitehead calls them both 'givens' and 'objects' – constitute, from the point of view of the entity on the path of individuation, its *past*, as they are *literally* what precede it. They delimit what Bergson called 'ready-made reality' since they are what 'took place', acts that occurred at a particular moment. We have no other references or perspectives than the actual entity that becomes the measure of both what is present and what is past. There is, moreover, no ontological difference between the two since the past is nothing but a collection of entities that has taken place, while the present is nothing but the multiplicity of entities that have come to be. They simply correspond to distinct moments, to phases of being.

But if we look again at Whitehead's definition of prehension, namely that it is an integration of all the other entities, we can say that a new actual entity comes into existence by fully integrating the past. This past is captured and integrated in a being that is 'in progress'. Thus we have here nothing like the classical understanding of time, where the past is understood as an elapsed moment making way for a new one. The past is rather the material of each new being, 'real potentiality' that is constantly being actualized by beings in action.

But if the past provides the material, it does not provide the form. An actual entity does not derive passively from the past. Its appropriation is specific to what it is and especially to what it is *tending* to become. The past could never be integrated if the entity itself were not animated by something that does *not* derive from its past. Whitehead calls this

something, which is irreducible to other actual entities, the entity's 'subjective goal', its final cause. An entity in the process of individuation is in a relation of inadequacy to itself, and is being projected towards its own end. It is because the entity is a tendency, an aim, and thus a choice or decision to exist, that its past is integrated in a specific mode. Whitehead refers to a 'way' or a 'how'. Certainly, every entity, without exception, is linked to everything that came before it – even to the negative prehensions,[23] what is rejected determines what becomes – but it is connected in a unique way, which is its own perspective. Whitehead is in accord with Leibniz's principle of indiscernables: there are no two similar entities in the universe because there are no two identical ways to inherit a common past. We can also define the future in the same way we have defined the past from the perspective of the individuation of an actual entity. The future is the subjective goal of the entity, its 'principle of restlessness', its 'immanent aim'. The past as well as the future are here resituated in being itself and communicate with each other in the concrete operations of existence.

The process of individuation that makes the future and the past communicate in a concrete operation happens all at once. It is delimited on the inside by precise boundaries marking a beginning (the emergence of a new entity within a disjunctive plurality) and an end (the satisfaction). This point is crucial because it has been the source of a misunderstanding of Whitehead's thought: becoming is atomic and without extension. It comes to a radical end. Once the entity has attained satisfaction, once all of its relationships to the universe have been established, it will never again be susceptible to transformation or change. It will invariably remain *this* actual entity. Certainly, it will now acquire a new form of existence, becoming the object of new individuations, but changes and becomings will no longer affect it.

The emergence of continuity: becomings and durations

We can now return to Zeno's paradoxes and, thanks to the concept of the actual entity, avoid the choice that seemed to impose itself earlier between on the one hand a thinking of discontinuity (brought about by spatialization), incapable of accounting for change *qua* change, and on the other a thinking of continuity incapable of explaining the moments in the trajectory of the arrow as more than artificial cuts. To affirm both that the movement of the arrow is made up of distinct moments *and* that there is nevertheless a continuous trajectory allows for the concept of the actual entity to be thought as a process of individuation. How can

Whitehead maintain within one set of ideas these two lines of thought that seemed to oppose each other so radically? In *Process and Reality*, he presents his own reading of the paradoxes based on his concept of the actual entity: 'The argument, so far as it is valid, elicits a contradiction from the two premises: (i) that in a becoming something (*res vera*) becomes, and (ii) that every act of becoming is divisible into earlier and later sections which are themselves acts of becoming.'[24] Whitehead's solution relies entirely on the concept of the actual entity. According to the first premise, becoming is necessarily the becoming of something, what we have suggested calling an 'individuation'. According to the second premise, the trajectory is made up of successions, where one block of individuation succeeds another. Whatever part 'we [arbitrarily] indicate presupposes an earlier creature which became after the beginning of the second and antecedently to the indicated creature.'[25] Every act thus inherits from, and integrates, what precedes it.

Whitehead also speaks of a *transmission of feelings*: the precursor transmits its own existence to the entity that comes after it, which in turn relays this heritage to those that follow. And it is this series of inheritances, resumptions and transmissions he calls a 'trajectory'. Can it be that these two premises sum up what we said earlier, namely that the actual entities are acts of becoming that form series? Whitehead distinguishes them:

> One kind is the fluency inherent in the constitution of the particular existent. This kind I have called 'concrescence'. The other kind is the fluency whereby the perishing of the process, on the completion of the particular existent, constitutes that existent as an original element in the constitutions of other particular existents elicited by repetitions of process. This kind I have called 'transition'.[26]

The movement of the arrow is comparable to a relay, in which each member passes on to the next what he received from the one before him; a transition from one concrescence to another. The moments are added together and are taken up successively, forming a long chain of inheritances and transmissions. We could say of the succession of the acts of becoming what Dewey wrote on the subject of experience: 'Experiencing like breathing is a rhythm of intakings and outgivings. Their succession is punctuated and made a rhythm by the existence of intervals, periods in which one phase is ceasing and the other is inchoate and preparing.'[27]

What comes first is not, as Bergson thought, the continuity of the arrow, cut by the intellect into distinct moments, but rather the series

of discontinuous acts of becoming that give rise, through their transmission, to a continuity. Whitehead, like Dewey, speaks of 'rhythms':

> The creative process is rhythmic: it swings from the publicity of many things to the individual privacy; and it swings back from the private individual to the publicity of the objectified individual. The former swing is dominated by the final cause, which is the ideal; and the latter swing is dominated by the efficient cause, which is actual.[28]

The movement is more of the order of a heartbeat, of a series of contractions and relaxations, prehensions and objectivations, than of a continuous, harmoniously prolonged development. The order of causes has to be reversed: continuity is not first, but an effect, a mixture of concrescence and transition. The essence of time is discontinuity, but one which produces, by the transition of one individuation to another, a continuity forever dependent on the decision of each existence. Whitehead expresses it in a phrase that seems mysterious at first glance: 'There is a becoming of continuity, but no continuity of becoming.'[29]

Conclusion: The two forms of empiricism

Bergson thought that with the problem of duration he had found the conditions for a transformation of philosophy towards an empiricism of a particular type, a 'superior' or 'true' empiricism. His critique of representation as a tendency to spatialize experience lent substantial support to the idea that an appropriate understanding of duration and change would imply a transformation of our modes of experience towards superior forms of adequation, such as sympathy and intuition. Thus, according to Bergson, 'In order to advance with the moving reality, you must replace yourself within it. Install yourself within change, and you will grasp at once both change itself and the successive states in which *it might* at any instant be immobilized.'[30] By placing ourselves *within* duration, a complete experience becomes possible, giving us both mobility and immobility, change as well as stability. The conditions of this complete experience are given in the terms mobilized by Bergson: 'to install oneself', 'to place oneself within', 'to coincide with'.

The same will to extricate knowledge from the model of representation runs through *Process and Reality*, but it is deployed in a new context. Speculative philosophy employs technical and abstract means, entirely different from those of Bergsonism, to account for the principal qualities

Bergson attributed to duration. In order to account for duration, Whitehead removes himself from it by positing elements – the actual entities – that do not last, that are without duration. Whitehead opposes the empiricism of immediacy that characterizes Bergson's thought with an empiricism of mediations and abstractions. His empiricism attempts 'an elucidation of immediate experience'[31] based on the construction of a collection of abstractions that do not correspond directly to anything in our experience, but that, like technical tools, allow us to *interpret* it. Inasmuch as the interpretation of the most singular and concrete elements of our experience require the construction of the most universal abstractions, according to this empiricism, it deserves to be called, by contrast, a 'speculative empiricism'.

Translated by Millay Hyatt

Notes

1. A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality. An Essay in Cosmology* (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. vii.
2. It was undoubtedly Jean Wahl who presented the most coherent of these Bergsonian readings of Whitehead, notably in his essential book *Vers le concret* (Paris: Vrin, 1932). This legacy is carried on by Gilles Deleuze, notably in *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*. Trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). Deleuze describes Whitehead's philosophy as a thinking of the event and lists the following three core components: 1. an event has extension, that is to say, it 's'étend sur les suivants, de telle manière qu'il est un tout, et les suivants, ses parties' (p. 105); 2. an event is composed of extensive series that 'ont des propriétés intrinsèques (par exemple, hauteur, intensité, timbre d'un son, ou teinte, valeur, saturation de la couleur), qui entrent pour leur compte dans de nouvelles séries infinies . . .' (p. 105); 3. an event is an individual. If 'nous appelons élément ce qui a des parties et est une partie, mais aussi ce qui a des propriétés intrinsèques, nous disons que l'individu est une "concrescence" d'éléments' (p. 105). Deleuze, following Wahl, attributes the qualities of actual entities to events, and vice versa. The two concepts became confused, in my view, because Whitehead's thinking of the event is not sufficiently distinguished from other philosophies of the event, particularly that of Bergson.
3. A. N. Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), p. 54.
4. H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (London: Macmillan, 1911), p. 252.
5. It is true that in *The Concept of Nature*, Whitehead uses a language very close to Bergson's, referencing events, passages and durations. Nature is described here as one continuous reality, which we experience in 'chunks', cutouts that are events. Whitehead writes: 'The continuity of nature is the continuity of events' (1920, p. 76). But beginning with *Process and Reality*, the concepts of nature and of the event lose their ultimate character in favour of creativity

and actual entities. Furthermore, from this point on Whitehead considers discontinuity rather than continuity to be the fundamental nature of the universe. It would thus seem that there is not simply a continuation and generalization from *The Concept of Nature* to *Process and Reality*. It is not a matter of denying that there is a profound coherence between the two books, but it cannot be situated, in my view, in the treatment of the same problem.

6. Whitehead, *Process and Reality,* p. 3.
7. Whitehead, *Process and Reality,* p. 11.
8. *Process and Reality,* p. 3.
9. Whitehead, *Process and Reality,* p. 3.
10. Whitehead, *Process and Reality,* p. 4.
11. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. vii.
12. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 325.
13. Whitehead, *Process and Reality,* p. 209.
14. H. Bergson, *The Creative Mind* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 167.
15. Bergson, *The Creative Mind*, p. 190.
16. Bergson, *The Creative Mind*, p. 48.
17. Whitehead, *Process and Reality,* p. 4.
18. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 18.
19. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 40.
20. For a more complete analysis of Whitehead's relationship to the history of the concept of individuation, see my *Un Empirisme spéculatif. Lecture de Process and Reality de Whitehead* (Paris: Vrin, 2006).
21. Whitehead, *Process and Reality,* p. 43.
22. Whitehead, *Process and Reality,* p. 87.
23. Whitehead, *Process and Reality,* p. 23.
24. Whitehead, *Process and Reality,* p. 68.
25. Whitehead, *Process and Reality,* p. 68.
26. Whitehead, *Process and Reality,* p. 210.
27. J. Dewey, 'Art as Experience', in *The Later Works, 1925–1953*, vol. 10 (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), p. 62.
28. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 151.
29. Whitehead, *Process and Reality,* p. 35.
30. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, pp. 324–5.
31. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 4.

5

Deleuze and Whitehead: the Concept of Reciprocal Determination[1]

James Williams

Dualism and immanence

Three related problems form the background to Deleuze's development of the concept of reciprocal determination in *Difference and Repetition*. The historical importance of these problems and the power of the concept in resolving them explain its pivotal role in Deleuze's work. Indeed, it is questionable whether Deleuze's metaphysics can stand without reciprocal determination. Given the strong connection between Deleuze's and Whitehead's philosophies and their common background in the problems to be outlined below, this chapter asks whether a parallel idea of determination can be found in Whitehead's work.[2] It will be shown that such parallels exist through many of Whitehead's books and essays, but that there are significant and productive differences between the two positions.

The first problem concerns a possible accusation of dualism in philosophies that split reality into two realms, or, more properly in Deleuze's case, into two fields. The fields can be seen as two sides of reality, as two separate fields that together constitute reality, or as one prior field from which the other declines or in regard to which the other turns out to be an illusion. Despite Deleuze's claims to an ontology of immanence, the use of two concepts with respect to reality, virtual and actual, and the refusal to conflate the two, raise traditional questions with respect to dualism. These split into problems of interaction and problems of unity. How do the virtual and the actual interact? How do they maintain their distinction, if they do interact? Is not interaction the place to define a higher unity that denies the priority of the initial distinction? These questions can be seen as raising technical objections, resolved through the many facets of reciprocal determination, but they

can also be seen as introducing more serious metaphysical objections, that is, that Deleuze's philosophy should be reclassified as a philosophy of transcendence.[3] Such objections would weaken Deleuze's claims to immanence and univocity for his philosophy.

The second problem raised by the actual/virtual distinction does not follow directly from the problem of dualism, but it is related to particular criticisms of philosophies of transcendence. If the solution to interaction or to separateness overemphasizes one or other sides of the distinction, then there can be the formal objection that the distinction is false and that, in fact, everything collapses back onto the privileged side. There can be a similar objection in terms of value, that is, that the privileging of one side over the other is illegitimate and establishes a false and destructive hierarchy. Criticisms of the devaluation of the body as the legacy of Cartesianism would be an example of this kind of objection. According to such objections, though two realms are defined as separate, the distinction does not hold when their respective values are compared and one of them turns out to be the main source of value, thereby conflating the two realms.

In Deleuze's case, this split can go both ways. He can be interpreted as depending on a strong materialism that brings him close to positions in contemporary science, thereby devaluing his work on Ideas in *Difference and Repetition*. Or he can be interpreted as overemphasizing a new Ideal and virtual field at the expense of the actual, thereby leading to accusations of an anti-Platonism that merely replicates its biggest fault, instead of inverting or correcting it.[4] In terms of a return to transcendence, this privileging of one field over the other leads to the claim that one transcends the other, in the sense of providing illegitimate means for the definition or restriction of its components. This fixing leads to the third problem. If Deleuze's philosophy is seen as above all dependent on an ontology of becoming or process, and if the virtual/actual distinction leads to an ontology where one or the other remains fixed, though related to the other, then becoming is subjected to being and to the return to identity, for example, in essences or predicates. Again, this can be seen as a technical problem. How can something deemed to be primarily becoming be anchored in being? Is not becoming always secondary to being, given the requirement of prior identities, for difference to be thought?

In terms of this return to identity in philosophies of becoming or process philosophy, there is a key difference between the two thinkers: the side of reality that is in danger of being fixed by the other is not the same. For Deleuze, identity returns more readily in the actual. For

Whitehead, it seems to be a factor in the world of Value or of eternal objects. Yet, despite these differences, both need answers to the following questions: Can they be criticized for elaborating dualist metaphysics? If not, can the key distinctions in their metaphysics be maintained? If they can be maintained, is it at the price of a return to identity and to being?

Immortality

A first response could be that Deleuze and Whitehead deny the key premises concerning a division into fields and realms and the possibility of treating them separately. The doctrine of reciprocal determination could then be put quite simply as follows. Whilst reality or the universe can be considered under two realms or fields, neither can be viewed as completely determined until it is taken in a relation of reciprocal determination with the other. From the point of view of complete determination, the virtual and the actual, or Fact and Value, or actual occasion and eternal object, must be seen as abstractions that provide the limits or boundaries within which reciprocal determination takes place and that contain the material taken in that determination.

There are significant problems concerned with such a definition. For example, it seems at times that Deleuze views the virtual as *the* real, if only completely determined when expressed in a process of actualization. Or at times it seems that Whitehead defines eternal objects independently of fact. So there is some sense according to which the fields retain an independence from the process of reciprocal determination. This is serious where that independence takes on an important metaphysical and practical role because these roles drive a wedge between the two fields, thus allowing claims regarding dualism to return in many of their most devastating guises.

Towards the end of their careers both thinkers wrote deeply beautiful and highly concentrated summary accounts of their metaphysics where they approached questions of life and immortality implied in their earlier works, but not necessarily fully worked out until these late creations. The essays 'Immortality' and 'L'Immanence: une vie …' ('Immanence: a life…'[5]) divert traditional questions of immortality, whilst insisting on the importance of value with respect to life. They also contain succinct, if difficult, restatements of the doctrines of reciprocal determination.[6] 'Immortality' is a distillation of Whitehead's metaphysics. He seeks to convey the power and essence of his thought, but at the risk of serious misinterpretations. I shall therefore use the essay only to begin to draw

questions about his views of reciprocal determination, only then to move back through *Science and the Modern World* and *Process and Reality*.

Whitehead insists on a necessary relation between Fact and Value in the Idea in two ways – one positive, one negative. Positively, Fact and Value are only fully realized when they are brought together, that is, where fact is the realization of value, for example, in the realization of ideas in the actions associated with human personal identity. The eternal ideas bring immortality to the fact of action and the action brings realization to the idea. Negatively, mere Fact or mere Value lacks something essential, that is, they are abstractions that miss the necessity of realization for complete Fact or Value in the Idea. The concepts of abstraction, of the mere and of emphasis show insufficiency or lack in considering the world of Fact or the world of Value on its own. Instead, their essence lies in the reciprocal determination expressed as the introduction of immortality into mere passing flow for the world of Fact and of realization for the world of Value. Here, abstraction, a form of bracketing, has a necessary role in the exposition, but this role does not imply that Fact and Value should be considered as separable when viewed from the point of view of a complete understanding of the Universe.

Value plays a necessary role in the universe for facts and for values, for example, from the point of view of judgements dependent on values in the world of facts. Without such judgements the world would not only be poorer, but simply misunderstood. It is important to note that Whitehead's selection of judgement is particularly problematic from the point of view of the connection to Deleuze, given his extended critique of the role of judgement in thought.[7] For Whitehead, value enters the world of fact through judgements. For Deleuze, judgements about facts or about values inhibit the work of virtual and actual intensities, in the sense where value has to be experienced rather than reflected upon. Like Whitehead, though more ambiguously, Deleuze insists on the interdependence of the two fields. The virtual is only fully realized as proper through a process of actualization. Or, in another formulation, the virtual is incomplete without this actualization. In return, though, the actual is incomplete without its differentiation in the virtual. So both realms require a completion that depends on a process within the other. By proper, Deleuze means that the virtual only acquires an individuality associated with singularities – singular features – through actualization. This gives us our first sense of what it means to be determined. It is to come out of an undifferentiated multiplicity, into a differentiated, 'characterized' one. Deleuze draws a distinction between *une vie* (a life) and *la vie* (life) to underline this process and its necessity.

'A life' is the virtual. The virtual is the transcendental condition for every actual life, past, present and future. More precisely, virtual Ideas and intensities are the conditions for the creative process at work in any individual through its sensations. These relations of individuation – of sensations, intensities and Ideas – are the singularities that determine any individual: 'A life is everywhere, in all the moments traversed by this or that subject and measured by such and such objects: immanent life carrying the events and singularities that are only actualised in subjects and objects.'[8] So 'a life' is not a particular life. This is why useful explanatory terms for determination, such as character and feature, must be treated with great care; they do not depend on the indication of a given particular and identified being. Deleuze does not recognize the independence of any particular life from its virtual conditions. Instead, any such particular must be seen in the wider context of an actualization of those conditions under certain singular conditions. All lives are singular expressions of those conditions, that is, a life given determinacy through its singularities. The notion of a particular life, thinkable under a general category or species, is inimical to Deleuze's structure where all things are connected to all others – both virtual and actual. This connection is a process of determination that goes from the virtual to the actual answered by a process that goes from the actual to the virtual. Any emerging subject or object only acquires determinacy in the actual through its singularities, themselves dependent on their transcendental conditions in the virtual. That is, an individuality that resists full identification, and hence a reduction to sameness, depends on intensities – values – that can only come out of the virtual or 'a life'. In 'L'immanence: une vie . . .', Deleuze tends to emphasize the process from actual to virtual rather than the other way round. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the other relation is not important. Rather, there are contingent historical and political reasons in that essay for the insistence on the virtual.

Following these two broad outlines, it is possible to define reciprocal determination more clearly, in particular in relation to problems of dualism. First, for both thinkers, the relation does not take the form of legislation in the sense bequeathed by Kant's transcendental philosophy. Neither field draws up limits for the other, whereby particular judgements or propositions could be judged to be illegitimate. Instead, the relation is a properly transforming one. Value needs to be realized. The virtual needs to be actualized. Fact requires Value. The actual requires the virtual intensity of 'a life . . .' However, it does not appear that this transforming relation can be a causal one, open to induction, or even

a symmetrical one, that is, where a process can be undone or traced back. There is uniqueness to each transformation as a singular event. This uniqueness is itself guaranteed by Deleuze's insistence on the role of virtual singularities, which we can define as relations resistant to identification or representation, yet conditional for determinacy.

An individual is determined by singular relations of reciprocal transformation of the virtual and the actual that make it incomparable to other individuals. These singularities cannot be represented without losing that property, which explains Deleuze's emphasis on the roles of expression and dramatization in his work. We can only express individuality, and the relation between virtual conditions and actual subjects and objects is one of dramatization – we have to dramatize our differences. So neither Deleuze nor Whitehead puts forward laws governing the relation of one field to another. They both insist on the role of the relation with respect to the completing of its two sides, but exactly how that completion takes place is often left very vague. This is quite deliberate and explicit with respect to science, in the case of Whitehead, perhaps less so, or less obviously so, in the case of Deleuze. For Whitehead, science is associated with the world of Fact, though mathematics is associated with the world of Value. Neither can explain the process of realization of Value into Fact. In his essay 'Mathematics and the Good', twinned with 'Immortality' in *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*, Whitehead argues that mathematics teaches us about pattern, that is, about relations in the world of Value. There lies its existential importance. But this study of abstraction must be completed through 'the doom of realisation, actual or conceptual'. Philosophy has to go beyond science in responding to this relation of abstraction to individuality.[9]

Deleuze insists on twin processes of actualization (the determination of virtual Ideas in actual expressions) and differentiation (the determination of singular individuals in virtual Ideas). Any individual is therefore determined through the way its actual differences give form to a chaos of virtual Ideas; but it is also determined through the way its singular Idea and associated intensities undo its actual form by introducing singular transformations and intensities. This twinning is also a key factor for Whitehead in the balance of a process that assigns relative positions and a process that ensures that individuality remains. Both thinkers are responding to the problem of how we can have genuine individuality in a world where we also have genuine relativity. All individuals share the same world, but in a singular way. This is because existence is only complete when viewed as a reciprocal determination of singularity and identity (Deleuze) or as a balance of individuality and relativity

(Whitehead). The world is neither governed by full equivalences and substitutability, nor by full independence and incommensurability. Instead, neither of these options makes full sense and explains life unless it is set alongside the other.

Potential and identity

But how can Deleuze and Whitehead lay claim to a real transformation that resists theorization in terms of laws? What form does it take? Here we begin to see great differences between the two thinkers. In the above discussion, I have left open a choice between terms: abstraction and completion, lack and incompleteness. For Whitehead, the two 'realms' are separate because they are abstract, only to be fully realised in what he calls 'Ideas'. The description of the two Worlds involves stages which include characteristics borrowed from the other world: 'The reason is that these worlds are abstractions from the Universe; and every abstraction involves reference to the totality of existence.'[10] Reciprocal determination takes place between the two realms and not in them. For Deleuze, on the other hand, the processes take place in the fields themselves. The virtual and the actual reciprocally determine one another; there is no third term between them and independent of them. Nor is there any abstraction. Later, we shall see that this relation is highly complex and that it involves new concepts, such as intensity and sensation, that may invite claims about third terms or mediation anew. However, here we can stick to the definition that reality is the virtual and the actual. There are illusory and differently damaging false views in limiting reality to one or other field.

The difference between the two thinkers is summed up in opposed views regarding potential and identity (or essence). Deleuze often insists that the virtual is not the possible or the potential. It must not be thought in terms of a modal logic, where a distinction between possible and actual allows for discrimination between fields in terms of reality. The virtual is fully part of reality and lacks nothing in comparison to the actual: 'The event, considered as non-actualized (indefinite), lacks nothing.'[11] Whitehead, on the other hand, defines the realm or world of Value in terms of the possible, a Value or Eternal object has a possible realization and not an actual one: 'Thus, the World of Activity is grounded upon the multiplicity of finite Acts, and the World of Value is grounded upon the unity of active coordination of the various possibilities of Value.'[12]

Deleuze avoids any reference to identity with respect to the virtual. It is to be a multiplicity of variations resistant to identification

and entering into determinacy only through relations characterized as distinct–obscure. This explains his resistance to the subject and to the object in 'L'immanence: une vie . . .': 'A transcendental field is distinguished from experience in not referring to an object, or belonging to a subject (empirical representation).'[13] Whitehead, on the other hand, defines Value or eternal objects as having a fixed, well-defined essence. Their variation only comes in where they shift from potential to realized: 'The World which emphasizes Persistence is the world of Value. Value is in its nature timeless and immortal. Its essence is not rooted in any passing circumstance. The immediacy of some mortal circumstance is only valuable because it shares in the immortality of some value.'[14] These differences can be organized around a key question: How is creation or innovation going to be explained without setting up some kind of transcendent benchmark that allows for the new to be related to that in which it occurs, whilst still allowing for determinacy?

Abstraction

To study the differences between the two processes of reciprocal determination further, I now turn to two earlier texts. The first is Chapter X of Whitehead's *Science and the Modern World*, on abstraction. The second is Deleuze's 'La méthode de dramatisation' from 1967, reproduced in *L'Île déserte et autres textes*. This is the first text to explain reciprocal determination and to place it at the core of Deleuze's philosophy. It prepares for much of the later work in *Différence et répétition*.

Early on in the chapter on abstraction, Whitehead is careful to insist on the necessary connection of two realms (just as he will later in 'Immortality'). However, eternal objects can be defined in abstraction from actual occasions: 'By "abstract" I mean that what an abstract object is in itself – that is to say its essence – is comprehensible without reference to some one particular occasion of experience.'[15] As I hope to show later, it is exactly this kind of abstraction of a singular idea that Deleuze refuses. For Whitehead, there can be a separation of the eternal object into three aspects: its particular individuality, its relation to other eternal objects and 'the general principle which expresses its ingression in particular occasions'. The first two are abstracted from the last. The abstracted aspect of the eternal object is not only invariant, it is invariant in its ingression in an actual occasion: 'This unique contribution is identical for all such occasions in respect to the fact that the object in all modes of ingression is just its identical self.'[16] So ingression in an actual occasion, and is not judged as different due to any particular eternal object, but to

the different eternal objects in each ingression. In one case X, we may have ingressions of a, b, c. We know that another case Y is different, because we have a, b, d. The ingressions do not alter a as abstract, but in its relation to b, c and d. Whitehead goes on to conclude, again exactly as in 'Immortality', that eternal objects are possibilities for actualities, that is, they may be 'selected' or not – the emphasis on this term is to help a later remark on different understandings of selection in Deleuze and Whitehead.[17]

However, things become a lot more complicated through two further remarks. First, Whitehead describes this selection as 'a gradation of possibilities in respect to their realization in that occasion'. This is particularly puzzling, since we could either suppose that all eternal objects are present in each ingression, though to different degrees, but that would contradict the claims regarding identity made just before (this is the option closest to Deleuze's metaphysics). Or, we could suppose that some eternal objects are involved in the ingression and they themselves are graded. But this would raise the questions of how eternal objects can be separated from one another and, more seriously, how there can be a selection of only some in any ingression, if we suppose endless connections between actual occasions.

Whitehead seems to lead to a merging of both interpretations in his next metaphysical principle: 'An eternal object, considered as an abstract entity, cannot be divorced from its reference to other eternal objects, and from its references to actuality generally; though it is disconnected from its actual modes of ingression into definite actual occasions.'[18] All eternal objects are related and have a general 'position' with respect to the possibility of any actualization. So, though we have a necessary connection at the level of the realm of Value and that connection limits the possible ingressions together with a relation to a general actuality, each actual occasion is still a selection of some eternal objects and not others; if it were not, then the 'relational essence' would be variable, as would be the limits it defined. To clarify this apparent contradiction of independence and dependence in the abstraction of eternal objects, summed up in the statement that eternal objects have an essence separable from ingression but that they are also dependent on ingression in some way, it is helpful to return to the concept of gradation. On further reading, it is clear that gradation is not a matter of degrees or intensities, but of relations between eternal objects. Free of relations, eternal objects have a grade zero. These are then simple: 'An eternal object, such as the definite shade of green, which cannot be analysed into a relationship of components, will be called "simple" '.[19]

Whitehead explains abstraction in terms of hierarchies of complexity. There is greater abstraction where there is greater complexity, that is, where an eternal object can be subdivided into relations of other eternal objects. We then have a pyramid with a peak at the most complex relation, subdividing to a base of simple eternal objects. He implies that possibility is related to this abstraction: 'Thus, as we pass from the grade of simple eternal objects to higher and higher grades of complexity, we are indulging in higher grades of possibility.'[20] The key question then becomes: How are these definitions of abstraction and possibility related to ingression in actual occurrences?

The transition to an answer happens late in the chapter on abstraction. Whitehead begins with the statement that his discussion of the hierarchy and its conditions is locked into the realm of possibility, objects are more or less possible, but here possible has nothing to do with their probability of being actual, it is rather a way of explaining different levels of abstraction. When we say 'Green is more possible than' we merely mean 'Green is less complex than'. He makes this point with the statement that within the realm of possibility eternal objects 'are devoid of real togetherness: they remain within their "isolation"'.[21] Real togetherness is different from abstract relations in the hierarchy, it is a stronger relation that can only come from ingression, since it involves a selection within the hierarchy. For Whitehead, this selection involves an infinite set of relations, defined in terms of connectedness. Ingression highlights this set and its particular relations *against the background of the whole hierarchy of possibles*:

> There is a connected hierarchy of concepts applicable to the occasion, including concepts of all degrees of complexity. Also in the actual occasion, the individual essences of the eternal objects involved in these complex concepts achieve a synthetic synthesis, productive of the occasion as an experience for its own sake.'[22]

As Whitehead is quick to point out, this means that he is using two concepts of abstraction: as an indicator of levels in the hierarchy and as the process of abstraction of the associated hierarchy from the one of all possible relations. This leads to an interesting application. The simple eternal objects are more abstract, from the occasion, because they involve fewer relations and hence a greater cut from the associated hierarchy.

So the answer to the apparent paradox with respect to the definition of the eternal object is that any eternal object has two sides, one in the 'whole' hierarchy, and one in terms of actual occasions. Each determines

the occasion in different ways: one in terms of a general grading, the other in terms of synthetic relations. Why are both essential? The first is a necessary property of the nature of relations between eternal objects. The second allows the eternal object to be determined in an infinite set of possible relations. On the one hand, we have position, on the other, shape. Shape depends on position for its orientation, but position makes no sense without its associated senses or shapes. We cannot grasp position within an infinite set of relations without making certain abstractions through shaping dependent on ingression.

An intuitive way of grasping Deleuze's difference from Whitehead is that properties and eternal objects should be more like Deleuzian Ideas in that any new expression or combination of them changes the property, eternal object and Idea, so we never have a set to select from, but a series of varying degrees that we alter but do not select in. For Deleuze, the selection of parts is only in terms of actual and incomplete differences; it expresses an indirect selection of degrees of intensity at the level of Ideas. The stakes are high, since if we are dealing with relations of varying degrees (Deleuze) we lose the logical independence of eternal ideas and properties and gain a fundamental connectedness of all individuals (worlds). Deleuze's point has very wide ethical and political repercussions that deserve much longer treatment than can be given here. Briefly, the opposition lies in questions of the priority of continuity and discontinuity, in metaphysics, and of completeness and affirmation versus identity and negation, in ethics and politics. 'Only connect' is more important in metaphysics than anywhere else; indeed, if we fail it in metaphysics, we fail it everywhere else – despite appearances.

Dramatization

Whitehead's treatment of determinacy mirrors his work on abstraction. The double definition of abstraction, in terms of both relations in the hierarchy of eternal objects and relations in the hierarchy, is replicated in two definitions of the determinacy of the eternal object. That determinacy is defined with respect to other eternal objects: 'The determinate relatedness of the eternal object A to every other eternal object is how A is systematically and by the necessity of its nature related to every other eternal object. Such relatedness represents a possibility for realisation.'[23] However, the determinacy is also defined in terms of actual realizations. This latter determinacy is itself twofold. The actual occasion acquires determinacy at the same time as the eternal object: 'Thus the synthetic prehension, which is α, is the solution of the indeterminateness of A into

the determinateness of α.'[24] So reciprocity is not only about relations, it is about twofold determinacy at the level of the eternal object and at the level of the actual occasion. An actual occasion is determined by the abstraction it makes within eternal objects and by the wider relations that hold between those objects in a hierarchy. Thus occasion α is determined by its selection selects A, B, C, F, but also by the eternal relations that hold between A, B, C, F.

Deleuze describes this reciprocity in the following way in 'La méthode de dramatisation': 'Thus, it seems that all things have something like two impair "halves", dissimilar and unsymmetrical. Each of these halves is itself divided into two'.[25] So Whitehead's double twofold determinacy can be found in Deleuze's metaphysics. This similarity is as exhilarating as it is surprising. Two thinkers from very different backgrounds and responding to different influences and problems come up with the same formal metaphysical structure. For Whitehead and for Deleuze, it is not only that the universe or reality is two-sided, but also that both of those sides are two-sided. But how they are so is quite different. For Deleuze, there is only completeness where determinacy involves all four determinations. He defines important principles of reason for his work as, first, determinacy and, second, completeness in terms of determinacy. The Idea has its own determinacy and one requiring the actual. The actual has its own determinacy and one requiring the virtual, or the Idea. This is similar to Whitehead, for example, in terms of the two determinations of eternal objects and of occasions. But then the similarities begin to break down. The divergence is teased out by two questions: What is the exact form of determinacy in different cases? How is determinacy given through reciprocal relations?

First clues to answers can be found through very different uses of concepts. In 'La méthode de dramatisation', Deleuze develops a strong critique of the question 'What?' by claiming that other questions are much better for an approach to the Idea. This remark is then developed in *Difference and Repetition*, where a full critique is made of questions and of the search for essences and identity. In place of questions defined in terms of fields of possible answers, Deleuze advocates problems, that is, irresolvable networks of tensions between Ideas. Problems can be expressed in terms of actualization, in the sense that an actualization revivifies and transforms a problem, but never solves it once and for all. 'What?' seeks essences and assumes progress towards final answers, or at least relative progress. The questions 'Who?' and 'How?' respond to local pressures and admit to local answers that change a wider frame of reference without eliminating it as a source of the pressures. Whitehead,

on the other hand, continues to seek determinacy through a definition of essences. This comes out most strongly in the abstraction to simple eternal objects, which are 'what they are'. It could be argued that Whitehead, like Deleuze, emphasizes relations above essences and that what things are is relational (in terms of hierarchies that determine eternal objects). But this is not a full counter, since those relations depends on the related terms for their definition and for the deduction of the conditions that determine the nature of the relations. Hierarchies can only be set up if there is a prior definition of simple eternal objects that are then combined. So, though it is the case that the essence of complex eternal objects points strictly to the sub-relations, the definitions of complex and simple depends on the determination of essence: 'Thus the complexity of an eternal object means its analysability into a relationship of component eternal objects.'[26]

A further difference follows from this definition of analysability. For Deleuze, Ideas are not analysable, they must be thought of as continuous multiplicities of relations of variations. So, in *Difference and Repetition*, Ideas are given a positive and a negative definition: they are to be continuous multiplicities and, as such, they are resistant to any analysis in sub-identities. To cut an Idea is to change it. In 'La méthode de dramatisation' this definition is sustained through a crucial discussion of the Idea in terms of clarity, distinctness and obscurity:

> We call distinct the state of a fully differentiated Idea, and clear, the state of the actualised Idea, that is, differenciated. We must break with the rule of proportionality of the clear and the distinct: the Idea in itself is not clear and distinct, but on the contrary, distinct and obscure.[27]

Ideas differ internally in terms of other Ideas through matters of degrees of relations, that is, through which regions are more distinct and which more obscure. For Whitehead, they differ in terms of components and not degrees.

Again, it is important to see what is at stake here. Whitehead can give much more determinate answers to what Ideas or eternal objects are, but this commits him to concepts of essence and analysis that Deleuze could criticize through a transcendental critique of the presuppositions of both essence and analysis. What are the conditions for the definition of simples? What are the conditions for the possibility of analysability? For the former, there would be a commitment to a contingent definition of the simple, for example, through the notion that

a colour is indivisible. For the latter, there is a commitment to identity that goes counter to genesis: Ideas become and are nothing but becoming, only differentiated in terms of degrees. Where it depends on abstraction, Whitehead's metaphysics still has negation at its heart – as shown in the metaphors cutting out that I have used here. But he could retort with the following question to Deleuze: How are degrees themselves differentiated? If they can be measured or deduced in some way, then identity and cuts return. If they cannot, then there must be another, seemingly mystical or contingent approach. It is in answering this question that we come to the greatest difference between the two thinkers. Deleuze introduces the concept of intensity in order to explain the individual determinacy of Ideas and of the actual. There isn't a direct reciprocal determination between Ideas and 'actual occurrences', instead, the fields of the actual and the virtual depend on a process working through the sensations, intensities and singularities that determine an individual.

Deleuze defines this process through the difficult concept of individrama-differentiation. What it means is that complete determination depends on the dramatization of a relation of distinctness and obscurity in Ideas, through intensities that underlie sensations as they become part of an expression of intensity in actual identities. An individual creates itself in relation to the Ideas that it expresses through processes of reciprocal determination that run from the actual to the virtual (differentiation, where the Idea becomes determined) and from the virtual to the actual (differentiation, where the actual becomes determined through intensities or and singularities). This is particularly elegant, but counterintuitive, since the actual is not determined through identifiable differences, but through the transformation of, and resistance to, those differences as an Idea becomes expressed. In return, the virtual or the Idea is not determined through a correspondence to actual identifiable differences but through relations of distinctness and obscurity in the Idea that presuppose an actualization but do not correspond to it.

This is why Ideas can only be dramatized and not identified. How they are dramatized is explained through the concepts of the individual, of intensity, of differentiation and of differentiation. Through the concept of intensity that operates in the virtual and in the actual varying relations take precedence in both realms, thereby forestalling any priority of individuality or separation. Whitehead's twofold abstraction is added to through the introduction of intensity. That addition brings greater cohesiveness to the form of reciprocal determination, because neither of

the realms separates from the other as the source of an eternal identity. In that sense, the problem of transcendence studied in the chapter on Deleuze and Kant can be seen as a problem for Whitehead through the definition of eternal objects.

Stakes of a difference: Ideas and eternal objects

The stakes of the differences between Deleuze and Whitehead on reciprocal determination are summed up in the following remarks. Deleuze depends on and nurtures continuity in a way that Whitehead cannot due to his commitment to eternal objects. Yet Whitehead can define eternal objects as relations much more precisely than Deleuze, not in the sense of characterizing specific relations, but in understanding complexity better. Deleuze has to depend on the much vaguer concepts of distinctness and obscurity; and this makes his philosophy more dependent on an aesthetic creativity right at the heart of metaphysics, for example, in the concepts of dramatization and expression. Both thinkers see actualization in terms of spatio-temporal realizations or actualizations, but for Whitehead a duality in actual occurrences is more strongly linked to duality in eternal objects. This allows for distinctions within the actual in terms of eternal objects, their number, arrangements and hierarchies. For Deleuze the actual is divided through identity and representation and that which resists it, intensity and sensation. This latter aspect is radically individual, in a way not allowed by Whitehead.

Deleuze is right to see Whitehead as an ally in the opposition to the dominance of identity and representation in philosophy.[28] But it seems that Whitehead's speculative metaphysics is restricted in its openness and resistance to identity through the definition of the eternal objects and the mathematical ideas that account for their distribution into relations and hierarchies. This restriction operates through the 'Category of Explanation' xx in *Process and Reality* in a reprise of the earlier account of abstraction and realisation from *Science and the Modern World*: 'Determinateness' is analysable into 'definiteness' and 'position', where 'definiteness' is the illustration of select eternal objects, and 'position' is relative status in a nexus of actual entities.[29] Through this category, eternal objects and their realization diminish the temporary and relative nature of actual entities that are only ever mobile accounts of processes such as prehension. If selection has to be among identities through their relations, then the form of the 'functionings' is determined in exactly the kind of categorical way that

Deleuze criticizes through a distinction between nomadic and sedentary distributions:

> the nomadic distributions carried about by the fantastical notions as opposed to the sedentary distributions of categories. The former, in effect, are not universals like the categories, nor are they the *hic et nunc* or *now here*, the diversity to which categories apply in representation.[30]

For Whitehead, the eternity of the objects stands in contrast to the fleeting nature of actual occasions thereby resolving the problem of the despair or nihilism associated with a mere perpetual perishing.[31] His God requires the fluency of actual occasions to be complete and actual occasions require God's permanence. The issue here is not whether Deleuze should have a place for God in his metaphysics; rather, it is whether his idea of the virtual can provide the kind of permanence sought by Whitehead in the face of perpetual perishing. It is also whether that kind of permanence is even desirable.

Notes

1. Versions of this chapter were given at the Chromatiques Whiteheadiennes at Louvain-la-Neuve and the Seminaires Whitehead at Paris I. I thank both audiences for their very useful comments, in particular, Isabella Palin, Keith Robinson and Michel Weber. This work was made possible by an Arts and Humanities Research Board Research Leave Scheme Award. There is a longer version of this chapter in my *The Transversal Thought of Gilles Deleuze: Encounters and Influences* (Manchester: Clinamen, 2005).
2. See Isabelle Stengers, *Penser avec Whitehead: une libre et sauvage creation de concepts* (Paris: Seuil, 2002), p. 245.
3. For early criticisms of Kant's transcendental as remaining within transcendence, see Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche et la Philosophie* (Paris: PUF, 1962), p. 106.
4. See Alain Badiou, *Deleuze: 'la Clameur de l'être'* (Paris: Hachette, 1997), pp. 149–50.
5. Gilles Deleuze, 'Immanence: a life …', trans. N. Millett, in J. Khalfa (ed.) *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze* (London: Continuum, 2003), pp. 171–3.
6. A. N. Whitehead, 'Immortality', in *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*. Ed. P. Schlipp (New York: Tudor, 1941) p. 688. 'L'Immanence: une vie…', p. 363.
7. See Gilles Deleuze, *Critique et clinique* (Paris: Minuit, 1993), pp. 159–69.
8. 'L'immanence: une vie …', p. 362.
9. A. N. Whitehead, 'Mathematics and the Good', in *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*, pp. 679–80.

10. 'Immortality', p. 685.
11. 'L'immanence: une vie . . .' p. 363. See also Stengers, *Penser avec Whitehead*, p. 244.
12. 'Immortality', p. 687.
13. 'L'immanence: une vie ...', p. 359.
14. 'Immortality', p. 684.
15. A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928), p. 197.
16. *Science and the Modern World*, p. 198.
17. See also *Process and Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 1978), pp. 22–3.
18. *Science and the Modern World*, p. 198.
19. *Science and the Modern World*, p. 207.
20. *Science and the Modern World*, p. 208.
21. *Science and the Modern World*, p. 209.
22. *Science and the Modern World*, pp. 211–12.
23. *Science and the Modern World*, p. 199.
24. *Science and the Modern World*, p. 199.
25. 'Le Méthode de dramatisation', in *L'Île déserte et autres texts*. Ed. David Lapoujade (Paris: Minuit, 2002), pp. 131–62, esp. 141; all translations mine.
26. *Science and the Modern World*, p. 207.
27. 'La méthode de dramatisation', p. 140.
28. *Difference and Repetition*, pp. 284–5.
29. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 25.
30. *Difference and Repetition*, p. 285.
31. *Process and Reality*, p. 347.

6
Heterogenesis and the Problems of Metaphysics

Andrew Goffey

Introduction

> Empiricism, with its emphasis on empirical sources, implies an essential element of metaphysics at least in the sense that the *essential* knowledge … has an inherent fortuitousness, from which it derives an element of meaning which, according to the prevalent logic, is excluded precisely by the concept of the accidental.
>
> (Adorno, 2000, p. 141)

Theodor Adorno's verdict on the relationship between empiricism and metaphysics would perhaps have met with Gilles Deleuze's guarded approval. Chance, for Deleuze, was the sole form of necessity; the empiricist search for the conditions of the new involved a counter-effectuation of the accidents of experience; and events defied the strict modal distinction between possible, impossible and necessary. That the link between empiricism and metaphysics was exemplified for Adorno in the concept of *openness* might also have met with Deleuze's approval, for openness, according to Adorno, is philosophy thinking beyond itself.

Deleuze, however, would perhaps have been less approving of the tools with which Adorno sought to have philosophy think beyond itself. Unconcerned with saving the heritage of critical philosophy, for Deleuze the openness of thinking is the product of a peculiarly coherent theory-practice of heterogenesis, an activity that accomplishes an experimental transformation of metaphysics or, to borrow Bruno Latour's expression, is simply an *experimental metaphysics* (Latour, 2004, p. 241).

This chapter examines several of the components of Deleuze's concept of heterogenesis and explores the ways in which they enabled him to find new ways of working with the metaphysical tradition. At the

same time, it endeavours to use the concept of heterogenesis as a way of understanding aspects of the speculative philosophy of Whitehead, a philosopher whose own practice as a thinker, it will be argued, entertains some interesting resonances with Deleuze's writing. This thematic enquiry is developed in a number of ways. In the first instance it considers Deleuze's interest in Leibniz and Spinoza and does so in relation to his way of dealing with the history of philosophy. By considering the specific place of Spinoza in Deleuze's writings, the chapter engages in a discussion about Deleuze's *creative* transformation and displacement of the metaphysical tradition. Second, the relationship between the concept of heterogenesis and the concept of style is discussed. Deleuze's specific use of the notion of free indirect discourse allows us to consider how the concept of heterogenesis might be used to counter ways in which the linguistic turn has sought to appropriate aspects of the metaphysical tradition for its own ends. Third is a discussion of Whitehead, more specifically the Whitehead of *Process and Reality*. The aim here in particular is to consider how the complex experiment with language, which for Whitehead forms an essential part of speculative philosophy, might be usefully contrasted with the Deleuzean process of heterogenesis.

A system of the new

Deleuze's vindication of a certain kind of philosophical systematizing, expressed in a letter to Jean-Clet Martin as heterogenesis, in its dismissal of the problems of the death of philosophy, marks a radical insouciance and a willed innocence with regard to the history of philosophy and philosophy as history or historicity. It also (though this is less frequently remarked) characterizes the way Deleuze attempts to transform the impact of the history of philosophy – accused by him of having a 'repressive role' – on thinking (Deleuze, 2003, p. 358; Deleuze and Parnet, 1996, p. 19).

Current expressions of the impossibility of philosophizing tend to accept the verdict on philosophy's history proposed by the likes of Martin Heidegger, for whom a repetition of the problems of philosophy past ultimately meant coming to terms with the Greek experience of thought. To pose the problem of metaphysics from this angle would be to disclose the historical way that it would testify to Being, a testimony which could only ever be a reprise of Ancient Greek thinking, which thus poses an inevitable limit on philosophy and the problems it poses. In such an account there could be no experience of the new which would not somehow be understood within the framework of the origin – in the

terms of the 'retreat and return of the Origin', as Michel Foucault once put it. Or, to put matters a little more bluntly, metaphysics has to become fundamental ontology.[1]

In this Heideggerian framework, the metaphysics of the pre-Kantian and post-Cartesian philosophies of Spinoza and Leibniz will be understood in relation to the two more 'historically' significant thinkers: Descartes and Kant. In their development of the Cartesian bid for a *mathesis universalis*, both Leibniz and Spinoza are thus understood as ratifying this crucial gesture of modern metaphysics, and hence as being in essential continuity with Descartes, but not tackled on their own terms.

The argument proposed is that in relationship to metaphysics, Deleuze's philosophical practice of heterogenesis confers a peculiar coherence to his work in and on the history of philosophy. It is the coherence of a series of movements which takes philosophy outside of itself and deprives it of some of the power Deleuze believes the history of philosophy confers on its specialists. This practice of Deleuze's is not 'history of philosophy' in the traditional sense as it does not trace out the filiation and descent of ideas (or, indeed, the 'succession' of philosophical systems),[2] or because of the repressive function which Deleuze came to recognize that the history of philosophy exercised. Nor is it about historicity, for whilst it is true that Deleuze adopts and adapts Heidegger's view that philosophy has to work on its own past, to repeat the problems that it envelopes, this practice of repetition for Deleuze is not about disclosing the authentic understanding of Being that problems contain, but releasing the coefficient of novelty of which they are the vector, a novelty of which they cannot be the bearer for as long as thinking is conceptualized along the lines of a retreat and return of the origin. In this respect, for Deleuze there is a strong sense in which metaphysics is the bearer of *problems*[3] and philosophical thinking exemplifies the Nietzschean view of history as a 'mass of incessantly attempted experiments' (Beaufret, 1996, p. 4).

Deleuze's conception of philosophy as a system in heterogenesis is best clarified initially in relationship to his appreciation of the writings of Leibniz. In a letter to Jean-Clet Martin he points out that it is Leibniz who first identifies philosophy and system, and to the extent that he *does* this, Deleuze adheres to the identification. A system in heterogenesis is not, he suggests, simply a system comprised of heterogeneous elements (Deleuze, 2003, p. 338). To be in heterogenesis is to be caught up in the a-parallel evolution of becoming-other and of other-becomings. Or to put it another way, a system in heterogenesis is a system undergoing the transformation of a movement in the process of happening,

which consequently appeals to a different relationship between theory and practice.[4]

It is worth emphasizing that for Deleuze it is what Leibniz *does* that is important. Whilst Deleuze suggests, in the same text, that he feels himself to be a philosopher in the classical sense of the word, we should be wary of thinking that a Deleuzean metaphysics would simply (?) be a set of theoretical/speculative propositions. Indeed, although from his early work in the history of philosophy through to the writings of his maturity Deleuze always insists on the practical element of philosophizing, whether this be in his reading of the relationship between the eternal return and the will to power in Nietzsche[5] or in the practical philosophy of Spinoza (reading Spinoza by the middle). For example, the development of his own writing as a system in heterogenesis is marked by a tendency towards the accentuation of the practical aspect of philosophy, exemplified in the well-known statement in *A Thousand Plateaus*, that the multiple 'must be made'[6] (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 7).

The importance of this practical conception of philosophy as an activity can be seen in terms of principles themselves, for as Deleuze remarks in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, principles are always the principles of what we are doing, rather than what we are. In this respect, a principle is not something that we need to try to know for it does not by definition permit us to accede to a state of apodictic certainty (as it might in what Heidegger calls 'onto-theology')[7]. A principle might then be better understood as a function capturing a specific aspect of active transformation.

There is a second aspect to Deleuze's appreciation of the way that Leibniz identifies philosophy and system, and this has to do with the problem his philosophy confronts:

> it is with Leibniz that the philosophical problem which will not cease to haunt Whitehead and Bergson arises: not how to attain the eternal, but under what conditions does the objective world permit a subjective production of novelty, that is to say a creation?
>
> (Deleuze, 1988, p. 107)

In many respects this is precisely the problem for which *Difference and Repetition* provides a kind of formalization, with its conception of the intensive differential system. The idea of the intensive, differential system is organized around the claim that every phenomenon is constructed around a fundamental *disparity*, and that creativity, the production of the new, derives from the resonance without intermediary between

heterogeneous sets of terms without resemblance, a resonance which introduces a forced movement into the system (which thus overflows or exceeds itself). Differential systems *amplify* and *multiply* difference. We might choose to read Deleuze's conception of the intensive system as a description of the way in which he tackles the metaphysical tradition of thinking, and thus as a description of the way in which philosophy present repeats philosophy past to produce philosophy future. The concept of the differential system aims at producing the unconscious of a pure thought, conceptualized in view of Heidegger's claim that we are not yet thinking. In this respect, Deleuze's assertion that 'It is no longer possible in the system of the unconscious to establish an order of succession between series … it is no longer possible to regard one as originary and the other as derived, one as model and the other as copy' serves as an accurate description of the kind of relationship his work on the history of philosophy seeks to produce, as numerous commentators have pointed out (Deleuze, 1994, p. 125).

Crucially for Deleuze, if this practice (and it is a practice: repetition is a condition of action, of what one does, before being a concept of reflection) of thinking is not to replicate the arbitrary, abstract possibility of thinking characteristic of the logic of representation, the communication of series must be motivated by something: the encounter with something in sensibility which forces thought. A version of the aesthetic rescued from the Kantian conditions of *possible* experience serves this purpose, making unrepresentable intensity the focal point of what Jean-François Lyotard has called (referring to Deleuze) this 'other metaphysics' (Lyotard, 1990, p. 12). Only intensity, the paradoxical *experience* of difference, can motivate the experiments of thought: 'There is a crucial experience of difference and a corresponding experiment' (Deleuze, 1994, p. 50).

To place Deleuze's treatment of the notion of the philosophical system in relation to the history of philosophy in context, it is useful to try to understand it in relation to some of the issues with which post-Kantian philosophy was concerned. The extensive use that Deleuze makes of Spinoza can also be understood in this context.

As Jean-Marie Vaysse has shown in his superb study of the place of Spinoza in German Idealism, the Kantian critical turn, far from rendering nugatory any reckoning with one of the great masters of the philosophical system (the sole completed system as Heidegger – not known for his interest in Spinoza – put it), actually exacerbated this requirement. For the Kantian gesture, miring philosophy in what Heidegger came to call constitutive finitude – and with all the pathos attendant on this

notion – forced an accounting with Spinoza, whose 'innocent way of starting out from the infinite' as Merleau-Ponty once put it, so impressed Deleuze. Paying particular emphasis to Heidegger's reading of Friedrich Schelling and the latter's attempts to generate a 'system of freedom', Vaysse points out that since post-Kantian philosophy generally accepted the idea of an irreducible conflict between freedom and necessity, philosophical systems in this period could only be developed as systems of the understanding. To this extent, Hegel's dismissal of Spinoza as a pale imitation of Parmenides inevitably incapable, from the reflective position of the understanding, of attaining the true movement of a system, expresses Heidegger's more general view that a philosophical system cannot or could not incorporate that which grounds it.[8]

Deleuze's reading of Spinoza in this context is interesting, not because it is situated in terms of the problematic just laid out (it isn't), but because of the way that, like *Difference and Repetition*, it directs our attention to Deleuze's empiricist 'transformation' of thinking – in this case Spinoza's rationalism – a transformation which is important because it clarifies the way that Deleuze's reading necessitates thinking, together the practical and speculative elements of philosophy in a manner that the post-Kantian reception of criticism was unable to do.[9] By drawing on the Leibnizean notion of expression, which received little comment from writers on Spinoza (the 'heterogenesis of its unthought', to borrow an expression from Alliez [1996, p. 36]), Deleuze is able to make a convincing case for not considering Spinoza's modal universe to be an arbitrary addition to the system of substance and attributes as Kant had claimed, and to argue that the limitations attendant on the ostensible formalism of the geometrical method are not only overcome in speculative terms (because expression places demonstration in the absolute), but are also overcome practically by virtue of the peculiar role which the common notions assume in the *Ethics*.

Deleuze's argument is that although the vast majority of the *Ethics* is written from the point of view of the common notions, this does not signify that the latter are given. The crucial point about common notions is that they must be *formed*. As the idea of a similarity of composition of movement and rest between at least two bodies, the formation of a common notion is contingent on the accident of an encounter. But it is necessary to form such ideas, for without them one can form no knowledge of 'essences' at all and thus not grasp univocity. In this sense Spinoza's philosophical system is inseparable from an *ars vivendi*: 'The common notions are an Art, the art of the *Ethics* itself: organising good encounters, composing actual relations, forming powers,

experimenting'[10] (Deleuze, 1988, p. 119). Against the idea that Spinoza's reasoning *more geometrico* constitutes a simple process of deduction – the well-known idea according to which Spinoza would *set out* from the idea of God and deduce everything else in due order – Deleuze argues that we have to *form* this idea, an idea which is adequate to the extent that it is expressive. And we can only do this to the extent that we form common notions. In this way, *this* experience, the encounter (Deleuze–Spinoza, Leibniz–Spinoza, the Man from Kiev in Malamud's *The Fixer*) turns out to be 'central' to the *Ethics*. Or to put it another way, for Deleuze we read the *Ethics* in order to understand the necessity of chance.

There is an interesting rapprochement to be made here between Deleuze's work on Spinoza and *Difference and Repetition*. It is a curiosity which has struck some readers of Spinoza that whilst the *Ethics* is a rigorous demonstration of the necessity of one substance possessing all the attributes, there is absolutely no accounting for the necessity of necessity. Or, as Rosset put it, 'the greatest paradox of Spinoza's thought is this: that which distributes necessity (*deus sive natura*, or the sum of 'what exists'), does not itself possess any necessity' (1971, p. 120). This coincidence of chance and necessity in the speculative apparatus of the *Ethics* suggests that Deleuze's account of expression in Spinoza, which places the chains of necessity formed by demonstration into the absolute, must be understood itself in terms of the account proposed in *Difference and Repetition* of the 'determination of the indeterminate'.

In the theory of expression proposed by Deleuze in *Spinoza et le problème de l'expression*, the univocity of the Spinozist *causa sui* is understood along the lines that whilst an effect can be distinct from its cause, the cause does not distinguish itself from the effect to which it gives rise. An effect *immanates* in its cause. Thus there is a very specific kind of distinction between substance and its modes. Compare this with Deleuze's description of unilateral determination (internal difference) in *Difference and Repetition*:

> Instead of something distinguished from something else, imagine something which distinguishes itself – and yet that from which it distinguishes itself, does not distinguish itself from it. Lightning, for example, distinguishes itself from the black sky but must also trail behind it, as though it were distinguishing itself from that which does not distinguish itself from it. It is as if the ground rose to the surface without ceasing to be the ground .... The form reflected in this ground is no longer a form but an abstract line acting directly on the soul.
>
> (Deleuze, 1994, p. 28)

Differential systems and the expressive system of Spinoza overcome the objection which Heidegger places at the door of philosophical systematizing because they grasp in the immanence of a surface, in an encounter (Spinoza) or an event, that which Heidegger thought inimical to a system of knowledge, that which had to remain concealed. By means of the notion of the singularity of expression the traditional conflictual understanding of the relationship between contingency and necessity is overcome and real experience becomes thinkable.[11]

There is a second aspect to Deleuze's conception of heterogenesis: the relationship between heterogenesis and the concept of style. This relationship is important for several reasons. In the first instance it allows us to address key aspects of the ways in which Deleuze sought to exercise thought. Second, given that the conception of style which Deleuze proposes requires us to address the problem of creativity in language, it gives us a more concrete way of addressing the differences between Deleuze and Whitehead, given the latter's remarks on language near the start of *Process and Reality*. I would like to suggest that by the manner in which it draws attention to free indirect discourse and language within language, it might provide a fruitful way of exploring the peculiar power of Whitehead's approach to metaphysics in *Process and Reality*.

The disparity of style

Deleuze is well known for his claim (made in the Introduction to *Difference and Repetition*) that it is necessary to find new means of philosophical expression ('The time is coming when it will hardly be possible to write a book of philosophy as it has been doen for so long: Ah! The old style ...' [1994, p. xx])). However, whilst the question of style to which this claim is related is an enduring theme of his work, going back at least as far as his book on Proust, he provides no more than somewhat allusive indicators to what his conception of style and its functioning actually are.

The first commentator to take Deleuze's own style seriously and to grasp its importance was Foucault. In his preface to the English-language translation of *Anti-Oedipus*, Foucault remarks that Deleuze and Guattari 'care so little for power that they have tried to neutralise the effects of their own discourse. Hence the games and snares scattered throughout the book … so many invitations to let oneself be put out, to take one's leave of the text and slam the door shut.' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, p. xiv). In other words, the specific construction of the text, its exorbitance and its humour function – in what Foucault would doubtless call

an ethical manner – to generate precisely the effects, the proliferating schizo flux, which it describes. Doing what it says, the *formation* of the text is identical to its *functioning*.

While commentators typically prefer to read a book such as *Anti-Oedipus* through the lens of Deleuze's earlier writings, Deleuze himself came to recognize an insufficiency in these earlier writings which necessitated the shift to the more concrete way of doing philosophy first exemplified in his work with Guattari. In his *Dialogues* with Claire Parnet, Deleuze acknowledges that whilst his earlier books *described* a 'certain exercise of thought' – the exercise of thought that opens philosophy up beyond itself to Lyotard's other metaphysics – to describe that exercise of thought 'was not yet exercising it' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1996, p. 23). In this regard, his later suggestion that he had abandoned the concept of the simulacrum, which had played such a crucial role in helping him construct his reversal of Platonism in *Difference and Repetition*, marks this shift in the way Deleuze felt it necessary to pose problems (Deleuze, 2003, p. 338). Style, I want to argue here, relays the conception of the philosophical system evident in Deleuze's earlier writings and establishes heterogenesis as a work in and on forms of expression, and equally offers a way of countering specific ways of dealing with the metaphysical tradition.

In *What Is Philosophy?* Deleuze argues for the importance of style in posing the question 'what is philosophy?' But it is an argument with something of a twist: in the past, he argues, the question 'what is philosophy?' had been posed – by himself, by others – in an indirect way: 'there was too much desire to do philosophy to wonder what it was, except as a stylistic exercise. That point of non-style where one could finally say "What is it I have been doing all my life?" had not been reached' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1990, p. 7). 'Non-style', then, is the positing of a question, but non-style, crucially, is not style's absence.

The appearance of the prefix non- in Deleuze's work is not the mark of a negative. Indeed, in *Difference and Repetition*, 'non-' is precisely the sign of a question rather than a negation, a ?-being, the sign of the imperceptible becoming, where something ceases to be attributable and thought is forced. In this respect, the non-style of which Deleuze speaks in *What is Philosophy?* is the *event* of a style, style as the creation of something new. This is confirmed in the short foreword he wrote for Giorgio Passerone's book *La Linea Astratta* where he states, à propos of Balzac, but in a way that is generalizable, that 'non-style is precisely the grand style, or the creation of style in the pure state' (Deleuze, 2003, p. 344).[12]

The whole of what Deleuze writes for Passerone's book should be read for the resonances that it introduces with *What is Philosophy?* (it would appear to have been written at the same time). Speaking there of free indirect discourse, Deleuze argues that it introduces process into language, with which it is coextensive in its entirety: 'it is not that one leaps from one language to another, as in bilingual- or plurilingualism, it is rather that there is always one language in another and so on to infinity. Not a mixture but a *heterogenesis*' (2003, p. 344). Likewise, in the first of his two books on cinema, Deleuze uses the idea as a way to think through the theme of a 'properly cinematographic Mitsein', 'or what Dos Passos justly called the "camera eye", the anonymous point of view of someone un-identified amongst the characters' (Deleuze, 1983b, p. 106). There, Deleuze is absolutely explicit about the extension that should be accorded to the assemblage of enunciation that free indirect discourse sets up: 'This splitting or this differentiation of the subject in language, do we not find it in thought and in art? It is the *Cogito*: an empirical subject cannot be born into the world without being reflected at the same time in a transcendental subject who thinks it and in which it thinks itself …' (Deleuze, 1983b, p. 107). In the second of his books on cinema, Deleuze also makes quite clear the links between his conception of free indirect discourse and thought: his well-known formula for transcendental empiricism – *I is an Other* – finds itself reworked in relationship to the films of Jean-Luc Godard, Jean Rouch and Glauber Rocha (Deleuze, 1985, p. 244).

Free indirect discourse, then, testifies to language as itself a heterogeneous system, a system 'far from equilibrium'. More importantly, style as the operation of heterogenesis within language, Deleuze suggests, traces out an *abstract line*, the point at which language confronts an outside. As in *Difference and Repetition,* where the abstract line marks precisely the operation of ungrounding as the determination equal to the indeterminate, the point at which thinking is generated, style in language yields the conditions which account for the new, the Idea as the birth of thinking, whether that thinking be by percept, affect or concept.

An obvious objection that could be made at this point to an analysis of philosophy in terms of free indirect discourse is that it would seem to reintroduce precisely the linguistic self-sufficiency which Deleuze objected to in his brief return to Whitehead in *Le pli: Leibniz et le baroque.* However, Deleuze is emphatically not a philosopher of the linguistic turn and his appeal to free indirect discourse allows us to establish this by reference to an important moment in the constitution of the metaphysical tradition in philosophy.

One of the most powerful claims for the founding role of language in the constitution of philosophy comes from arguments which base the requirements of critical rationality on the way in which communication ratifies the principle of non-contradiction introduced by Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*. As Barbara Cassin has argued, in their claims for a rationality grounded in communication, the likes of Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas repeat the very gesture which Aristotle himself accomplished: refuters of the principle of non-contradiction are, Aristotle points out, refuted from the moment that they open their mouths to say something, because to speak is to say and mean one thing at a time both for oneself and one's interlocutor – a claim vertiginously contested by sophistry.

The interesting thing about this claim, as Cassin has shown, is that it seems to be a contradictory gesture: as a principle of principles, the principle of non-contradiction should not be susceptible of proof for obvious logical reasons. Indeed, as archi-principle, it should have been possessed of a (phenomenological) self-evidence that would make even discussing it pointless. However, in her reconstruction of the gestures of Book ʼΩ Cassin (with Michel Narcy) has shown that what Aristotle *does* makes a sense of sorts, but only to the extent that it is understood in terms of the need for philosophy to exclude the sophist from the city. Aristotle, making the now time-honoured distinction between sense and reference (such that he could not, like the schizophrenic, confuse words and things), only needed to ensure that sophists would speak to constitute a well-ordered discourse, where words would only mean one thing at a time, for the archi-transcendental principle to have validity. Anyone who did not speak in this way would not, for Aristotle, be a human, but a talking plant (a rhizome, perhaps) or two-headed monster (*dikranie*: Deleuze and Guattari?) (Cassin and Narcy, 1989; Cassin, 1992; 1995).

Deleuze's conception of free indirect discourse, in so far as it is based on the principle of a language in a language to infinity, of necessity breaks with the consensus to which sensible human beings adhere, or rather shows this to be a pact of sorts, always subject to negotiation: *pourparlers*. To put it in a slightly different way: if we wish to grasp the event of the new, we cannot assume that what someone says will conform to a linguistic a priori as constraining, if not more so, than the Kantian conditions of possible experience. The importance for Deleuze, in his notorious account of how he worked with philosophers whom he liked, that they actually say the things he made them say – exasperating specialists to the point of incomprehension – along with his disregard for objections and misunderstandings (a misunderstanding could be productive), is perhaps better understood from the point of view of disregarding the founding

value of contradiction right down to the point of enunciation. What is important about free indirect discourse here is that it establishes a differential relation within language at precisely the point where Aristotle seeks to establish identity. It is perhaps to commit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness to seek to ground the rationality of metaphysical discourse in a principle of non-contradiction instantiated in the word as bearer of one meaning at a time. Adopting Deleuze's view of heterogenesis as the characteristic operation of free indirect discourse, by contrast, is suggestive of the way that his conception of enunciation allows us to counter the imperious and abstract claims of identity characteristic of the metaphysical tradition in general and the inheritance of these by the linguistic turn in particular. As Deleuze and Parnet state, 'The minimum real unit is not the word, the idea, the concept or the signifier, but the *assemblage*. It is always an assemblage which produces utterances' (1996, p. 65). Unlike communicative rationality, which grounds its normative conception of reason in a notion of community in which consensus is directly tied to exclusion, Deleuze's conception of free indirect discourse as a way of grasping enunciation is indicative of the way in which heterogenesis ties the creativity of thinking to non-consensual collectives, in which I is always an Other: 'the utterance is the product of an assemblage – which is always collective' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1996, p. 51).

Whitehead, indirectly

Deleuze's somewhat allusive conception of the philosophical system in heterogenesis offers a way of reworking and rethinking the philosophical tradition in terms of what has been called an experimental metaphysics. His work on Leibniz and Spinoza provides some of the means for that transformation and the transformation itself. As the later development of his work shows, the exercise of this experimental kind of thinking can, through his conception of style, equally be used to counter the rather abstract way in which more recent attempts at rescuing metaphysics operate, drawing into view the way that thinking might operate symbiotically in relationship to concrete discursive arrangements. The final section of this chapter turns briefly to the work of Alfred North Whitehead in order to consider some of the resonances which the preceding discussion of Deleuzean heterogenesis has set up.

Whitehead, like Deleuze, recognized the peculiar importance of language in the construction of philosophical systems. Indeed, in *Process and Reality* Whitehead quite explicitly claims an experimental relationship to language in the development of the ensemble of generic notions which

came to make up the categoreal scheme which so impressed the Deleuze of *Difference and Repetition*. Whitehead remarks that 'every science must devise its own instruments. The tool required for philosophy is language. Thus philosophy redesigns language in the same way that, in a physical science, pre-existing appliances are redesigned. It is exactly at this point that the appeal to facts is a difficult operation' (1978, p. 13). In a philosophy which aimed at the twin requirements of adequacy and applicability for the categoreal scheme, this acknowledgement points to a simultaneous strength and weakness of the linguistic engineering Whitehead felt was necessary to create a system which could be interrogated without the 'benumbing repression of common sense' (1978, p. 9).

As Isabelle Stengers has pointed out in *Penser avec Whitehead*, Whitehead's belated shift to metaphysics in *Science and The Modern World* is accomplished with a 'conceptual bet' which, she suggests 'announces a style' (2002, p. 234). Whitehead's style, which comes to full fruition in *Process and Reality*, itself forms both the means of transformation and the transformation itself of the metaphysical tradition, the series of footnotes to Plato, which Whitehead aimed at renewing, a transformation which sought to counter the destructive power which the abstractions of identity thinking had brought about.

To appreciate some of the depth of the transformation which *Process and Reality* attempts to bring about in relation to the metaphysical tradition, it is helpful to contrast Whitehead's enterprise to philosophical developments contemporaneous to his work in the early twentieth century. Clearly, this is not to undertake the sheer 'experimenting' of Whitehead's writing of which Stengers has so aptly written elsewhere, but it may help to map out the territories of the specialisms of thought such as they existed when Whitehead was developing his work as well as point towards the challenges his work accepted.

The analytic movement associated with Whitehead's protégé Bertrand Russell and Edmund Husserl's phenomenology are helpful triangulation points here, because in the symmetric failings of both these movements, we can see how Whitehead's turning to metaphysics and decrying of logic as a final court of appeal, whilst conserving, indeed *intensifying*, the value of an appeal to experience (requiring that appeal to experience not to judge it or to have it stand as judge) is quite an unusual event.

As Claude Imbert has shown, for both the phenomenology of Husserl and the analytic thinking of Russell, although for diametrically opposed reasons, it was deemed necessary to provide a unifying account of the relationship between the procedures of modern scientific thought – exemplified in the quantifying structures of mathematical reasoning

(where to be is, as Quine pointed out, to be the value of a variable) – and the more prosaic discursive procedures of 'natural' language, characterized by a subject–predicate structure which underpins the immediate certainties of sensory experience, our 'natural attitude', to borrow from Husserl. Within the economy of analytic thought, it was felt that there could and should be no appeal to intuition, an intuition which would, it was felt, considerably attenuate Russell's claim for the ultimate realism of the analytic viewpoint. By contrast, for Husserlian phenomenology, it was felt that the infinite exactitude of the discoveries of formal logic – exemplified, albeit problematically, in the work of Georg Cantor and later Kurt Gödel – required grounding in a transcendental logic which would appeal for its validity to a transcendental ego or some other phenomenological final instance, such as the belated recourse to a lifeworld.

However, as Imbert has pointed out, both projects were doomed to failure, but to a failure that demonstrated the inheritance in both Anglo-Saxon and continental traditions of thinking of a Kantian problematic that neither was either willing or able to call into question. For even if both Husserl and Russell wished to distance themselves from Kantian mathematics and the problematic transcendental deduction of the categories, 'the perception of the problem of objectivity [with which both movements were concerned] as much as the solutions attempted remained enclosed within the perspective of criticism'. 'It was wished that the same intellectual operations traverse the entire field of knowledge and perpetuate the unity of experience' (Imbert, 1992, p. 20). Both projects, she claims, failed because they 'retained the old certainties [of apophansis], but demanded in addition a syntactic effectiveness whose *mise au point* was to require that these same certainties were distanced' (Imbert, 1992, p. 21). In the case of phenomenology that failure was made most evident by Jean Cavaillès, whose frustration with phenomenology led to his own turn to Spinoza and the belated recognition that phenomenology would be unable to account for the absoluteness of the mathematical reasoning it wished to ground without for that very reason undercutting that reasoning's own claims to absoluteness. The failures of analysis can be seen, for example, in its inability to deal adequately with Stoic logic and equally in the stupidities which its professional specialism gave rise to, such as the notorious and perhaps apocryphal logician's claim that Aristotle had the mental age of a twelve year old.[13]

Whitehead, of course, was quite adamant that philosophy had to relativize the attributive schema which Kant's categories, in so far as they

were worked out from a schema of judgement, raised to an a priori status.[14] He argues, in *Process and Reality*, that metaphysics has, on the whole, taken the subject–predicate relationship as an ultimate truth, whereas in reality it is a highly accomplished abstraction. Logic, he points out, often confuses propositions with judgements.

The point being made here is that if it is reasonable to accept that natural language effectively encodes the subject–predicate relationship as a syntax of experience, as what phenomenologists call the 'natural attitude', then constructing a categoreal scheme which seeks to relativize the abstractions embedded within natural language requires a peculiarly creative kind of linguistic transformation. It equally requires that speculative philosophy display a healthy concern with the discursive certainties embedded in natural languages: like the more obvious case of formal logic these too exhibit an abstractness, although one of which we are habitually unaware.

The crucial point for Whitehead was that language is actually quite indeterminate – far from the analytic confidence in logical systems providing a means for an exhaustive account of natural language, Whitehead argued that every occurrence of language presupposes a systematic environment. This in turn entails that not only is there no common language within which the divergence of metaphysical systems might be measured, but also that metaphysics is by definition an open enterprise. The difficulty for Whitehead is that the systematic environment which particular kinds of propositions presuppose can lend such propositions a self-evidence or an 'unmerited air of sober obviousness' when proposed as first principles (Whitehead, 1978, p. 13).

In the history of philosophy, this is a statement which applies well to the kind of thinking which takes up the Aristotelian conception of the individual substance, *hupokeimenon* and then *qua* substance-subject proposes this as the ground for the movement of thought. Borrowing from Deleuze and Guattari, one might say that the process by which the grammatical subject of a statement can acquire an unmerited air of sober obviousness and become a first principle – *the* subject – is precisely the one of *overcoding* which Deleuze's conception of free indirect discourse was designed to combat. However, Whitehead is not Deleuze. The point rather is that our failure to appreciate the indeterminacy of language is precisely what accounts for our habitual reluctance to entertain new patterns, new schemata of thinking. In this respect, the deliberate re-engineering of language undertaken by Whitehead in *Process and Reality* is itself designed, as Stengers has pointed out, to introduce a measure of indeterminacy into our habitual experience and thus to create the

'elbow room' for creative novelty. 'No language, Whitehead says, can be anything but elliptical, requiring a leap of the imagination to understand its meaning in its relevance to immediate experience' (Whitehead, 1978, p. 13).

The margin of indeterminacy in language, which from the point of view of first principles might be considered a weakness is, then, in other respects a strength. The imaginative leap, which for Whitehead was necessary in order to appreciate the applicability of some statement or other for immediate experience, allows for the concepts of his philosophical system to do what they say, for his conception of pragmatics to become a *pragmatics of concepts* (Stengers, 2002 pp. 126–33). We may better understand this by looking at the way in which the categoreal scheme which forms the basis of *Process and Reality* actually functions. For if it is true that Whitehead is of necessity led to operate on the 'old certainties' of apophansis enveloped in natural language, then the adventure to which the reader of *Process and Reality* is convoked is an adventure which works *with* and *on* experience in a way that will not be straightforward. The concept of heterogenesis may be helpful here for the way that it allows us to follow this process through to the extent that it points towards a kind of differential operative in the process of enunciation (or generation of *propositions* to use Whitehead's terminology)

In *Science and the Modern World*, Whitehead argued that philosophy could not and should not dismiss the importance of the appeal to *naïve experience* (1985, p. 111). Now it is precisely this appeal which becomes difficult given the requirement of outlining a *coherent* metaphysical system. It is perhaps by reason of this difficulty and by reason of the need to disintricate the webs of judgement threaded through natural language that common sense holds a somewhat ambivalent status in *Process and Reality*. Outlining what for him was the value of the 'matrix' formed by his categoreal scheme – that it would allow 'true propositions applicable to particular circumstances' to be derived, allowing of bold argumentation using rigid logic – as already noted, Whitehead argues that 'the primary advantage thus gained is that experience is not interrogated with the benumbing repression of common sense' (1978, p. 9).[15] In this regard we should argue that the initial functioning of the categoreal scheme is precisely to work on the judgements encoded within the language of experience. Stengers has justly described the schema in terms of Deleuze's plane of immanence: one cannot in any convincing way think through the categories of entity, explanation and obligation in any simple rationalist manner such that the reality to which these categories ultimately make reference is a given in need of definition.[16] Thus

it seems appropriate to argue that the categoreal scheme works so as to *make* the reality to which it refers exist (Stengers, 2002, p. 285).

It is incorrect to talk here of *the* language of experience. For a pluralist philosophy such as that of pragmatism, such talk would confer on experience a *monological* quality at odds with what for Whitehead was the aim of the imaginative leap required in experiencing the adequacy of a metaphysical schema. As he puts it, 'the true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalisation; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation' (1978, p. 5). Because this process of abstraction aims in part at depriving the concepts and categories in particular fields of experience of their dogmatic application beyond themselves, it might be suggested that the effect which the 'flight' of experience here described is one of 'accenting' experience in different ways, creating contrasts where they did not previously exist.

But given that the reality which the schema makes exists only through the experiencing of its adequacy, it is clear that the process of making exist must be characterized by a kind of tension. Whitehead's conception of adequacy cannot in all likelihood be understood in relation to the way that it has been understood traditionally[17] as the typical understanding involves judgement and thus (presumably) the kind of precedence of the universal which Whitehead wished to dismiss.[18]

One way in which we might choose to understand Whitehead's appeal to the notion of adequacy is through the way that William James developed the notion of verification. In *Pragmatism*, James argues that 'truth happens to an idea …. Its truth is in fact an event, a process … Its truth is the process of its validation.' Commenting on this, David Lapoujade has suggested that 'to verify thus does not consist in exposing the truth initially contained in this idea, but in creating this very truth' (1997, p. 56). Lapoujade's reading is interesting because, by emphasizing the creative, processual nature of the verification, it resonates nicely with Whitehead's acknowledgement that rationalism cannot shake off its status as 'experimental adventure' and it implies that the 'making exist' of the schema and its becoming adequate are two aspects of the same process, a process which is, by the very same token, the becoming of experience.[19]

Stengers has suggested that this becoming of experience is accomplished by the way that Whitehead's writing creates a trance-like effect. In accordance with the *dialogical* experience of language which free indirect discourse testifies to, it might be argued that the new contrasts in

experience which Whitehead's work achieves through the indeterminacy it produces are directly analogous to the way that the language in a language principle noted in Deleuze's conception of heterogenesis changes the accentuation within a language. One must allow oneself to be infected by what Whitehead says, in the same way that the sounds, concepts and syntax of a foreign language seep into our nocturnal patterns of thought.

Re-accentuation, the experimental transformation of the thoughts of others, serves equally well as a description of the way that Whitehead deals with the metaphysical tradition. It has often been noted that Whitehead is, from the point of view of historiographical propriety, a little slapdash in the way that he utilizes the history of philosophy. From the latter point of view, for example, it is a little disarming to find Bishop Berkeley and Francis Bacon invoked in *Science and the Modern World* in favour of Whitehead's theory of prehensions. Yet as the particular passages from this text make clear, Whitehead is – in a manner somewhat analogous to the way that Deleuze deals with expression in Spinoza's writing – conferring a different accent on what Berkeley says and thus drawing out a different set of connections between figures from the history of philosophy than is the norm.[20] If it is accepted that in Deleuze's philosophy the concept of the system in heterogenesis informs the 'dramaturgy' of enunciation outlined in *What is Philosophy?* where the I of the philosopher is absorbed by the Others of his or her conceptual personae, it is not too difficult to accept that for Whitehead there are numerous figures from the history of philosophy who also operate in a similar way, as his 'mediators' (*intercesseurs*). Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Hume, Locke, Descartes, and so on, enable Whitehead to develop a schema of thinking which accentuates and links their work in new ways, developing contrasts which work against the dominant framework of critical rationality and the subject–object thinking it dogmatically generalizes.

Concluding remarks

Whitehead is not Deleuze of course, and any comparison between them is likely, as pointed out elsewhere in this book, to freeze-frame their work and neutralize the dynamic power of their respective writings (see Stengers, chapter 1). This chapter has for the most part concentrated on developing an account of Deleuze's conception of the philosophical system as a system in heterogenesis, paying particular attention to the way that such a conception works within and against the metaphysical

tradition. It has paid specific attention to Deleuze's (conception of) style as this is not only an important aspect of the concept of heterogenesis, but also a somewhat overlooked element of his work more generally. Whitehead too has a style – one that is immediately evident to even the most cursory reader of *Process and Reality*. By addressing Whitehead's understanding of the place of language in the construction of metaphysical systems and the importance he attributed to putting specific abstractions – such as subject–predicate logic – in their proper place, I hope to have shown how in Whitehead too, and specifically in his conception of the way that his categoreal scheme functions, a process of the creation of new contrasts with direct parallels in the Deleuzean conception of heterogenesis is operative. I have not addressed some of the more obvious differences between Deleuze's conception of the philosophical system and Whitehead's, but have suggested that the history of philosophy does operate within Whitehead's work in a way that Deleuze's conception of heterogenesis can clarify. However, in both instances there exists an active attempt to intensify the experience of openness which for Adorno, with whom we began, was a crucial characteristic of metaphysics.

Notes

1. Pierre Aubenque (1962) makes the point that the notions of metaphysics, ontology and primary philosophy in Aristotle do not coincide.
2. It was the case with Martial Gueroult, for whom Deleuze had a great deal of admiration (Deleuze, 2002, pp. 202–16).
3. *Pace* Heidegger, Deleuze's reference in *Difference and Repetition* is to Heidegger's work on Kant (*Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*). In this respect, there are parallels between Deleuze's conception of the problem and Foucault's notion of 'problematizing', which it may be worth following up.
4. As has been well known since his discussion in 1972 with Foucault on 'Intellectuals and Power' (Deleuze, 2002, pp. 288–98).
5. For the speculative element of negation, opposition or contradiction Nietzsche substitutes the practical element of *difference*, the object of affirmation and enjoyment' (Deleuze, 1983a, p. 9).
6. Deleuze's letter to Martin is useful in this regard. 'Je crois que plus un philosophe est doué, plus il a tendance, *au début*, à quitter le concret. Il doit s'en empêcher, mais seulement de temps en temps, le temps de revenir à des perceptions, à des affects, qui doivent redoubler les concepts' can be read as much as a remark on his own work as on that of other philosophers (Deleuze, 2003, pp. 339–40).
7. Reiner Schürmann offers an interesting outline and critique of the 'arche-telelogical' schema which subordinates acting to being in philosophy (Schürmann, 1990).

8. Interestingly, Vaysse (1994).argues that Heidegger reckons without a proper consideration of Spinoza, to the point that Spinoza actually accomplishes the gesture Heidegger claims post-Kantian philosophy sought to achieve but was incapable of doing.
9. Although *Difference and Repetition* seems more clearly oriented to an accounting with transcendental issues, the same cannot be said in any simple way of Deleuze's work on Spinoza, not least because of the latter's more obviously ontological approach. That there can be such interesting resonances between *Difference and Repetition* and *Spinoza: Expressionism in Philosophy* makes it difficult to separate the ontological and transcendental in Deleuze's work.
10. Deleuze accentuates the practical side of his reading of Spinoza's common notions in this text, but this does not differ substantially from the longer earlier work on Spinoza. It is well worth noting that *What is Philosophy?* draws implicitly on the reading of common notions in its Conclusion, where Deleuze and Guattari discuss Spinoza and Fichte.
11. A great deal more work needs to be done on Deleuze's relation to Heidegger – precisely in relation to the former's ideas about a philosophical system. In his work on Schelling, Heidegger drew the concept of the system into close relation with the idea of the baroque, suggesting, 'One can understand nothing of what has been designated, a little by chance, as baroque, if one has not understood the essence of this elaboration and construction of system'. It is a sign of Deleuze's humour that he takes this point seriously, if only to reverse its terms: *Le pli: Leibniz et le baroque* makes it clear that one can understand nothing of Leibniz's system if one has not grasped something of the baroque (Heidegger, 1977, p. 65; Deleuze, 1988).
12. Note that in French, the genitive *of* in the expression 'the creation of style' means both that which style creates and that style as itself a creation.
13. The logical systems which analysis generates provide a remarkable example of what Whitehead would see as the fascinating power which abstractions have in modern thought. Eugene Ionesco's play *The Rhinoceros* offers an amusing parody of the stupidity to which logic can give rise (Rosset, 1997).
14. See, for example, the opening chapter of *The Concept of Nature* and the numerous references in *Process and Reality* (Whitehead, 1920; 1978).
15. It is worth noting the ambivalence of this statement, which is increased if one notes that in the index to the corrected edition, the editors qualify the reference to common sense as 'repressive' (the index entry is 'Common sense: repressive, 9'). Elsewhere, though, the reference to common sense is more clearly positive: 'Philosophy is the welding of imagination and common sense into a restraint upon specialists' (p. 17).
16. Aspects of Deleuze's discussion of the plane of immanence are interesting in this regard. Movements or elements of a plane of immanence, he suggests, may seem to be merely nominal definitions if one neglects the difference in nature between a plane of immanence and the concepts which populate it (one will recall the importance of nominal and real definitions in Deleuze's reading of Spinoza). Whitehead's presentation of the categoreal scheme, as Stengers has implied, may seem to amount to a sort of definition. In addition, the installation of a plane of immanence creates a 'non-conceptual comprehension' or the 'pre-philosophical' as internal condition of philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari, 1990, pp. 42–3).

17. Heidegger's discussion of adequacy in *Being and Time* is helpful in this regard (1962, pp. 257–8).
18. Thus in his discussion of judgement, Whitehead (1978, p. 189) points out that the difficulties which judgement raises are ultimately 'camouflaged metaphysical difficulties'.
19. If the process of 'counter-effectuation' which Deleuze outlines in *The Logic of Sense* is a manner of dealing with the accidents of experience such that they are affirmed as events in an *amor fati* (Joe Bousquet: 'My wound existed before me, I was born to embody it'), then we might (Deleuze, 1990, p.148).
20. Keith Robinson, in chapter 7 below, makes felicitous use of Deleuze's cinematic conception of 'relinking' as a way of understanding his and Whitehead's approach to the metaphysical tradition.

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7

Deleuze, Whitehead and the Reversal of Platonism

Keith Robinson

> He who deviates from the traditional falls victim to the extraordinary; he who remains in the traditional becomes its slave. In either event he perishes.
>
> Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, 552

> The truthful man dies, every model of truth collapses, in favour of the new narration.
>
> Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time Image*

The fiction of the end of metaphysics

For some time now it has been said that philosophy as metaphysics is at an end. From Ayer and Carnap to Heidegger and Derrida the 'end of metaphysics' has been at least one of the primary questions of 'modern' philosophy and arguably *the* question of philosophy in the twentieth century on both sides of the professional divide, informing the questions of language, temporality and other topics. It has also been suggested that the claim regarding the 'end of metaphysics' is modern philosophy's 'supreme fiction', the strategy that constitutes its relation to prior traditions, enabling it to constantly renew itself.[1]

Indeed, from its beginnings, one could argue, philosophy has been said to be coincident with its end. Philosophy constantly 'fictions' its end as a way of satisfying its need to continue philosophizing. On this view one could say that philosophy lives off of and finds its future in its own repeated death. Every philosophical innovation requires a break with its past, an 'overcoming' of its tradition, a declaration of a 'rupture'. However, breaking is never easy or complete. Despite the fiction of the

end, resisting it, and potentially reversing it, is the question of whether every 'inversion', 'overcoming', 'overturning', etc. retains something of what is to be inverted, overcome or overturned. In this regard Nietzsche's demand that the task of modern philosophy should be a 'reversal of Platonism' is instructive. This reversal would instruct us in how the 'true world' became a fable. Indeed, the Nietzschean reversal of Platonism might proceed by pointing precisely to the role of 'fiction' in the constitution of Platonism, what Nietzsche refers to as the 'necessary lie'. For Nietzsche the lie amounts to claiming that for Plato 'the more "Idea", the more being. He [Plato] reversed the concept reality' (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 572). Thus Plato for Nietzsche had already carried out his own metaphysical 'reversal', preferring (according to Nietzsche) 'lie and invention to truth', 'appearance to Being', 'the inversion of the value-positing eye'. Nietzsche claims that Plato was so convinced of the value of appearance that he gave it the attributes 'Being', 'Causality', 'Goodness' and 'Truth'. Thus for Nietzsche, Plato's own reversal must be reversed. The fiction or invention of the Idea should not or only be replaced by a better fiction. Rather, such a reversal, I suggest, would be both an expression of the fictioning process or drive itself and a creative response to it: a 'dramatization' of the constitutive process and a new selection involving what Deleuze calls both a 'genetic element' and a synthetic principle. Or what Nietzsche called 'will to power'.[2]

Will to power is the genetic element of fiction in that it is constitutive of fictions. It is the differential element. But it is also that which makes a new evaluation and a new fiction of forces possible. This double response, or 'complex reversal' as I shall call it, is required since, as Nietzsche says, 'he who deviates from the traditional falls victim to the extraordinary; he who remains in the traditional becomes its slave. In either event he perishes' (1986, p. 552). Remaining simply within or without the tradition one risks perishing in the repetition of the same or the eruption of madness. In this 'simple reversal', of the kind that Nietzsche attributed to Plato, an identifiable origin is restored or returned, providing the ground for a decision with respect to its value or truth. In a 'complex reversal' there will always be a crisis of truth since at the origin there is a differential or fictioning element, a non-representational or 'virtual' element that eludes the logic of opposition within simple reversal and yet conditions it. In this transformed and transformative relation to the tradition 'the truthful man dies' and 'every model of truth collapses'. A different mode of inhabiting or living with the tradition can be developed dependent on a different fabulation or fiction, another narrative, less grand perhaps, but more 'untimely'.

Heidegger had also pointed out the 'fictioning essence' of Greek thought. He says, 'what in Greek would be referred to as Idea – thus created, is originally fictioned'. The 'Idea' for the Greeks is here the fiction of the 'super-sensuous', the true being that lies above. Indeed, Heidegger famously argued that Nietzsche's own 'reversal of Platonism' – insofar as that amounted to the idea that the 'sensuous stands above all' – remains within the formal structure of metaphysics, remains with the structure of Plato's reversal, remains within the Platonic fiction, within a simple reversal, in ignorance of its own 'fictioning essence'. The sensuous on this reading is the true being opposed to the fiction of the counterfeit. Instead of fictioning the super-sensuous as the 'true', Nietzsche fictions the 'sensuous' as its replacement. Thus, for Heidegger Nietzsche is the 'last metaphysician'. Although Heidegger recognizes Nietzsche's suspicion of simple reversal and antinomial values, this recognition comes all too late. The logic of Heidegger's claim here holds us to the either/or of simple reversal, or what Deleuze and Guattari call an 'exclusive disjunction', a 'double pincer' in that we either remain within the structure of the opposition of metaphysics or we break with the structure, 'transgress', overcome, 'twist free', etc. The double pincer fixes us more deeply to the fictionally redemptive power of classical metaphysics where we are restored to what Heidegger called 'ontotheology' or what Derrida called a 'metaphysics of presence'.[3]

Derrida's own 'deconstruction' demonstrates how the play of 'undecidables' (or 'quasi-transcendentals' as he calls them) prevents any simple return to or recuperation of the fiction of some simple presence. These undecidables prevent the restoration of the structure of simple reversal. From Plato to Heidegger Derrida's texts work through and expose the role of these non-concepts ('*pharmakon*', '*supplement*', etc.) in making the thought of the metaphysical tradition possible while eluding, disrupting and limiting that thought. In other words, it is impossible to both fiction and not fiction the fictioning process. For Derrida we are bound to this aporia of the fiction of the end. I want to suggest that both the Heideggerian and Derridean response to the question of metaphysics here demonstrates a deep awareness of the fictional and aporetic structure of metaphysics, but 'meditative thinking' and *Gelassenheit* in Heidegger's case, or deconstruction in Derrida's case, are insufficient as creative and pragmatic responses. Either we step outside metaphysics – whatever that would imply – and precisely risk a 'madness' that could even make the Nazis look appealing; or we remain bound to the task of a constant 'vigilance', making visible the constant self-undoing of the metaphysical text. Part of the problem with the latter is that in the

'madness of the decision', as Derrida puts it, the issue of how a positive non-oppositional mode of differentiation is to emerge is constantly deferred or attenuated. There are a few thinkers, however, who stress, and far more affirmatively, the possibilities of a transformation of metaphysics by recognizing the extent to which the metaphysical tradition already offers the resources for creatively 'making a difference', already offers the resources, indeed, for a non-oppositional 'complex reversal' of metaphysics.

Reversal and the metaphysical tradition

Both Deleuze's and Whitehead's thought here is important since neither is in thrall to the idea of 'going beyond' or the contortions involved in never quite but yet always remaining within the determinate oscillations of 'undecidability'. Whitehead's relation to the metaphysical tradition, for example, is often thought to lie in his famous yet sober view of the history of philosophy as a series of footnotes to Plato. However, this needs to be placed alongside his other, less well-known, but more interesting conception of the history of philosophy as a series of 'depositions' (Whitehead, 1978, pp. 7, 10–11) in need of imaginative 'coordination' (1978, p. 7) or experimentation to generate fresh alternatives. The history of philosophy on this view could be construed as a series of emplacements within a territory or deposits within stratified or embedded layers. The philosophical task would then be to loosen the sediment, disturb it and transform it, reawaken another formerly imperceptible layer within it or, in the idiom of Deleuze and Guattari, we might say the task is to activate a movement of 'deterritorialization', release 'lines of flight', and so on. In my view this is precisely what Whitehead does when he argues that the depositions of the great philosophers 'must be construed with limitations, adaptations, and inversions, *either unknown to them, or even explicitly repudiated by them*' (1978, p. 11; my emphasis). Thus the reading operates in the critically challenging and often creatively destructive space of alternatives left unsaid by the author, pursuing their repudiations and adaptions and fictioning them for new ends and problems.

This is close, in fact, to the rationale of some of Heidegger's own readings of philosophers within the tradition. For example, in his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger's thought pursues a 'retrieval' where if one merely gives back what the author says, then one does not arrive at a more fundamental 'laying out' (*Auslegung*) of what the author was 'unable to say' but 'had wanted to say', and that remains 'unsaid in and

through what has been said'. In this attempt to question 'what has not been said' (Heidegger, 1997, p. 175), one can situate Whitehead's own relation to Kant and the history of philosophy. Equally Deleuze's Kant interpretation is based on working back to that which an author 'does not say in what he says, in order to extract something that still belongs to him, though you can also turn it against him' (Deleuze, 2004, p. 139). Whitehead's own readings of the 'unsaid' in the history of philosophy – and as we shall see, his own reading of Plato – endorse this idea of a rich, critical and yet creative transformation of the metaphysical tradition in order to invent from the concepts deposited there a kind of '*becoming*' of thought. And this becoming or 'untimeliness' of thought for Whitehead, as for Deleuze, could be said to operate according to a certain 'doubling' and 'falsifying' requiring a creation and 'dramatization' of the concept and a new 'method' for expressing the novelty and concrete 'essence' or 'multiplicity' of the Idea in the actual. This style pervades Whitehead's reading of individual philosophers and the broader sweep of his understanding of the history of philosophy, especially its moments of transformation. Whitehead's use of individual philosophers in the history of philosophy, like Deleuze's, is dynamic and dramatic, restaging concepts in relation to contemporary problems and releasing them for new becomings. When Whitehead says 'a new idea introduces an alternative; and we are not less indebted to a thinker when we adopt the alternative he discarded' (1979, p. 11), we think he is questioning, and creating from, a thinker on the basis of what they do not or could not say, distinguishing the history, representation and academized 'stratification' of a concept from its 'virtual' potential for becoming and creation. Whitehead's readings of the metaphysical tradition, like Deleuze's, operate on the basis of creating alternative becomings and relinkings in thought, releasing completely new concepts and new readings of existing concepts from the history of philosophy. Like Deleuze, Whitehead's way of escaping the history of philosophy was by creating from it, pushing thinkers towards new becomings and 'immortalizing' their concepts in new ways.

In other words, for Whitehead the end of metaphysics is, as Deleuze and Guattari say, 'pointless idle chatter', just as positing a distinction between the 'end' and the *cloture* (or closure) of metaphysics is unnecessary. Indeed, Deleuze's own suspicion regarding Heidegger is that ultimately he does not conceive metaphysics in such a manner that it will be truly disengaged from a subordination to the identity of representation, especially 'given his [Heidegger's] critique of the eternal return' (Deleuze, 1994, p. 66). If Heidegger here presses too quickly towards a

' "turning" beyond metaphysics' (1994, p. 65), Deleuze would have us think metaphysics itself in and as the very structure of reversal, a complex reversal that neither simply and uncritically remains within metaphysics, nor breaks outside of it, or remains on the border or limit exposing its aporetic conditions. Reversal here is neither simply inside or outside the structure within which it inheres, nor is it a transcendent prising open of a formally closed structure. Rather, complex reversal involves an immanent doubling or repetition of returning itself. Along with the language of difference and repetition, and the idea of a self-differentiating or repeating difference, Deleuze is quite fond of formulations here that invoke the 'folds' of a surface, for example, 'inside *of* an outside', 'an interior of projected exterior', etc. Thus Deleuze develops the idea of a double structure neither as 'present' or 'simply located', nor as two moments fused into simultaneity, or as two things coming together as one where their difference is overcome. Rather the double maintains its difference as an 'inclusive disjunction' pulling in two different directions that at once 'eludes the present'. The double is a becoming that will not tolerate the separation of before and after, past and future, but gestures in both directions in a time not captured by the present. This double reversal would amount to a 'conversion', as Deleuze calls it, in which univocal Being revolves entirely around the difference or becoming of beings. One finds similar remarks in many of Deleuze's texts. Most notably in Deleuze's otherwise wholly affirmative reading of Spinoza he suggests that Spinoza occasionally seems to let transcendence back in. To avoid this Deleuze says that substance must be made to turn around the modes. Whitehead himself makes a similar point in *Process and Reality* when he objects to Spinoza's substance since it is an 'eminent' term over and above the modes: 'the ultimate is illegitimately allowed a final 'eminent' reality, beyond that ascribed to any of its accidents' (1979, p. 7).

The doubling or reversal operates not just in relation to individual thinkers but also as a metaphilosophical strategy. Here reversal is the incorporation or repetition of metaphysics with a creative difference that adds to the structure and is then enfolded into the now transformed tradition. If this is recognizable as Deleuze's 'difference and repetition' or his notion of philosophical system as heterogenesis, it seems that this is also expressed in Whitehead's 'the many become one and are increased by one'. In other words, Whitehead's claim about the 'ultimate' as immanence and as creativity must also apply to philosophical systems where the concept of system, far from being abandoned, is transformed in accordance with the idea of complex reversal.

Just as Deleuze claims that the concepts of philosophy depend on 'careful systematic use' (1995, p. 32), so Whitehead suggests that 'we must be systematic; but we should keep our systems open' (1966, p. 6). In the 'fallacy of discarding method' Whitehead complains that 'philosophers boast that they uphold no system' (1967, p. 223), but in doing so they fall prey to the 'delusive clarity' of expressions that their thought was intended to surmount. Equally, Whitehead famously critiques those philosophers[4] who assume that intellectual analysis is possible only in relation to one 'discarded dogmatic method' and then deduce that intellect is tied to error. Here Whitehead critiques a fairly typical – and typically 'postmodern' – response to systematic metaphysics, where metaphysics is rejected as necessarily tied to fixed, dogmatic methods. Despite the postmodern idea that systems have broken down, or that the fragmentation of knowledge makes the construction of a system impossible, Deleuze says that 'systems have in fact lost absolutely none of their power' (1995, p. 31). Indeed, all the tools for a theory of 'open systems' are available in contemporary science and logic.

An 'open' metaphysical system consists in the construction or creation of concepts that relate to 'circumstances' rather than 'essences', where questions are driven by the specific form of a problem relating to circumstances. Yet for Deleuze the quintessential question of philosophy has too often been thought to be the question of the 'Essence', the essential 'what is X? When Socrates' interlocutors reply to his questions about the essence with 'This is X' this is only seen as 'sloppy thinking, whether by old men or not so clever children' (Deleuze, 2004, p. 95). Here the method of dialectic, in its pursuit of the essence, will end only in contradiction. It is, Deleuze argues, only when the Platonic dialectic becomes 'serious and positive' that it begins to ask a rather different type of question. In order to discover a positive determination of the Idea, and in relation to a specific case and its circumstances, the question becomes 'Who?' 'How much?' 'Where and when?', etc. Perhaps Deleuze was influenced by Whitehead here since it is precisely on this point that Whitehead applauds Plato for demonstrating that 'we can never get away from the questions: How much, – In what proportions – and In what pattern of arrangement with other things . . . In fact there is hardly a question to be asked which should not be fenced round with qualifications as to how much, and as to what pattern of circumstances' (1967, p. 152).

Perhaps the most important question guiding the construction of open metaphysical systems is 'How can concrete fact exhibit entities abstract from itself and yet participated in by its own nature?' (Whitehead, 1978,

p. 20). The quintessential question of philosophy for Whitehead, as we have seen with Deleuze, has been to ask how concrete particulars can be built up of universals, or how the particular participates in the essence or form. For Whitehead this is a 'complete mistake' (1978, p. 20) leading philosophy astray in a misunderstanding of its explanatory purpose. The explanatory purpose of philosophical systems is to ask how abstractions emerge from the concrete. This is why Deleuze describes himself as an empiricist by the way in which 'Whitehead defined empiricism' (Deleuze, 1987, p. vii). This empiricism has a twofold character: first, 'the abstract does not explain, but itself be explained; and the aim is not to rediscover the eternal or universal, but to find the conditions under which something new is produced (*creativeness*)' (Deleuze, 1987, p. vii). Too often in 'rationalist philosophies' one begins, Deleuze says, with big abstractions – the One, the Subject, the Whole – and one asks how they are embodied in the world. But with Deleuze and Whitehead empiricism begins with a completely different evaluation, analysing the concrete states of things. Thus, in the new metaphysics, or the reversal of philosophy, we should not begin with system but rather with what Whitehead himself calls '*assemblage*' (1966, p. 2). The process of assemblage is precisely an attention to everything that escapes systematic formalization or, in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, one must begin with assemblages because they (de)territorialize strata. One begins in the middle of an assemblage and, as Deleuze says, one creates or 'extracts' non-pre-existent concepts from them. One creates concepts in accordance with the assemblage or multiplicity by tracing the lines of becoming of which they are made up.

Complex reversal, then, is a strategy for reversing philosophy in the transformation of its 'metaphysical' vocation. It is an immanence immanent only to itself, a self-actualizing or constructive structure that requires a creative 'continuity' or conservation out of which the new will emerge. Indeed, we might say (along with Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*) that in any 'reversal' it is not only inevitable that elements from the overturned are conserved but, Deleuze adds, that this conservation is 'desirable' (1994, p. 59). This comment is made in relation to what Deleuze refers to as 'Platonism'. In the next section I assess the transformation of metaphysics in Deleuze and Whitehead in relation to their reversed appropriations of Plato and Platonism. This will show the extent to which both Deleuze and Whitehead 'fiction' a new and creative relation to the metaphysical tradition which will have little time for the fiction of the end, but which equally cannot be called 'Platonism with a different accentuation'.[5]

Deleuze and Plato

As we have seen, Deleuze retains elements from Plato, a conservation that Deleuze claims is both inevitable and desirable. What are these elements? We begin to get a sense when in response to a question about Plato Deleuze suggests that in the later dialogues Ideas are something like multiplicities that must be traversed by questions such as 'How? How much?' In this sense, Deleuze says, 'then, yes, everything I've said has something Platonic about it' (2004, p. 116). In other words, there are moments in Plato for Deleuze where the Ideas open onto and express assemblages or multiplicities closer to the accident and the event than the essence, multiplicities that respond to a different type of question. Here Deleuze tends to differentiate early and later Plato, and 'Platonism' from Plato. In Platonism, the being of the question responds to the 'what is', the essence, and the problem of difference has already been subordinated to the world of representation, but in Plato, Deleuze says, 'the issue is still in doubt' (1994, p. 59).

If in Plato the issue is still in doubt it is because Deleuze finds in the later Plato another fiction, not the fiction of the Idea but another model, the 'terrifying' model as Deleuze calls it of the *pseudos*. In the chapter 'Difference in itself' from *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze says:

> Among the most extraordinary pages in Plato, demonstrating the anti-Platonism at the heart of Platonism, are those which suggest that the different, the dissimilar, the unequal – in short, becoming – may well be not merely defects which affect copies like a ransom paid for their secondary character or a counterpart to their resemblance, but rather models themselves, terrifying models of the *pseudos* in which unfolds the power of the false.
>
> (1994, p. 128)

For Deleuze the direction for the reversal of Platonism is given by Plato himself in the terrifying 'counter-model' of the *pseudos*. It is the model of 'the power of the false' that must be conserved from Plato, the constitutive and differential element that fictions opposing values as well as the type of questions engendered by this power. The false does not gain its power from a presupposed model of truth. Its power derives from the virtual force of creation and becoming itself out of which new philosophical concepts, values and narrations emerge.

> Narration becomes fundamentally falsifying. This is not at all a case of 'each has its own truth', a variability of content. It is a power of the

> false which replaces and supersedes the form of the true, because it poses the simultaneity of incompossible presents, or the co-existence of not-necessarily true pasts. . . . We have not mentioned the author who is essential in this regard: it is Nietzsche, who, under the name of the 'will to power', substitutes the power of the false for the form of the true, and resolves the crisis of truth . . . . in favor of the false and its artistic, creative power.
>
> (Deleuze, 1989, pp. 130–1)

Deleuze takes up the 'power of the false' in relation to his reading of Plato in *The Logic of Sense*. Here he thinks of 'reversal' as making visible the 'motivation' of Platonism. This motivation cannot be revealed by the formula of (simple) reversal in terms of the abolition of the world of appearances and the world of essences since this could be ascribed to Kant, Hegel and others.[6] Rather, the motivation of Platonism lies in distinguishing 'pretenders' and screening their claims in relation to the model of 'participation'. And there will be all kinds of degrees of the more and less to sort out down to that which participates the least, the mirage and the simulacrum, a whole 'infinity of degradation' as Deleuze says. In this regard Deleuze finds that the *Sophist* is an exception in the Platonic texts. Rather than look for the pure gold (the essence or form of the philosopher) the false pretender is sought, the Sophist himself. And it is at the end of the *Sophist*, in what Deleuze describes as 'the most extraordinary adventure of Platonism', that Deleuze finds Plato peering into the abyss and discovering that the simulacrum is not just a false copy but places in question the very notions of copy and model. (Is Socrates the Sophist?) The triumph of the false pretender, the twilight of the Idols. The power of the simulacrum lies not just in its denial of simple reversal, of representational oppositions between model and copy where 'what is made not to return is that which presupposes the Same and the Similar, that which pretends to correct divergence or order the chaos' (Deleuze, 1990, p. 265). The power of the simulacrum also lies in its positive affirmation of complex reversal where eternal return enables a making or fictioning of difference out of the chaos that is neither predicted nor anticipated. In this other mode a little destruction and a little madness may be necessary, but there is all the difference between 'destroying in order to conserve . . . and destroying in order to institute the chaos which creates' (Deleuze, 1990, p. 266), the chaos or fiction that destroys and the chaos or fiction that creates and composes. The point, then, is not to eliminate madness or the chaos, but negatively to prevent their eruption or simple repetition and positively to affirm their capacity for complex

reversal and their power to create. Either the simple repetition of custom, habit and tradition or you are in madness; either you have a 'ground', order, principle or you are in chaos. As Deleuze says, metaphysics has often been presented with this alternative: 'either an undifferentiated ground, a groundlessness, formless non-being, or an abyss without difference and without properties *or* a supremely individuated being and an intensely personalized Form. Without this Being or Form you will only have chaos' (1990, p. 106). The 'pragmatics' of Deleuzian metaphysics work 'in between' these oppositions of simple reversal, fictioning a new relation and balance between smooth and striated, territorialization and deterritorialization, etc., between the chaos that negates and the chaos that affirms, shaped only by the needs of the 'assemblage' in each case. As Deleuze and Guattari say, 'pragmatics, has no other meaning: make a rhizome. But you don't know what you can make a rhizome with, you don't know which subterranean stem is going to make a rhizome, or enter a becoming, people your desert. So experiment' (1988. p. 246).

Whitehead and Plato

We have already mentioned Whitehead's famous remark about Plato and the history of philosophy. Whitehead's comment has often and usually been taken to mean that he is simply a Platonist in the mould of A. E. Taylor. There is a good deal in Whitehead to support this view, particularly the resemblance of his concepts of eternal objects, the 'primordial nature of God', extensive continuum, etc., to Plato's own notions; a conservation of Plato that is both inevitable and desirable. Yet Whitehead is also deeply critical of Plato and particularly of the role mathematics plays in establishing a non-processual reality in his thought. Indeed, Whitehead is reported to have said, 'if you come to Plato for the first time, your impression is: what a muddle the man is in'. Plato is a 'muddle-head' as opposed to those who are 'simple-minded'. In other words, what Plato loses in clarity Whitehead thinks he may make up for in adequacy and breadth. As Whitehead says, you can't expect a genius to have common sense. His central critique of Plato relates to the conception of the 'static absolute':

> As the Greeks understood that science [mathematics], the notion of transition was in the background. Each number, each ratio, each geometric form exhibited a static attainment . . . . The ideal forms are for them motionless, impervious and self-sufficient each representing a perfection peculiar to itself. Such was the reaction of Greek thought to the fundamental notions of mathematics. The human mind was

> dazzled by this glimpse of eternity. The result of this revelation was that Greek philosophy – at least in its most influential school – conceived ultimate reality in the guise of static existences with timeless interrelations. Perfection was unrelated to transition. Creation with its world in change, was an inferior avocation of a static absolute.
> (Whitehead, 1966, p. 81)

Although Whitehead is critical of the 'static fallacy' in Plato and the Greeks and critical also of nineteenth-century interpreters who fix and canonize this view of Plato, he is also, like Deleuze and others, deeply appreciative of the later dialogues, especially the *Sophist* and the *Timaeus*, where he finds something of a reversal of the static fallacy and the presentation of an alternative model. So, if Plato in his earlier thought is deceived by the 'beauty of mathematics intelligible in unchanging perfection' and thereby 'conceived of a super world of idea, forever perfect and forever interwoven', in his later phase 'he [Plato] sometimes repudiates the notion, though he never consistently abandons it' (Whitehead, 1967, p. 275). Here Whitehead loves to quote the *Sophist* where the definition of being is 'simply power', or 'being is an energy arising from a power . . . anything affected by anything has existence', 'not being is a form of being', etc. Indeed, Whitehead points out that 'Plato liked yachting, the sport of the aristocrat. Yachting – the turn and the flash where everything is becoming and nothing really is.' Indeed, the resemblance between Whitehead's *Process and Reality* and the *Timaeus* is clear and has been noted by others.[7] However, Whitehead's 'eternals', far from being the most real, only have reality insofar as they are 'ingressed' in actuality. The 'essence' of reality for Whitehead is 'process'. 'Thus each actual thing is only to be understood in terms of its becoming and perishing' (Whitehead, 1967, p. 274). Whitehead lifts seven basic doctrines from the later Plato – 'The Ideas, The Physical Elements, The Psyche, The Eros, The Harmony, The Mathematical Relation, The Receptacle' (1967, p. 275) – and claims that modern metaphysics must develop these notions in the context of actuality as a process.

The question here is whether the development of the notions that Whitehead finds in Plato amount to a 'reversal of Platonism', a reversal whose direction is given by Plato himself. If so, does this movement approximate more to what we have called simple reversal or a complex reversal of the metaphysical tradition? What Whitehead seems to find in the *Sophist* and the *Timaeus* is another model of fluency driven by a non-identifiable creative element. 'It never really "is"', as Whitehead is fond of repeating. This genetic element of becoming and creativity

for Whitehead is also a principle of synthesis. This is the category of the ultimate as the power of the creative. It is what Whitehead calls a 'real potentiality'. Here he says 'the term "real" [in real potentiality] refers to the creative activity, where the Platonic definition of "real" in the *Sophist* is referred to' (1967, p. 179). Whitehead's appropriations of Plato here seem to move his thought a step closer to the structure of complex reversal, recognizing that a simple reversal of the static fallacy will amount only to a repetition of the same without real fluency or 'transition':

> If the opposites, static and fluent, have once been so explained as separately to characterize diverse actualities, the interplay between the thing which is static and the things which are fluent involves contradiction at every step in its explanation. Such philosophies must include the notion of 'illusion' as a fundamental principle – the notion of 'mere appearance'. This is the final Platonic problem.
>
> (Whitehead, 1978, pp. 346–7)

For Whitehead the static and the fluent in Plato cannot inhere in one actuality, where transition and change can only be given the status of 'appearance' or illusion. This is the fiction – the 'decadent' fiction – of the early Plato with its static values that have become 'unendurable' in their 'appalling monotony of endurance'. Rather than the fiction of the Platonic problem, in the final sections of *Process and Reality* Whitehead formulates what he calls the 'double problem':

> This is not the mere problem of fluency *and* permanence. There is the double problem: actuality with permanence requiring fluency as its completion, and actuality with fluency, requiring permanence as its completion.
>
> (1978, p. 347)

For Whitehead, if Plato's earlier texts operate out of a simple opposition between 'permanence' and 'fluency', the later texts come much closer to embodying the complex or double problem of permanence and fluidity in one actuality. Does the double problem that Whitehead describes provide sufficient resistance to the claims of essence and identity of simple reversal? Actuality is described as a permanence that requires fluency just as fluency requires permanence. Simple order is not enough:

> What is required is something much more complex. It is order entering upon novelty so that massiveness of order does not degenerate

> into mere repetition; and so that novelty is always reflected upon a background of system.
>
> (1978, p. 339)

The achievement of novelty requires that complex order is accompanied by 'a little destruction' to avoid degenerating into 'mere repetition', just as novelty requires a little order and system to avoid the excess. Whitehead's discussion here (and elsewhere on the notions of 'perishing' and 'evil') comes close to Deleuze's own discussions of the 'two nihilisms' in *The Logic of Sense*. Whitehead distinguishes what we could call a 'conservative' or 'anaesthetic evil' and a 'creative', 'aesthetic' and productive evil. The first type operates on the basis of simple exclusion, removing opposition and 'inhibition' in order to achieve the static maintenance of perfection. Here inhibitions are removed, evil is avoided and anaesthesia results (Whitehead, 1967, p. 256). Conservative 'evil' is 'trivial' and 'decadent', looks only to the past in order simply to repeat itself, excluding the impulse to novelty. The second type is 'discordant evil' where inhibitions are allowed in, sometimes leading to destruction, but where the avoidance of destruction leads to 'decadence' and 'anesthesia'. Although this second type leads to discord, for Whitehead 'progress is founded upon the experience of discordant feelings' (1967, p. 257). Thus the second type of evil is productive of novelty by bringing together permanence and fluency in one actuality. One question is whether Whitehead's synthesis of permanence and fluency is comparable to the 'eternal return' of Deleuze. Here Whitehead suggests that by developing later Plato's seven notions one brings into synthesis the three 'complexes' of time by which novelty is produced:

> Synthesis creates a new fact which is the Appearance woven out of the old and new – a compound of reception and anticipation, which in its turn passes into the future. The final synthesis of these three complexes is the end to which its indwelling Eros urges the soul. Its good resides in the realization of a strength of many feelings fortifying each other as they meet in novel unity. Its evil lies in the clash of vivid feelings, denying to each other their proper expansion. Its triviality lies in the anaesthesia by which evil is avoided . . . Evil is the half-way house between perfection and triviality. It is the violence of strength against strength.
>
> (1967, p. 277)

In the final sections of *Process and Reality* Whitehead attempted to address what in *Adventure of Ideas* he called the 'final synthesis' by trying to

resolve all the oppositions (summarized as God and World) of simple reversal into a union of 'contrasts' that require each other. Does Whitehead merely end up in a healing or reconciliation of the oppositions of the End in transcendence, or do they achieve the level of complex plateaux without resolution? Do the contrasts here form the 'inclusive disjunctions' and eternal repetitions that characterize the complex reversals of Deleuzian pragmatics? 'Neither God nor world reaches static completion. Both are in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground – the creative advance into novelty' (Whitehead, 1978, p. 349).

I suggest that what we find in both Deleuze and Whitehead is the transformation of philosophy and the reversal of Platonism not as a simple 'reversal' or 'inversion', but as a 'reversal of reversal' that both 'conserves' elements of what is being reversed and repeats them with a difference. 'Double reversal' or the double structure of complex reversal reveals the power of the false or the power of the creative as the non-representational or differential element that insists or subsists beneath the oppositions of simple reversal. This is 'counter-actualization' of the tradition that resists the destructive 'ends' of simple reversal in favour of an 'untimely' philosophy to come, a virtual transformation of metaphysics as a 'philosophy of the future'.

Notes

1. See Jonathan Ree, 'The End of Metaphysics: Philosophy's Supreme Fiction?' In A. J. Holland (ed.), *Philosophy, its History and Historiography*. Royal Institute of Philosophy Conferences (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1983), pp. 3–26.
2. Will to power in one aspect is a pathos, a feeling of power, a feeling or capacity to affect and be affected. That will to power is a dynamic quanta composed of relational centres of forces in opposition to the atomism of Nietzsche's day immediately pulls together the Nietzschean and Whiteheadian universes. Whitehead's own 'actual occasions' are dynamic relational units that affect and are affected and could be directly compared with Nietzsche's concept here.
3. Simon Critchley and Dominique Janicaud would dispute this reading of Heidegger. In his paper on Janicaud, Critchley suggests that Janicaud had already uncovered a thought similar to what I am suggesting here in Heidegger, which he calls the 'overcoming of overcoming'. See Simon Critchley, 'The Overcoming of Overcoming: On Dominique Janicaud', *Continental Philosophy Review*, 36(4) (December 2003).
4. Here Whitehead accuses Bergson and Nietzsche of 'anti-intellectualism', which also 'tinges American pragmatism'. Although Nietzsche does talk about a 'will to system', both Nietzsche and Bergson are systematic thinkers in the same sense that we attribute here to Whitehead and so we think Whitehead's claim is mistaken.

5. This is the claim of Alain Badiou (25.6 *Clamour of Being*). Much of Badiou's text on Deleuze relies on attributing to Deleuze a 'Nietzschean construction named "Platonism"', which Deleuze's own reversal, he claims, is apparently dependent on. Badiou talks of 'the pared down version of Platonism that Deleuze concocts', or insists that whenever Deleuze talks of the 'false', this 'refers uniquely to a category of truth founded on the same of the model and the similar of the copy' and, of course, nobody in the history of philosophy buys this concept of truth, least of all Plato. This recognition does not stop Badiou from insisting that Deleuze still uses this. Although I think Badiou's text on Deleuze is interesting and provocative, at times profound, the misleading interpretations above, and others like it, mean that his book must be approached with caution.
6. This, as we have seen, is the reversal that Nietzsche ascribes to Plato. Deleuze has other formulas for reversal. For example, 'to reverse Platonism we must remove essences and substitute events in their place', 'give me a body then, that is the formula of a philosophical reversal'. There are others.
7. See Dorothy Emmett, *Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism* (London: Macmillan, 1966) and Joseph Brennan's account of Whitehead's lectures on Plato in his course on 'Ancient and Modern Cosmologies' at Harvard University, Autumn 1934, published as 'Whitehead on Plato's Cosmology', *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 9 (1971), pp. 70–8.

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8

Whitehead and Deleuze on Creation and Calculus

Jean-Claude Dumoncel

In *Process and Reality* (hereafter P & R)[1] we find:

> God can be termed the creator of each temporal actual entity. But the phrase is apt to be misleading by its suggestion that the ultimate creativity of the universe is to be ascribed to God's volition.[2]

And:

> He does not create the world, he saves it.[3]

This may be labelled the Whiteheadian wavering on God's activity. In *Différence et répétition* we read:*

> Il est . . . bien vrai que Dieu fait le monde en calculant, mais ses calculs ne tombent jamais juste, et c'est cette injustice dans le résultat, cette irréductible inégalité, qui forme la condition du monde.[4]

This is the Deleuzian thesis on God's activity[5]. For the sake of brevity, I will refer to it as the *thesis of the odd calculus*. A comparison of Whitehead and Deleuze on this point requires a broadening of the comparative panel, where the two authors to be added are Plato and Leibniz. We thus obtain four propositions at the scale of the whole history of metaphysics:

1. According to Plato, the world is a *participation* in (or a *simulation* of) *Ideas*.
2. According to Leibniz, the (*real*) world is a realization of a *possible* world.

*English translations for all French quotations are given in the notes.

3. According to Whitehead, the world is the *ingression* of *potential* objects in *actual* entities.
4. According to Deleuze, the world of *actualities* is the *incarnation* of *virtualities*.

Before we spell out any detail on the relation betweeen Deleuze and Whitehead, we must quote the sentence in which Deleuze himself, in a famous page from *Différence et répétition*, epitomizes his reading of *Process and Reality*. After saying that the *nomadic notions* of Whitehead must be understood in relation to the word '*Erewhon*', he stipulates: 'Le *Erewhon* de Butler ne nous semble pas seulement un déguisement de *no-where*, mais un bouleversement de *now-here*.'[6]

This is the epitome of *Process and Reality* and takes its meaning from the distance between the *Platonic Ideas* and the *Whiteheadian adventure of Ideas*. As a Whiteheadian halfway house in this distance, we find the Whiteheadian requisite that the Kantian order between objectivity and subjectivity be *inverted* (P & R, 156). For Deleuze, this means that the whole Kantian game of *Ideas*, *concepts* and *schemes* must be transformed. In its Kantian version, it is the orthodox theory of the *now-here*, focused on the double work of schematism, respectively on Time and Space. By contrast, the *no-where* has its paradigm in the Platonic *Ideas* and the Leibnizian *possible worlds* so that the Whiteheadian metaphysics is obtained by a double process: *disguising* the *no-where* (by conceiving the 'eternal objects' as potentials for ingression) and *upsetting* the *now-here* (by inverting the Kantian order in the constitution of experience). Consequently, this chapter is divided into three sections: 1) the Deleuzian doctrine of the creating Calculus; 2) the Whiteheadian doctrine of reversion; and 3) a comparison of Whitehead and Deleuze. These sections are very unequal in length, with the Deleuzian commentary receiving the principal place for two reasons:

i) The Deleuzian theory seems to be more difficult than the Whiteheadian one.
ii) The Whiteheadian theory of reversion is concentrated in a few lines, the Deleuzian doctrine of the creating calculus is scattered throughout *Différence et répetition*.

Deleuze

In order to explain the thesis of the odd calculus, I shall proceed as follows: first, I will give a simplified paradigm of the calculus, and then enrich the paradigm until the whole theory is obtained.

The simplified model is obtained from a Platonic scheme found in Lautman. Lautman is no ordinary philosopher of mathematics. According to the standard position adopted in the philosophy of mathematics,[7] mathematics is the *object* of study. But Lautman had another *problem*: the problem of *Being*. For him, mathematics contains the *solution* to this *ontological* problem. In order to unfold such a relation between philosophy and mathematics, Lautman resorts to the Platonic assessment of the relation between dialectics and mathematics, as it is exposited in the famous Division of the Line, with its upper and lower parts:

This will be labelled the *Lautman Line*. It is the backbone of the Deleuzian universe with its two levels (the Virtual in the upper segment and the Actual in the lower segment). And with this diagram in mind we can obtain the paradigm. The essential point is that, according to Lautman, dialectics is conceived as the level of *problems*, located at the upper segment *L*, with the solution given at the lower segment *l*. This is the *Lautman Law*.

Suppose now that the upper segment has the value 1 and that it is the locus of the following problem: 'What is the diagonal of my square?' The solution is given by a kind of calculus, which gives the value of the lower segment: $l = \sqrt{2}$.

Here we have the explanation of the title given by Deleuze to the last chapter of *Différence et répetition*: 'Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible' . In Plato, the two parts of the Line represent respectively the sensible world and the intelligible world, so that the division of the line is already an 'Asymmetrical Genesis of the Sensible'. In the Deleuzian universe, the upper segment symbolizes the Virtual and the lower segment symbolizes the Actual, so that we obtain the 'Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible' as the actualization (or *Incarnation*) of the Virtual in the Actual.

Now we can return to the key lines where the odd calculus is introduced:

> Il est . . . bien vrai que Dieu fait le monde en calculant, mais ses calculs ne tombent jamais juste, et c'est cette injustice dans le résultat, cette irréductible inégalité, qui forme la condition du monde. Le monde ≪se fait≫ pendant que Dieu calcule; il n'y aurait pas de monde si le calcul était juste. Le monde est toujours assimilable à un ≪reste≫,

> et le réel dans le monde ne peut être pensé qu'en termes de nombres fractionnaires ou même incommensurables.[8]

Here the essential point is the transition from inequality to 'incommensurability'. The first is deepened by the second, but the inequality suffices to produce an asymmetry between the potential and the actual. However, the Lautman Line provides us only with the vertical axis of the Deleuzian universe. In order to obtain the whole, we must proceed to the elaborations. They also have a geometrical scheme, which is given when the Lautman Line is replaced by X, where the upper part is written V and the lower part Λ. V must be conceived as a holder for the Bergsonian Cone of Memory, and the Λ as a pace in the Bergsonian Duration. The odd calculus is the calculus of what takes place in the actualities of the pace, from what takes place as virtualities in the cone. So that Deleuze discloses the Bergsonian canvass of his whole system when he says (DR 274):

> Le schéma bergsonien qui unit l'*Evolution créatrice* à *Matière et mémoire* commence par l'exposition d'une gigantesque mémoire, multiplicité formée par la coexistence virtuelle de toutes les sections du ≪cône≫, chaque section étant comme la répétition de toutes les autres, et s'en distinguant seulement par l'ordre des rapports et la distribution des points singuliers. Puis l'actualisation de ce virtuel mnémonique apparaît comme la création de lignes divergentes, dont chacune correspond à une section virtuelle et représente une manière de résoudre un problème, mais en incarnant dans des espèces et des parties différenciées l'ordre des rapports et la distribution de singularités propre à la section considérée. La différence et la répétition dans le virtuel fondent le mouvement de l'actualisation, de la différenciation comme création, se substituant ainsi à l'identité et à la ressemblance du possible, qui n'inspirent qu'un pseudo-mouvement, le faux mouvement de la réalisation comme limitation abstraite.[9]

But the Bergsonian X iself must be crossed by the Deleuzian Z. And this letter Z is simply the monogram of the Deleuzian *Urphänomen*. Consider, in a thunderstorm, the event *Thunderbolt*. In order for the lightning to strike, a potential *difference* is required as a precondition, and this difference is only another name for the electrical *tension* which in Bergson gives the physical model of Memory. But the lightning in itself, with its zigzag, is already a case of *repetition*. And the thunder, occurring after the lightning, is a *secondary* or *subsequent repetition*,

echoing the first. This provides at the physical level a complete paradigm of Difference and Repetition in Deleuzian metaphysics.[10] The whole model must be divided intp two main parts, with a systematic correspondence between its Bergsonian antecedent. The set formed by the potential difference and the repetition in the zigzag of lightning is wholly contained in the Bergsonian crater of memory, with its differences in heights and its *antecedent repetition* of the same story. The repetition in thunder corresponds to a *subsequent repetition* in the Bergsonian Duration. The first part is the 'Ideal', the second is in the 'sensible'. (It should be noted that when 'repetition' is *unqualified*, it means the *subsequent* repetition, since the *antecedent repetition* is *identical with difference*.) We read:

> dans cette philosophie de la Différence que représente l'ensemble du bergsonisme, vient le moment où Bergson s'interroge sur la double genèse de la qualité et de l'étendue. Et cette différenciation fondamentale (qualité-étendue) ne peut trouver sa raison que dans une grande synthèse de la Mémoire qui fait coexister tous les degrés de différence comme degrés de détente et de contraction, et qui redécouvre au sein de la durée l'ordre impliqué de cette intensité qui n'avait été dénoncée que du dehors et provisoirement.[11]

As for the use of the Bergsonian scheme, we need to remember that the Cone of Memory stands on the Plane of Matter. This entails that the Deleuzian world ultimately has *three* levels. This has an essential bearing on the whole of the chapter 'Repetition for itself': it means that the Three Syntheses of Time set out in this chapter are in exact correspondence with the three levels of the universe. The synthesis of Habitus is located on the plane of matter; the synthesis of Mnemosyne is located in the cone of memory; and the synthesis of Thanatos is located in the flux of duration. An alternative paradigm is offered when Deleuze proclaims: 'Partout l'Ecluse'.[12]

In order to understand this epigrammatic proposition, you must imagine a system of sluices along a river which flows from a chain of high mountains. The sluices may be supposed to permit the navigation of a boat downstream. And in the system the lowest sluice will be the one allowing the passage from the last level on the river to the sea or 'river Ocean'. In this model, all the sluices are defining as many scansions in the Bergsonian Memory, the 'river Ocean' is an image of Duration, and, in the Asymmetrical Synthesis, the lowest sluice is the door of the Ideal, opening onto the Sensible.

As for the author of the Odd Calculus between the Ideal and the Sensible, explaining the transition from the first to the second, his *existence* is established in *Différence et répetition*, where Deleuze envisages 'l'équivalent d'une preuve cosmologique':

> l'enchaînement horizontal des causes et des effets dans le monde réclame une Cause première totalisante, extra-mondaine, comme cause verticale des effets et des causes.[13]

This proof contains two main theses:

1. The temporal world has an extra-mundane *first cause*.
2. The Deleuzian First Cause is 'vertical'. This means that it consists in the Bergsonian Cone of Memory, conceived as the locus where the 'Ideal synthesis of Difference' takes place.

And so the Cosmological Proof of Deleuze may be rephrased by saying that the world of duration and *subsequent Repetition* has its cause in the world of **Difference**, identical with *antecedent* repetition.

Now that we have explicated the Deleuzian Universe as a whole, with its two main levels of Virtual causality and Actual effects, we can inquire into the nature of each level in itself. What is the Deleuzian world of Difference and what is the meaning of the Deleuzian world of Repetition? The answer is contained in the word 'synthesis'. But synthesis is unequally ('asymmetrically') shared between the two. The world of Difference is the locus of the 'Synthesis of Difference'; the world of Repetition is the theatre, amid the three syntheses of Time, of the *third* synthesis as the explanation of Individuation.

In the asymmetrical synthesis of the sensible, with its two segments of the Virtual and the Actual, the Synthesis of Difference is the theory of the Virtual, which is also the Deleuzian theory of 'Ideas'. But the Deleuzian concept of Idea requires a detailed explanation. In this chapter, the decisive question is 'How many?' The answer is given by Spinoza in a famous dictum:

> Les philosophes vulgaires commencent par les créatures; Descartes a commencé par l'esprit; moi, je commence par Dieu.

As Deleuze says: 'Le moi, les choses et Dieu sont les trois idées du troisième genre.'[14]

This means that the Self, the World and God, before their Kantian registration as 'Ideas of Reason', are *Ideas of Intellectual Intuition*. As such,

they compose what will be labelled the Deleuzian *Crown of Ideas*, *summa divisio* of his whole doctrine of Ideas. This crown is subject to a kind of Law of Portmanteau (DR 246):

> Chaque Idée a comme deux faces qui sont l'amour et la colère : l'amour dans la recherche des fragments, dans la détermination progressive et l'enchaînement des corps idéaux d'adjonction ; la colère dans la condensation des singularités, qui définit à coups d'événements idéaux le recueillement d'une ≪situation révolutionnaire≫ et fait éclater l'Idée dans l'actuel.[15]

The law of portmanteau applies first to the Idea of the First Cause:

> Le Dieu d'amour et le Dieu de colère ne sont pas de trop pour avoir une Idée.[16]

When the Idea of God has thus received his status, we are left with the Ideas of the World and of the Self. Their treatment is governed from the *distinguo* between the Virtual and the Possible. In *Différence et répétition* Deleuze writes:

> Le seul danger, en tout ceci, c'est de confondre le virtuel avec le possible. Car le possible s'oppose au réel; le processus du possible est donc une ≪réalisation≫. Le virtuel, au contraire, ne s'oppose pas au réel ; il possède une pleine réalité par lui-même. Son processus est l'actualisation. On aurait tort de ne voir ici qu'une dispute de mots : il s'agit de l'existence elle-même. Chaque fois que nous posons le problème en termes de posssible et de réel, nous sommes forcés de concevoir l'existence comme un surgissement brut, acte pur, saut qui s'opère toujours derrière notre dos, soumis à la loi du tout ou rien. Quelle différence peut-il y avoir entre l'existant et le non-existant, si le non-existant est déjà possible, recueilli dans le concept, ayant tous les caractères que le concept lui confère comme possibilité? L'existence est la même que le concept, mais hors du concept. On pose donc l'existence dans l'espace et dans le temps, mais comme milieux indifférents, sans que la production de l'existence se fasse elle-même dans un espace et un temps caractéristiques. La différence ne peut plus être que le négatif déterminé par le concept : soit la limitation des possibles entre eux pour se réaliser, soit l'opposition du possible avec la réalité du réel. Le virtuel, au contraire, est le caractère de l'Idée ; c'est à partir de sa réalité que l'existence est produite,

> et produite conformément à un temps et un espace immanents à l'Idée.[17]

> C'est le possible et le réel qui se ressemblent, mais non pas du tout le virtuel et l'actuel.[18]

The Virtual and the Actual are like the chrysalis and the butterfly. As for the possible, the Deleuzian doctrine is a *double* thesis. First, we have a Deleuzian criticism of the possible. The concept of the possible is subject to an essential objection (p. 273):

> dans la mesure où le possible se propose à la ≪réalisation≫, il est lui-même conçu comme l'image du réel, et le réel comme la ressemblance du possible. C'est pourquoi l'on comprende si peu ce que l'existence ajoute au concept, en doublant le semblable par le semblable. Telle est la tare du possible (*stain of the possible*), tare qui le dénonce comme produit après coup, fabriqué rétroactivement, lui-même à l'image de ce qui lui ressemble.[19]

But this criticism is only the propaedeutics of a new theory of possibility, based on a new concept of *possible worlds*, including a new connection with the concept of the *alter ego*. And this governs the *distinguo* between the World and the Self. Deleuze is the philosopher who has made of *politeness* a transcendental principle: in his system, the Idea of *I* gives way to the Idea of *You*. And the alter ego becomes a holder of *possible worlds* so that the Deleuzian concept of Idea, at this point, divides into two cases:

- Idea of the real *World* as world of the *Virtual* and the *Actual*.
- Idea of the alter *ego* as *Possible* World.

As for the Idea of the World, it splits into a series of subordinate Ideas, as follows:

> Idée mathématique, mathématique-physique, chimique, biologique, psychique, sociologique, linguistique . . .[20]

This means that the Kantian Idea of the World splits into the *Ideas of Comte*. And this division, so practised in the Idea of World, has its *ratio* in a division of the World according to the *Diaspora of Difference and Repetition* explicated by Tarde. Tarde is a wonderful philosopher, because

he has discovered that *Repetition is dedicated to Difference* (DR 104).[21] But in his metaphysics this dedication of Repetition to Difference is scattered according to the scientific division of Being which gives us:

> l'imitation comme répétition d'une invention, la reproduction comme répétition d'une variation, le rayonnement comme répétition d'une perturbation, la sommation comme répétition d'un différentiel.[22]

Here Deleuze is only listing and completing in reverse order a litany of Tarde's:

> Répétition, la série des ondes lumineuses, électriques, sonores, la gravitatation des astres, le tourbillonnement intérieur des molécules. Répétition, le tourbillon vital, la nutrition, la respiration, la circulation, toutes les fonctions organiques, à commencer par la génération qui les comprend toutes. Répétition, le langage, la religion, le savoir, l'éducation, le travail, toutes les activités sociales, en un seul mot l'imitation.[23]

This is the 'Ideal Synthesis' of *Repetition*. Tarde inherits here the classification of the sciences from Comte and Cournot. But in his hands, the chapters of the positivist *Encyclopaedia* undergo two metamorphoses. First, they become (in Husserl's terms) so many regional *ontologies*. Second, the ontologies so obtained are from the outset subjugated to the metaphysical Dialectics of Difference and Repetition. For Deleuze, this entails as a corollary that the dialectical nature of mathematics exhibited by Lautman is generalized to all scientific areas. This leads to a principle: one scientific area, one Idea. And so we obtain 'l'Idée-atome', 'l'Idée-organisme', 'l'Idée-société'.[24] And in each of these the Lautman Law holds: the solutions are scientific, but the problems are philosophical.

The Idea of the World in the Deleuzian system contains the doctrine of the Virtual. But the Idea of the I leads to a doctrine of the Possible, according to a concept of the alter ego as *possible world*.[25]

> Il n'y a pas d'amour qui ne commence par la révélation d'un monde possible en tant que tel, enroulé dans autrui qui l'exprime.
>
> Dans chaque système psychique, il y a un fourmillement de possibilités autour de la réalité; mais nos possibles sont toujours les Autres.

As in a crossword the Deleuzian theory of possible worlds is at the junction of two theories of Analytical Philosophy. The first is relatively well known. It is the so-called 'semantics of possible worlds' which, as Kripke recognizes, disguises what is really a *Metaphysics* of possible worlds, illustrated in his works, and in Hintikka's (and David Lewis's). The second is epitomized in a title by A. N. Prior: *Worlds, Times & Selves*.[26] Under this title, Prior exhibits a *Proportion*, or *structural similarity*, which governs the whole of Metaphysics:

Now / then = I / you = Here below / in other possible worlds.

This proportion must be labelled the *Prior Proportion*. It has a main corollary: the homology between *Times*, *Selves* and *Possible Worlds* (the TSW homology). The Prior Proportion contains the key to the paradoxical position adopted by Lewis on possible worlds (that it does not imply anything): according to Lewis, the unactualized possible worlds are as much *real* as the past or the future or as the other selves: it is simply that they are not 'here below'. (This well-known thesis has a misleading resemblance with the Deleuzian thesis that the Virtual is quite *real*.)

We have to realize that the move from the ego to the alter ego in Deleuze has nothing to do with an altruist lateralization: Deleuze is not Levinas. The point is wholly objective and results from a huge difference in the Spinozistic triptych of Self, World and God. The point is that God and the World are unique, whereas there are *many Selves*. This entails a full upsetting of Engagement (*Fiançailles*) as paradigm. In the subjectivist stance, the typical betrothed is named Søren Kierkegaard; in the Spinozistic stance his name is Bianca Castafiore. In the Bianca case, the mathematical duality between Constant and Variable acquires a new development:

Constant = **Bianca la Belle**
Variable = the Fiancé
= prince of INDIA
OR baron of SYLDAVIE
OR colonel of BORDURIE
OR marquis of GORGONZOLA (LOMBARDIE)
OR captain of MOULINSART.

We see that the possible weddings of Bianca Castafiore are indexed in geographical space as the Adventures of Tintin (in the Congo, in America,

etc.), as well as the Adventures of the Leibnizian Sextus (at Corinth, in Thrace, etc.) or the Adventures of Marcel (at Combray, at Balbec, etc.). Here lies a strong similarity between possible worlds and selves. It is founded on a Proportion:

One real world / *n* possible worlds = one I [je] / *n* selves.

According to Deleuze there is not only a structural similarity but also a superposition. The point is therefore that the concept of possible worlds is not only an affair of many alternatives to our unique world, but also of many selves: Autrui comme *expression d'un monde possible*.

This entails a problem of coherence. How can the Deleuzian criticism of the possible be consistent with a theory of possible worlds? In order to find a solution to this problem[27] we must resort to what is the archetype of possible worlds metaphysics: the Pyramid of all Possible Worlds at the end of Leibniz's *Theodicy*. In this pyramid, Sextus is taken as an example and represented by a (geometrical) *locus*: a line which goes through three main possibilities of Sextus in at least three possible worlds (and so is a *Trans-world heir line* in the sense of Kaplan): Sextus at Corinth, Sextus in Thace and Sextus at Rome. From a Deleuzian point of view, a crucial point is that the various possible worlds are *indexed* on as many *names of places*. This Leibnizian *procédé* anticipates the Proustian *procédé*, where the various *possible loves* (with Gilberte, with Oriane, with Albertine – but also with Miss of Stermaria) are also associated with corresponding names of places (Combray, Paris, Balbec, etc.). By transitivity, we obtain an indexation of *possible worlds* on *possible loves* conceived as *virtual* loves. And Albertine is, as Adam in Leibniz, a *world-bound individual* in the sense of Plantinga. This means that she suffices to identify a possible world: she is the *sufficient reason* of a possible world. So *the concept of virtuality is extended to a concept of possibility*. And Albertine has the ambiguity of the alter ego as such:

> Le visage d'Albertine exprimait l'amalgame de la plage et des flots: 'De quel monde inconnu me distinguait-elle ?' Toute l'histoire de cet amour exemplaire, c'est la longue explication des mondes possibles exprimés par Albertine, et qui tantôt la transforme en sujet fascinant, tantôt en objet décevant.[28]
>
> (DR: 335)

The stain of the possible, we remember, is its resemblance to reality. But if some possible world is the world *of a falling in love with*

Albertine, it is essentially an *enigmatic* world. The essential point here is the *Proustian Difference* between 'Noms de Pays' and 'Pays'. So, according to the Deleuzian metaphysics of Possible Worlds, we must distinguish two theses, usually associated in the standard treatment of the question:

- the thesis of a *plurality* of possibilities;
- the thesis of *resemblance* between possibility and reality.

Deleuze rejects the thesis of resemblance, but keeps the thesis of plurality, which he describes as 'un fourmillement de possibilités autour de la réalité'. According to Deleuze, the relation between the possible and the actual must be conceived on the model of the Proustian relation between 'Noms de pays' and 'Pays'. The Leibnizian possible worlds are suspected of being copies of the real one, but according to Proust there is *more* in 'Noms de pays' than there is in 'Pays'. So that not only does the Deleuzian possible not resemble reality, but it has an *advantage* over reality. (In this respect the Deleuzian Incarnation is the Platonic Participation.) In order to distinguish the Leibnizian possible worlds from the Deleuzian ones, we shall call these worlds *Albertinian worlds*.

In order to understand the role of Albertine we must refer to the typical *Question* in which she is concerned (DR: 253):

Will I marry Albertine? ('Vais-je épouser Albertine?')

This question must be compared with its ancestor, the Socratic either/or:

> In all cases you must marry: if you have a good wife, we shall be happy; if you have a bad wife, you will become a philosopher.

This pedigree leads to a comparison between two questions: 'Must I marry?' and 'Will I marry Albertine?' In the case of a positive answer, the first question results in my having *a wife*, the second results in my being the husband of *Albertine*. And this invites us to compare the semantics of 'My wife' and 'Albertine'. *My wife* may be Albertine, or Andrée, or Rosemonde, etc. The reference of a definite description thus varies from possible world to possible world. But in the vocabulary of Kripke, the proper name 'Albertine' is a 'rigid designator'. This means that in *all* possible worlds – including the worlds in which Albertine does not exist[29] – Albertine Simonet denotes Albertine Simonet. This fact throws light on the Mallarmean Cast of the Die as it is conceived by Deleuze.

In the Deleuzian lottery, the motto is 'A tous les coups l'on gagne'. And this motto may be rephrased: in all possible worlds 'Albertine' denotes Albertine.

How are Albertinian worlds possible? The problem at stake is the *possibility of possibility* and the solution is in the concept of *virtuality*. The possibility of possibility lies in a *Virtuality of possibility*. In Deleuzian metaphysics, *the Virtual is the fabric of the Possible*. And the fabrication of possibility is the first step of the Odd Calculus, the *Oddity* of the calculus in the creation of the world (or more exactly, the *Reason* of the oddity: what, in our simplified model, is illustrated by the question 'What is the diagonal of my square?').

In order to understand the fabric of possibility, we need to compare the Leibnizian Pyramid and the Bergsonian Cone. In many respects there is a strong similarity between the pyramid, with its floors, each marked by distinguished points, and the cone, with its virtual planes, each marked by their brilliant points. What makes the difference is the differentiation of the *virtual object* of Bergson from its *movement*. In Leibniz, such a move is immobilized in the *locus* of Sextus which, in standard semantics of possible worlds, corresponds, as we have seen, to the *Transworld heir line* relating a same individual from one world to another. This reflects the fact that in Leibniz the possible is conceived from the identity of the ego. By contrast, in Deleuze, the possible is conceived from the *alter* ego. This means that the virtual object is first conceived as a transcendental Object = X, which, by going for example through Combray or Balbec in the Memory of the World, becomes respectively Gilberte or Albertine in duration. In each step of the process there is a *function* in the canonical form $y = f(x)$. A comparison with standard functions will be enlightening. A good case of the standard function is given by Frege:

$$\text{Berlin} = \text{capital of (Germany)}$$

on a par with:

$$\sqrt{2} = \text{diagonale } (l^2).$$

In the Deleuzian doctrine, we have:

$$\text{Albertine} = \text{'Combray'}\ (x)$$

and something as:

$$\text{Mlle de Stermaria} = \text{Utopia}\ (x) \qquad \text{(VIII.1)}$$

This will be labelled *Proustian functions*. So the process, including functions, allows a calculus.[30] But between standard functions and Proustian functions, there are two *decisive differences*:

1. In standard functions, the function f is given by a *general* term ϕ, such as 'capital', 'diagonal', etc ; in Proustian functions it is given in a *proper name* such as 'Combray';
2. In standard functions, the argument is a *constant*, i.e. a *value of* the variable x; in Proustian functions, the variable (x) *acts directly* on the function f to deliver the value y of the function.

These two decisive differences are linked. In standard functions, the function is a *definite description*, 'the ϕ', constructed on a *universal* ϕ, and the argument is the value of a variable x with *singular terms* as possible values. But this means that the 'mathematical' concept of function $y = f(x)$ is *modelled* on the *logical* concept of *propositional* function $\phi(x)$, and more generally that the mathematical concept of the function is wholly defined from the *Russellian* concepts of *definite description* and *propositional function*. In this process of definition, the Fregean use of the concept of function in order to redescribe the concept of concept is only a halfway house; and, in this halfway house, when Frege believes that he is using a mathematical concept in order to endow logic with mathematical exactness, what he is really doing is paving the way that will lead to the full Russellian move, i.e. to the exact and exhaustive logicization of the mathematical machine labelled 'function'. Hence the Deleuzian complaint about the 'propositional' approach to problems. In Proustian functions, the form $y = f(x)$ is maintained, but f becomes a singular term such as 'Combray' or 'Balbec' and x is the Bergsonian *Virtual* object X. *So the Deleuzian possible world is here to be ingressed by the Virtual Object*. The Proustian functions are the nuptials of the Possible and the Virtual. And we must remember that in the Bergsonian Cone, the *sections* are virtual as well as the 'remembrance', which is the paradigm of the virtual *object*. This means that the Deleuzian worlds, even before being qualified as *possible* worlds, are primordially *virtual* worlds. So the doctrine of the possible is wholly governed by the doctrine of the virtual. If virtual worlds are qualified as *possible* worlds, this is by reason of their *singularity*.

This point may be explained by a new parallel with Leibnizian possible worlds. We must ask: what is the function of possible worlds in metaphysics? In the Leibnizian tradition, the function of *possible* worlds is to *explain* away the *modalities*. The paradigm is the Leibnizian analysis: Necessary = true in *all* possible worlds. And we may say that in the

Deleuzian doctrine, the function of possible worlds is to explain away *haecceities*. On the Leibnizian doctrine of individual notions, Deleuze writes:

> combien Leibniz a montré profondément que les essences individuelles se constituaient sur le fond≫ de ≪rapports idéaux≫ et de ≪singularités idéelles, en elles-mêmes préindividuelles[31]

This means that, according to Deleuze, we may speak of 'individual notions', but conceived as the result of a *constitution*. It is on this point that we find in Deleuze the model offered by the *Egg* with its proper relevance. The possible world expressed by Albertine, indexed on the *Nom de Pays* 'Combray' and ingressed by the Virtual Object, contains singularities, but only pre-individual singularities, to be conceived as an egg or an embryo. And an egg may be fertilized or not, incubated or not, etc. So that the egg paradigm leads to another: *the Wasp and the Orchid*.

This model must itself be developed at the two levels of 'Noms de Pays' and 'Pays'. At the level of Difference, the Wasp and the Orchid are two 'worlds', as Sodom and Paris or Gomorrha and Balbec; at the level of Repetition the *meeting* of the Wasp and the Orchid takes place, which also means a *meeting of possible worlds in reality*. This is a huge difference between Leibnizian and Deleuzian possible worlds. In the Leibnizian theory only one possible world is actualized. In the Deleuzian metaphysics the real world is an arena of possible worlds. This is a result, in the Prior Proportion, of the Deleuzian bijection between Worlds and Selves.

Another difference is that Leibnizian possible worlds are *ready-made* worlds, so that the creation of the World, in Whiteheadian terms, is only a *decision*, the cutting off or *detaching* of a section from the pyramid, and its projection in the real. Deleuzian possible worlds have no reality without their *activation* by the virtual object, and so they are perpetual *productions*, obtained by the move of the virtual object in the Bergsonian cone of virtual planes.

We must add that there is *no contradiction* between the Leibnizian theory of possible worlds and the Deleuzian doctine of possibility as virtuality, so that we do not have to make a metaphysical choice here. This is similar to the Schopenhauerian paradign of the world *as* Will and *as* Representation. The Sosein and the Dasein *may be seen as* Essence and Existence or as Virtual and Actual. The difference is only one in 'power of resolution': the Deleuzian metaphysics *produces many more differences* than the Leibnizian one. But 'qui peut le plus peut le moins'.

The Deleuzian concept of possibility must be compared with its natural opposite. The metaphysical function of possibility is subordinated to the function of *contingency*. The plurality of possible worlds is a *necessary condition of contingency*. And the negation of contingency is *necessity*. But Deleuze traces a *distinguo* between necessity and *destiny*.[32] The necessary is already written; the destiny is *weaved as it proceeds*. And it includes the production of possible worlds. So that the Deleuzian possible worlds are as opposed to the *ready-made* worlds of Leibniz as they are to the *written* necessity of Laplace. And the weaving of destiny as it proceeds, in itself, is nothing but the *Process of Difference and Repetition*:

> la répétition se tisse d'un point remarquable à un autre en comprenant en soi les différences.[33]

Whitehead

When, in the Whiteheadian commentary, we are on the topic of creation, we must remember that Creation is not Creativity. The idea of Creation is an old one; it means the production of the new. In Whitehead, 'Creativity' is a new category, a typical product of the Whiteheadian industry and so a *technical* term. Its meaning must be sought only in an official definition. And according to this definition, as we know, Creativity means a law by which the Many and the One are correlated. This law applies to *all* concrescence, as much as to *repetitive* concrescence as to *creative* concrescence so that, in the alternative between repetition and creation, Creativity is *neutral*.

Not only is Creation not Creativity, but Creation is not even a *case* of Creativity. Since Creativity is a law, it is not the abstract of creation (as activity is the abstract of action). And so creation *cannot* be a case of Creativity. This independence of creation from Creativity entails that, in Whitehead, the concept of creation is left to itself and to the contexts of its occurrence. The main points of these contexts are those that we have quoted above. Among the nine 'Categoreal Obligations' we find (26):

> (iv) *The Category of Conceptual Valuation*. From each physical feeling there is the derivation of a purely conceptual feeling whose datum is the eternal object determinant of the definiteness of the actual entity, or of the nexus, physically felt.
> (v) *The Category of Conceptual Reversion*. There is secondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with,

> and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in the first phase of the mental pole. The diversity is a relevant diversity determined by the subjective aim.

Whitehead adds:

> Note that category (iv) concerns conceptual reproduction of physical feelings, and category (v) concerns conceptual diversity from physical feelings.

Then Hume's Principle is remembered in a modified version:

> the only lure to conceptual feeling is an exact conformation to the qualities realized in the objectified actualities.[34]

But, as Whitehead points out, Hume's Principle was refuted by Hume himself in his decisive experiment of the *blank in the blue*. Whitehead endorses Hume's answer: the missing shade of blue will be *supplied* by the imagination. And Whitehead concludes:

> The analysis of concrescence, here adopted, conceives that there is an origination of conceptual feelings, admitting or rejecting whatever is apt for feeling by reason of its germaneness to the basic data. The gradation of eternal objects in respect to this germaneness is the 'objective lure' for feeling . . .

This *gradation* of eternal objects in respect to germaneness is the other face of *contrast* between distant eternal objects. Whitehead adds:

> This 'aim at contrast' is the expression of the ultimate creative purpose that each unification shall achieve some maximum depth of intensity of feeling . . .[35]

He also writes:

> The question, how, and in what sense, one unrealized eternal object can be more, or less, proximate to an eternal object in realized ingression – that is to say, in comparison with any other unfelt eternal object – is left unanswered by the Category of Reversion. In conformity with the ontological principle, this question can be answered only by reference to some actual entity. Every eternal object has entered into the conceptual feelings of God. Thus, a more

> fundamental account must ascribe the reverted conceptual feeling in a temporal subject to its conceptual feeling derived, according to Category IV, from the hybrid physical feeling of the relevancies conceptually ordered in God's experience. In this way, by the recognition of God's characterization of the creative act, a more complete rational explanation is attained. The Category of Reversion is then abolished; and Hume's principle of the derivation of conceptual experience from physical experience remains without any exception.

Here the decisive expression is 'God's characterization of the creative act'. This concept is the Whiteheadian counterpart of the Deleuzian Odd Calculus in the creation of the world by God. From the confrontation of these lines in Whitehead and of these lines of thought in the thought of Whitehead and Deleuze, three main conclusions emerge: the first on the problem at hand, the second on the solution, and the third on the limits of the solution:

1. In Whitehead, there is a theory, not only of 'Creativity' as the law of all becoming (repetitive as well as innovative), but also (and independently) a theory of *creative purpose* and *creative act*: that is, a theory of *Creation* in the sense of Bergson's *Creative Evolution*.
2. Even if the *Category* of Reversion is abolished, *Reversion* in itself is *not*. A 'category' is a principle or law, which applies by definition to *all* actual entities and describes their inner constitution. Reversion here is *transferred to God* in order finally to be *reserved* to God. Reversion is a *prerogative* of God. Reversion takes place in the *function* of God, according to Whitehead.
3. We must distinguish between:
   (i) eternal objects;
   (iia) their relevance; and
   (iib) the ordering of relevancies.

In the Hume experiment, the missing shade of blue is missing only in our human apparatus. In the Whiteheadian world *all* shades of blue are given as eternal objects. The supplying of the missing shade is not the creation of a new shade. In the primordial nature of God, all *possible* blues are given. Therefore, if reversion means only supplying a missing case, the fact that reversion is reserved to God or attributed to all actual entities makes no difference to our Deleuzian problem.

Deleuze and Whitehead

In this comparison we shall proceed from the least to the most difficult. The philosophy of Whitehead is known as Process Philosophy and in the development and progress of his work, the concept of 'process' was anticipated by the concept of *event*. The Deleuzian system is usually described as a 'philosophy of the event'. This description is not false, but in this understanding we must remember that in Deleuze we find a *double* theory of Events:

> Le problème est de l'ordre de l'événement. Non seulement parce que les cas de solution surgissent comme des événements réels, mais parce que les conditions du problème impliquent elles-mêmes des événements, sections, ablations, adjonctions. En ce sens il est exact de représenter une double série d'événements qui se déroulent sur deux plans, se faisant écho sans ressemblance, les uns réels au niveau des solutions engendrées, les autres idéels ou idéaux dans les conditions du problème, comme des actes ou plutôt des rêves de dieux qui dobleraient notre histoire.[36]

'Ceci étant posé', the comparative study of Deleuze and Whitehead will concentrate on the relation between Reversion and order of Relevancy and the Odd Calculus. On this register, the first point is the following: whereas the concept of the possible makes its entry under the sign of resemblance (by its resemblance to the real), the concept of the potential, in its relevance according to Bergson, Whitehead and Deleuze, is originally connected with Difference: it arises in the concept of *potential difference* (in French: *différence de potentiel*). Potential difference is the common denominator of Bergson's and Whitehead's modes of thought. In *Matter and Memory*, electric *tension* is the physical model which leads Bergson to its figuration of Memory as a Cone with its equipotential planes. In *Process and Reality* (p. 86), Whitehead quotes Hume describing a missing shade of blue as a 'blank'.[37] This *blank in the blue* is the Whiteheadian paradigm of 'contrast', and contrast in turn leads Whitehead to what he takes as the *primitive concept* of potential difference:

> The term 'potential difference' is an old one in physical science, and recently it has been introduced in physiology with a meaning diverse from, though generically allied to, its older meaning in physics. The ultimate fact in the constitution of an actual entity which suggests this term is the objective lure for feeling. In the comparison of two actual entities, the contrast between their objective lures is their 'potential

> difference'; and all other uses of this phrase are abstractions derivative from this ultimate meaning.[38]

Since the *ultimate meaning* of potential difference is discovered as an 'ultimate fact in the constitution of an actual entity', the Whiteheadian potential seems to be on the same side as the actual and the virtual in Deleuze. In the Whiteheadian system, the arch-concept is the concept of *Adventure*, not only 'of Ideas', but primordially of Being. In the Deleuzian system, the Whiteheadian Adventures of Ideas make a return with a new twist, resulting from the Deleuzian concept of 'Idea'.

As required by the Bergsonian paradigm of Memory, the Deleuzian scale of Ideas is only raising the theatre of a motion where the virtual object becomes the Object *x* of Dialectics, drawn in an objective diaphora or 'dialectical move' for which Deleuze has coined a Whiteheadian label: 'l'aventure des Idées'.[39] According to Deleuze, the classic conflict between genesis and structure is dissolved in advance in this concept:

> une Idée émerge avec tant d'aventures qu'il se peut qu'elle satisfasse déjà à certaines conditions structurales et génétiques, non pas encore à d'autres.[40]

This dissolution of the structuralist aporia on the relation between 'synchrony' and 'diachrony' – already anticipated in the Bergsonian concept of 'dynamic scheme'– barely scratches the surface in the meeting between Whitehead and Deleuze. It is highly significant that the occasion of the event was offered by the Whiteheadian topic of Adventure, but this just gives the initial basis for something which, in this meeting, is only at its beginning.

Notes

1. See the Reference section for all abbreviations.
2. P & R, p. 225.
3. P & R, p. 346.
4. D & R, p. 286.
5. The problem is the 'origine radicale', 'toujours assimilée à un jeu solitaire et divin' (D & R, pp. 361–2), with two main models: the *Timeus* (D & R, p. 300) and Leibniz's *De rerum originatione radicali* (D & R, p. 72).
6. D & R, p. 364. English translation: 'Butler's *Erewhon* seems to us not only a disguised *no-where* but a rearranged *now-here*' (D & R. p. 333).
7. Cf. J. C. Dumoncel, *Philosophie des mathématiques* (Paris: Ellipses, 2002).
8. D & R, p. 286. English translation: 'It is . . . true that God makes the world by calculating, but his calculations never work out exactly, and this inexactitude

or injustice in the result, this irreducible inequality, forms the condition of the world' (D & R, p. 222).

9. D & R, p. 274. English translation: 'The Bergsonian schema which unites *Creative Evolution* and *Matter and Memory* begins with the account of a gigantic memory, a multiplicity formed by the virtual coexistence of all the sections of the "cone", each section being the repetition of all the others and being distinguished from them only by the order of the relations and the distribution of singular points. Then, the actualization of this mnemonic virtual appears to take the form of the creation of divergent lines, each of which corresponds to a virtual section and represents a manner of solving a problem, but also the incarnation of the order of relations and distribution of singularities peculiar to the given section in differentiated species and parts. Difference and repetition in the virtual ground the movement of actualization, of differentiation as creation. They are thereby substituted for the identity and resemblance of the possible, which inspires only a pseudo-movement, the false movement of realisation understood as abstract limitation' (D & R, p. 212).
10. See D & R, p. 364, n. 287 on J. H. Rosny.
11. D & R, pp. 308–9. English translation: 'There comes a moment, however, in this philosophy of Difference which the whole of Bergsonism represents, when Bergson raises the question of the double genesis of quality and extensity. This fundamental differentiation (quality-extensity) can find its reason only in the great synthesis of Memory which allows all the degrees of difference to coexist as degrees of relaxation and contraction, and rediscovers at the heart of duration the implicated order of that intensity which had been denounced only provisionally and from without' (D & R, p. 239).
12. D & R, p. 286. English translation: 'There are locks everywhere' (D & R, p. 222).
13. D & R, p. 371.
14. *Spinoza et le problème de l'Expression*, p. 283. English translation:'Myself, things and God are the three ideas of the third kind' (EiPS, p. 304).
15. D & R, p. 246. English translation: 'It is as though every Idea has two faces, which are like love and anger: love in the search for fragments, the progressive determination and linking of the ideal adjoint fields; anger in the condensation of singularities, which by dint of ideal events, defines the concentration of "revolutionary situation" ' (D & R, p.190).
16. D & R, p. 247. English translation: 'The God of Love and the God of Anger are required in order to have an Idea' (D & R, p.191).
17. D & R, p. 272. English translation: 'The only danger in all this is that the virtual could be confused with the possible. The possible is opposed to the real; the process undergone by the possible is therefore a "realisation". By contrast, the virtual is not opposed to the real; it possesses a full reality by itself. The process it undergoes is that of actualiation. It would be wrong to see a verbal dispute here: it is a question of existence itself. Every time we pose the question in terms of possible and real, we are forced to conceive of existence as a brute eruption, a pure act or leap which always occurs behind our backs and is subject to a law of al or nothing. What difference can there be between the existent and the non-existent if the non-existent is already possible, already included in the concept and having all the characteristics

that the concept confers upon it as a possibility? Existence is *the same* as, but outside the concept. Existence is therefore supposed t occur in space and time, but these are understood as indifferent milieux instead of the production of existence occurring in a characteristic space and time. Difference can no longer be anything but the negative determined by the concept: either the limitation imposed by the possibles upon each other in order to be realized, or the opposition of the possible to the reality of the real. The virtual, by contrast, is the characteristic state of Ideas: it is on the basis of its reality that existence is produced, in accordance with a time and space immanent in the Idea' (D & R, p. 211).

18. D & R, p. 357. English translation: 'The possible and the real resemble one another but not the virtual and the actual' (D & R, p. 279).
19. D & R, p. 273. English translation: 'to the extent that the possible is open to "realisation", it is understood as an image of the real, while the real is supposed to resemble the possible. That is why it is difficult to understand what existence adds to the concept when all it does is double like with like. Such is the defect of the possible: a defect which serves to condemn it s produced after the fact, as retroactively fabricated in the image that resembles it' (D & R, p. 212).
20. D & R, p. 242. English translation: 'mathematical, mathematico-physical, chemical, biological, physical, sociological and linguistic Ideas' (D & R, p. 187).
21. D & R, p. 104.
22. D & R, p. 104.
23. *Psychologie économique*, I, p. 5.
24. D & R, pp. 238, 239, 240. English D & R, pp. 184–6 where Deleuze gives the examples of 'atomism as a physical idea', 'organism as a biological idea' and 'social Ideas'.
25. D & R, pp. 334–5; 360. English translation: 'There is no love which does not begin with the revelation of a possible world as such, enwound in the other which expresses it.' (D & R, p. 261).
26. A. N. Prior, *Worlds, Times & Selves*. Ed. Kit Fine (London: Duckworth, 1977).
27. *Logique du Sens*, pp. 138–9, n. 4.
28. D & R, p. 335. English translation: 'Albertine's face expressed the blending of beach and waves: "From what unknown world does she distinguish me?" The entire history of that exemplary love is the long explication of the possible worlds expressed by Albertine, which transform her now into a fascinating subject, now into a deceptive object' (D & R, p. 261).
29. Since, when we say that Albertine does not exist in these worlds, we must refer to the same Albertine who exists in other possible worlds.
30. It is not sufficient here to conceive the move of the virtual object as a Mallarmean *Cast of the Die*, so that the whole process is aleatory. Because if this move is conceived as a cast of a die, the difficulty is only moved back. The pyramid of possible worlds is simply preceded by a pyramid of possible casts where God plays with dice.
31. D & R, p. 357. The English translation here breaks the French syntax into separate sentences: 'the intensive series of individuating factors envelop ideal singularities which are in themselves pre-individual; the resonances between series put ideal relations into play. Here too, Leibniz showed profoundly that

the individual essences were constituted on the ground of these relations and these singularities' (D & R, p. 279).

32. *Logique du Sens*, p. 198.
33. D & R, p. 19.
34. P & R, p. 87.
35. P & R, p. 249.
36. D & R, p. 244. English translation: 'Problems are of the order of events – not only because cases of solution emerge like real events, but because the conditions of a problem themselves imply events such as sections, ablations, adjunctions. In this sense it is correct to represent a double series of events which develop on two planes, without resembling each other: real events on the level of the engendered solutions, and ideal events embedded in the conditions of the problem, like the acts – or rather, the dreams – of the gods who double our history' (D & R, pp. 188–9).
37. P & R, p. 86.
38. P & R, p. 87.
39. D & R, p. 235. English translation, D & R, pp. 181–2.
40. D & R, p. 238. English translation: 'an idea with all its adventures emerges in so far as it already satisfies certain structural and genetic conditions, and not others' (D & R, p. 184).

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9

Gilles Deleuze, Deleuze's Bergson and Bergson Himself

Peter Gunter

In a letter to Michel Cressole, Gilles Deleuze outlines his concept of the writing of the history of philosophy:

> But I suppose the main way I coped with it at the time was to see the history of philosophy as a sort of buggery or (it comes to the same thing) immaculate conception. I saw myself as taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous. It was really important for it to be his own child, because the author had to actually say all I had him saying. But the child was bound to be monstrous too, because it resulted from all sorts of shifting, slipping, dislocations and hidden emissions that I really enjoyed. I think my book on Bergson a good example.
>
> (Deleuze, 1995, p. 6)

Michael Hardt warns against interpreting Deleuze's historical studies (e.g. of Spinoza, Hume, Kant, etc.) as if they were intended as complete in themselves. Rather, he states that they are ' "punctual interventions" – he makes surgical incisions in the corpus of the history of philosophy' (Hardt, 1993, p. xix). Hardt is correct. But an incomplete account may be truncated, leaving out essentials. As Deleuze warns, the problem is more radical than this. Deleuze intentionally creates what might be called a caricature of a philosophy. Such a caricature must call on the efforts of scholars, in turn, to spell out the true features of the original, and to compare them with the caricature.

That is what this chapter attempts to do. I begin with a sketch of two fundamental, mutually congruent Bergsonian axioms: the concept of a hierarchy of durations and the notion of a qualitative calculus, modelled by analogy on the infinitesimal calculus. These two features of

Bergson's philosophy are, I believe, essential, though they have been largely overlooked or undervalued by Bergson's commentators. Three factors justify their being made the centrepiece of this chapter. First, by noting their place in his thought the reader may learn something new about Bergson. But also, Deleuze seems to see their importance, since he continues to return to and refashion them. Finally, the Platonic nature of Bergson's hierarchy (which is an inversion of Plato's divided line), as well as his notion of memory (similar to a platonic reminiscence), brings his philosophy closer to Whitehead's than might otherwise be expected.

Deleuze, Bergson – background

Deleuze's first essay on Bergson, 'Bergson's Conception of Difference', presented in 1954, was published in 1956. As the title proclaims, it marks his first appropriation of Bergson as a philosopher of divergence and difference. In that year he also published 'Bergson. 1859–1941', which compares Bergson's thought favourably to phenomenology; in 1957, he published a selection of Bergson's writings, *Memoire et vie*. In 1960, he lectured on chapter 3 of *Creative Evolution*; in 1963, he published a new edition of *Memoire et vie*; and in 1966, the study on which this chapter focuses, *Bergsonism* appeared.

This brief chronology is intended to show that Deleuze's interest in Bergson during the first period of his thought was constant. It was to be renewed later in both *Difference and Repetition* and *Cinema* I and II. Hence it should not be surprising to claim that Deleuze's unwavering insistence on the reality of difference and of the virtual and his denial that possibility precedes reality are Bergsonian, and are never abandoned.

Bergson's continuity of durations

Bergson's basic mode of knowing is, of course, intuition. Intuition in turn is grounded in acquaintance with ourselves, with our 'own person in its flowing through time' (Bergson, 1946, p.191). A theory of knowledge grounded in such an experience would seem to many to be over-subjective, even solipsistic. But Bergson warns us against making this assumption. In a passage that will be returned to in this chapter, he states:

> It is altogether different if one places oneself directly, by an effort of intuition in the concrete flowing of duration. To be sure, we shall

> find no logical reason for positing multiple and diverse durations. Strictly speaking, there might exist no other duration than our own, as there might be no other color in the world other than orange, for example. But just as a consciousness of color, which would harmonize inwardly with orange instead of perceiving it outwardly, would feel itself caught between red and yellow, would perhaps even have, beneath the latter color, a presentiment of a whole spectrum in which is naturally prolonged the continuity which goes from red to yellow, so the intuition of our duration, far from leaving us suspended in the void as pure analysis would do, puts us in contact with a whole continuity of durations which we should try to follow either downwardly or upwardly: in both cases we can dilate ourselves indefinitely by a more and more rigorous effort, in both cases transcend ourselves. In the first case, we advance toward a duration more and more scattered, whose palpitations, more rapid than ours, dividing our simple sensation, diluting its quality into quantity: at the limit would be the pure homogeneous, the pure *repetition* by which we shall define materiality. In advancing in the other direction, we go towards a duration which stretches, tightens, and becomes more and more intensified: at the limit would be eternity. This time not only conceptual eternity, which is an eternity of death, but an eternity of life. It would be a living and consequently still moving eternity where our own duration would find itself like the vibrations in light, and which would be the concretion of duration as materiality is its dispersion.
>
> (Bergson, 1946, pp. 220–1)

Between these 'extreme limits' intuition moves. This movement, Bergson states, is metaphysics itself (1946, p. 221).

Bergson here sketches a series of greater to lesser durations, with subordinate durations 'contained in' higher durations. Put another way, Bergson describes a temporal hierarchy which is given form by two fundamental principles:

1. The concept of relative breadths of duration (broader or briefer).
2. A serial ordering principle. According to this principle broader durations extend over briefer durations and these over briefer still, *ad indefinitum* (Sipfle, 1969). Music provides innumerable examples of serial durational order: for example, the extended phrases of a melody overarching successive rhythmic beats or, more prosaically, a whole note extending over two half-notes, each of which extends over

two quarter-notes. Living organisms provide examples of hierarchical orderings of biological rhythms.

There is more to the concept of temporal hierarchy than relative breadths of duration and serial order. Those who have written about it from a physiological and biological standpoint (for example, Ted Bastin) have stressed prolonged temporality as a constraining and otherwise influencing factors of briefer duration (Bastin, 1969, pp. 252–5). There can be no doubt that Bergson's notion of temporal hierarchy involves a similar idea. Longer, more intense psychological durations can, on his terms, prevail over briefer, less concerted physical durations. The mind–body problem would be better understood if stated in temporal rather than spatial terms.

The passage from *An Introduction to Metaphysics* quoted above provides little more than a framework consisting of three segments: physical matter, human psychological time and, at the upper limit, a 'living and still moving eternity'. Bergson will later fill the gaps in his framework. The gap between human, inner-time consciousness and the sheer brevity of material existence will be spanned in *Creative Evolution*, in which each form of life will be described as having its own unique duration (Bergson, 1965, p. 46). Breadths of duration between human kind and eternity will be found in the elevated moral and religious states explored in his last work, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (Bergson, 1935, pp. 198–254).

Integral hierarchy: Bergson's qualitative calculus

It must seem a long way from Bergson's durational hierarchy to the operations of the infinitesimal calculus. As remarked above, however, Bergson finds the two to be congruent. The calculus provides a mode of thought in terms of which intuition can be understood and developed. That is, for Bergson intuition can be understood as performing 'qualitative integrations and differentiations'. That which is integrated/differentiated is – since there is nothing else in Bergson's universe to be thus manipulated – duration. Intuition moves up and down his durational hierarchy, integrating (summing up) and differentiating (decomposing).

It is no secret that the history and foundations of mathematics can be looked at in myriad ways. Bergson's way, closely linked to applied mathematics, involves a stress on the revolutionary status of the infinitesimal

calculus: not only as marking a decisive break with Greek mathematics but as helping make possible the success of the natural sciences. The 'break' associated with the invention of the calculus, he believes, involves a real reversal of our thought, placing the dynamic above the static, the mobile above the immobile:

> The most powerful method of investigation known to the mind, infinitesimal calculus was born of that very reversal.[1] Modern mathematics is precisely an effort to substitute for the *ready-made* what is in process of *becoming*, to follow the growth of magnitudes, to seize movement no longer from outside and in its manifest result, but from within and in its tendency towards change, in short, to adopt the mobile continuity of the pattern of things. (Bergson, 1946, p. 225)

A similar revolution is possible in philosophy. It will consist in attempting to think process without rendering it static. Bergson proposes 'that metaphysics should adopt the generative idea of our mathematics in order to extend it to all qualities to reality in general' (1946, p. 225).[2] This proposal is not merely a casual reflection or aside. Bergson stresses its centrality on the next page: 'One of the objects of metaphysics is to operate (qualitative) integrations' (1946, p. 226). The concluding sentence of *An Introduction to Metaphysics* describes metaphysics as 'integral experience' (1946, p. 277).[3]

Disentangling Bergson's exact meaning in these passages is not easy. Nor is the application of his analogy of the calculus to evolutionary biology simple to unravel. It will be helpful in this respect to outline one basic feature of the calculus, its 'Fundamental Theorem'. For this theorem, any integral (which is always a summing up) has as its inverse a 'derivative' (the result of differentiation, a breaking down or division), and vice versa. Moreover, on this theorem, it is possible to integrate over an integral and integrate over this integral again, and so on, indefinitely, while, inversely, it is possible to differentiate 'under' a derivative, and then differentiate under this, also indefinitely. Bergson's analogy of the calculus, then, would have an 'integration' in his sense leading to broader durations, a differentiation leading to briefer durations. These, of course, are qualitative integration/differentiations; they manipulate (qualitative) durations (Gunter, 1989).

Though familiar with both the Bergsonian calculus and Bergson's durational hierarchy, Deleuze will have a hard time accepting either on Bergson's terms. In the following two sections Deleuze's puzzling treatment of both ideas will be examined.

Deleuze's derivatives

Bergson, Deleuze states, 'sometimes compares the approach of philosophy to the processes of the calculus' (1991, p. 27). This is odd given Bergson's actual words, which in his unique way valorize the calculus. Having marginalized the place of the calculus in Bergson's thought, however, Deleuze then drags it back to centre stage through his analysis of Bergson's method. Bergson's intuition, he contends, is one of the most fully developed methods in the history of philosophy. (1991, p. 13). In coming to deal with that method, however, Deleuze interprets it so as to make differentiation its fundamental key. This does make the calculus central, as Bergson wishes, but it eliminates – or very nearly eliminates – integration from the calculus. It is necessary, then, to sketch Deleuze's view of Bergsonian method.

This method, Deleuze argues, is threefold (B35): it is, first, problematizing (posing critiques of false problems); it is also differentiating (attempting, like Plato's good chef, to carve reality along the joints); and finally, it is temporalizing (striving to think in terms of duration).

Deleuze's treatment of Bergsonian method is clear and challenging. Yet, since it demotes thinking in duration to third place in the order of methodology, it raises questions. Deleuze defines the problematizing function of philosophy as linked exclusively to the misconstrual of our notions of 'more' or 'less', that is, of comparative extensive relations (1991, pp. 17–21). But the problems involved in grasping duration *per se* surely came first in Bergson's thought and are not grounded in errors derived from judgements concerning extensive relations. This would mean, strictly speaking, that for Deleuze duration does not have its own problematic. Even a cursory study of Bergson's thought would show, however, that the problematic of duration appears at the beginning of his thought and is broadened and deepened throughout. Only from the vantage point of *durée*, moreover, can the other problematics be resolved.

In displacing duration from the centre of Bergson's thought Deleuze is free to insist that Bergson's fundamental problematic is that of differentiation, and that Bergson's appropriation of the calculus is limited to the differential calculus (and hence is concerned with difference alone).

The two examples of the calculus in Bergson's writing which Deleuze cites make clear Deleuze's intentions. The first, taken from *Matter and Memory* (Bergson, 1929, p. 185), describes the task of the philosopher as being like that of the mathematician who attempts, from infinitely small elements of a curve (i.e. from our limited knowledge), to project 'the curve itself stretching into the darkness beyond' (Deleuze, 1991,

pp. 27–8). This particular mathematical metaphor creates no difficulties. But the second of Deleuze's examples is less than reassuring. Here (in a passage from *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*) Deleuze describes Bergson as depicting 'lines of fact' which converge upon each other (Bergson, 1935, p. 185).

> each one indicating but the direction of the truth, because it does not go far enough. Truth itself, however will be reached if two of them can be prolonged to the point where they intersect.
>
> (Deleuze, 1991, p. 29)

The problem here is twofold. Deleuze misdescribes Bergson's example, portraying it as a case in which two curves start from 'indefinite points' and, having curved away from each other, curve back to converge 'towards the same idea or virtual point' (Deleuze, 1991, p. 29). Bergson, by contrast, speaks here of a surveyor who sights straight lines from two *definite* points, lines which do not 'diverge and then converge', but, simply, being straight lines, intersect. Nor does Bergson describe them as intersecting in the 'virtual'. (This latter is a Deleuzean invention.) Deleuze then adds here 'integration follows differentiation' (B29). But the examples he cites are entirely in the differential calculus, and the second example can be worked without the calculus, using elementary geometry. It is not clear if the integral calculus, indeed any calculus, has an application here at all.[4]

It is clear from what has been quoted above from Bergson's text and from others of his statements that differentiation, difference and derivatives cannot be a complete account of knowledge, much less of evolution. In *Creative Evolution* Bergson states (envisaging a new, as yet undeveloped biology):

> And just as an infinity of functions have the same differential, these functions differing from each other, by a constant so perhaps the integration of the physico-chemical elements of properly vital action might determine that action only in part – a part would be left to indetermination.[5]

That is, for Bergson, drawing here on the Fundamental Theorem of the Calculus, integration takes place wherever there is differentiation. In evolution, in order for there to be a new sort of organism there must be a new 'summation' of biological and physical factors. This would be a matter of specific actual cases in evolution, not of an ideal or virtual point.

Wherever differentiation takes place in evolution, integration takes place also.

Deleuze's elusive hierarchy

The same spirit of conceptual freedom that Deleuze utilizes in his treatment of Bergson's qualitative calculus is applied in the interpretation of Bergson's hierarchy of durations. Quoting Bergson's statement that his intuitional method makes it possible to affirm the existence of objects 'inferior and superior to us' (Deleuze, 1991, p. 33; Bergson, 1946, p. 217) Deleuze warns us that we should not be misled by the words 'inferior' and 'superior', which refer only to differences in kind (B33). But if we read the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter on the hierarchy of durations, Bergson is referring here specifically to durations. These are not described as simply 'diversity' or 'plurality' (Deleuze, 1991, p. 76) or as 'faster or slower' (B76). These are durations broader and less broad. There is even a suggestion that the lower levels of duration participate in the higher. Bergson states that our human duration, in relations to eternity, 'finds' itself like the 'vibrations in light' (Bergson, 1946, p. 221).

It is also clear from Bergson's text that his statements about his continuity of durations allow him to establish a realist position. Far from being closed off in itself, intuition allows us to explore and assert the independence of a real world. It is, to use Sartre's term, 'ek-static'. This realist move is entirely clear from both the passage in question and its context. But as we shall see, Deleuze, having denied the existence of levels of duration, will then move unexpectedly to affirm their existence. He even seems to assert the higher values of the higher level. But these will have nothing to do with any actual world. They will be entirely 'virtual'.

Having argued that in talking about the intuition of objects independent of ourselves, Bergson is not talking about either durations or relations of higher and lower, Deleuze then notes that Bergson holds that we are 'caught' between durations either 'more intense' or 'more dispersed' than our own (Deleuze, 1991, pp. 77, 60–1). He even proclaims that the former are 'superhuman', the latter 'inhuman' (1991, p. 28). To speak in this way is to reverse his prior position. Subsequently, he will go even further, but with a difference, arguing that in Bergson's universe there really are 'levels' and 'degrees' (1991, pp. 100, 101, 106). These, however, are not in the real (that is, the actual) world but in the ideal (the virtual). He here refers to Bergson's *élan vital* (B100–6), which he interprets as one, pure and simple and transcending the actualities of evolution (i.e. actual organisms) (1991, pp. 100–6).

Bergson uses the term 'virtual' differently from Deleuze. For Deleuze virtual means both 'real' and 'ideal'. For Bergson it means 'nearly' or 'not quite'. Bergson describes the past as virtual in two senses: first, as being in some respects similar to a geometrical dimension yet different from it; and second, as being active at a high level and hence capable of entering into the present as part of a creative act. This latter use of the term is well understood by Bergson's readers. The former use is less well known. Like a geometrical concept of the past, Bergson's virtual past contains successive past moments in serial order (the order in which they happen). But the moments of Bergson's past are qualitative, take up relationships not involved in serial order and are thoroughly dynamic: characteristics not found in geometry. Bergson's past is virtually but not actually linear and geometrical.

Deleuze's constant goal in Bergsonism is to transform Bergson's 'virtual past' not into a condition of present creativity, but into a self-contained, transcendent and dominating reality. To do so is of necessity to diminish the reality of the present, making it only the 'most condensed form of the past,' (Deleuze, 1991, p. 75), even insisting, at one point, that the present does not exist (1991, p. 58). It is not an exaggeration to say that for Deleuze, to go from the virtual to the actual is a diminution. In the case of the *élan vital* it is to go from perfect oneness to the mere pluralism of distinct forms of life (Deleuze, 1991, p. 77). The actual duration of things for Deleuze stains the white radiance of the virtual.

Bergson never ceased to argue against this view of actualization (Bergson, 1983, p. 210n). But there is no need thus to suspend Bergson's hierarchy of durations in midair (i.e. in pure ontology) any more than there is to make evolution the work of a pure, unified 'virtual' outside of but somehow directing the emergence of life. The passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter, which we have revisited, clearly establishes Bergson's hierarchy as existing in the world. In addition, his treatment of evolution portrays the *élan vital* as entirely immanent in the world and needing no virtual reality outside of actuality to sustain the creative advance of nature. The wholeness and harmony Bergson finds in evolution are described by him as entirely immanent.

The actual *élan vital*

In describing the *élan vital* Deleuze proclaims:

> We know that the *virtual as virtual has a reality*: this reality, extended to the whole universe, consists in all the coexisting degrees of expansion

> (*détente)* and contraction. A gigantic memory a universal cone in which everything coexists with itself . . .
>
> (Deleuze, 1991, p. 100)

In this gigantic memory the Bergsonian hierarchy, as we have seen, reappears as a series of 'coexisting degrees of expansion and contraction', that is, 'degrees in the virtual totality' (Deleuze, 1991, p. 100). Compared to these, the actual course of evolution is a rather truncated affair, with different organisms in conflict with each other, and with the fundamental *élan* self-divided.

At a time when most cosmologists believed in a stable, essentially unchanging universe, Bergson – with considerable audacity – proposed a dynamic cosmology according to which the universe has appeared suddenly and exhibits continual transformation, including expansion (Gunter, 1971). In the beginning, before the consolidation of suns and planets, life and matter would not be distinguishable (Bergson, 1983, pp. 179, 181). Under the right conditions (conditions which today we still cannot fully specify) the first living things emerged. Bergson's description of the subsequent bifurcations which have resulted in kingdoms, phyla, species, is entirely immanentist. The vital impetus is, for Bergson, literally *in* the genes of living organisms (1983, pp. 27, 37, 79, 87), destabilizing them, making possible new combinations, new organisms. The vital impetus (1983, pp. 181, 270) passes *through* generations of *individuals* (1983, pp. 53, 250, 269).

The immanentist interpretation of Bergsonian evolution gains strength from another factor: Bergson's repeated insistence that evolution is the result of an initial impetus, which, once given, continues on its own without the need of any transcendent guidance (1983, pp. 104, 105, 246, 247, 269, 271). Hence Bergson's depictions of evolution as being like 'a shell, which suddenly bursts into fragments, which fragments, being themselves shells, burst in their turn into fragments destined to burst again, and so on . . .' (CE 98). Everything taking place in this metaphor is contained in the 'shells' and their initial impetus. Nothing needs to be added, beyond the original 'push', which clearly has a history of its own.

It is not only that Bergson's vital push is entirely immanent and entirely the conveyor of an original act: its embodiment as a kind of memory also guarantees its freedom from any overarching, transcendent cause. The Bergsonian theory of memory, first developed in *Matter and Memory* in the study of human psychology, is broadened in *Creative*

Evolution to include biological evolution. This theory has two parts. The first, which might be called the Bergson–Freud Thesis, presumes that all memories are retained. The second postulates that each particular recollection contains, or is intricately related to, all other memories (for example, memories of one's twelfth birthday tie in to other memories of one's life). Bergson's *élan vital* is, besides a persisting impetus, a memory containing all factors in an indeterminate, 'vague' form which may emerge in the course of evolution. The various bifurcations, marking the emergence of new kinds of organisms, continue this memory, each expressing a different component of it. This is possible, for Bergson, because each life-form retains the remainder of the initial memory. It may help to describe this persistent carry-over of a past mnemonic content as being like a fractal set. It is, like a fractal set, self-similar. Each new division recovers a set identical to the original but on a different scale.

While, as Deleuze points out, different species are described by Bergson as cut off from each other and in conflict (Deleuze, 1991, p. 104), they are also described by Bergson as 'complementary' (1983, pp. xii, 51, 101) and involved in sustaining each other (1983, pp. 106–7). Hence there is an undeniable 'harmony' in evolution and an obvious wholeness (1983, p. 105). The peculiar mnemonic features of Bergsonian evolution guarantee the wholeness and complementarity of life. Each direction life takes, each species, contains the character of every other, actual or yet to be. Hence, no matter what 'splits' may occur in the course of evolution, it will follow that the resulting life-forms will be complementary to each other and involve some measure of mutual support. And since each component of evolution expresses both its own unique character and the content of the initial impetus, evolution is inevitably pluralized, yet is also one.

One final point needs making here, and concerns both Bergson's durational hierarchy and his concept of biological evolution. In the passage on this hierarchy cited above, Bergson refers to 'a living and still moving eternity', later to be reconceived as God. With his capacity for negative textual prehension, Deleuze nowhere refers to this being in relation to levels or intensities of being in Bergson. It is easy to see why. It is from God, Bergson holds, that both physical matter and the vital impetus derive (1983, p. 249). If this were so, then Deleuze's virtual would, so to speak, be co-opted from above. Rather than standing on its own, as Deleuze wishes, the *élan vital* would be first actual in God and then actual in the actual world. It would nowhere have the pure 'virtuality' with which Deleuze wishes to endow it.

Bergson, Deleuze and Whitehead

This chapter has been written for a volume on Deleuze and Whitehead. I hope that what is said about Bergson and Deleuze here will cast a useful light on both. One can also imagine that a Whiteheadian encounter with Deleuze will enrich any efforts towards a Whiteheadian postmodern constructivism. Deleuze's notions of chaosmos, of the rhizomatic nature of becoming, of creativity, his radical critiques of abstractions of all kinds, provide important venues for rethinking the philosophy of *Process and Reality*. It goes without saying, however, that Deleuze's philosophical aims differ significantly from those of Whitehead, who hopes to sustain what is best in European society. It is not clear, considering the trajectory of his thought, that Deleuze believes that in Western society there is much that is worthwhile. Whitehead constructs; Deleuze deconstructs.

What has been written about Bergson here suggests unexpected analogies between his philosophy and Whitehead's. This is true in at least two respects. Bergson's hierarchy of durations has been a neglected part of his thought. Once its significance is understood, however, it becomes clear that behind the holistic rhetoric and dynamic imagery of *Creative Evolution* there is a carefully worked out basis for the analysis of organisms of all sorts, from what Whitehead terms 'actual occasions' to *nexus* existing at higher levels. Also, there are many varieties or intuition, Bergson insists, each of which can be painstakingly focused on different degrees of being (Bergson, *Creative Mind*, p. 217). To say this is to get beyond a supposed irrationalism or anti-intellectualism at variance with Whitehead's approach. It is to get at the specificity in Bergson's universe.

Equally significant for the relations between Bergson and Whitehead is Bergson's notion of reminiscence. If Western philosophy is, as Whitehead states, so many footnotes to Plato, it is clear that Bergson intends his philosophy as one of those – in this case, a very pointed footnote. While Bergson does not accept Whitehead's theory of eternal objects, it is clear that his cosmic memory contains the (non-contingent, non-perishing) noetic content out of which the course of evolution and human history can be created. For Bergson this content is, though dynamic, eternal. With Bergson and Whitehead it is a matter of contrasting but not entirely opposed Platonisms.

But there is one major difference between Deleuze and Bergson as process philosophers and Whitehead. The God of Leibniz can envisage all possible words, even in their infinite complexity. Similarly,

Whitehead's God is construed as containing the sum of all possibilities in his primordial nature.

Those with a nodding acquaintance with logic will note the appearance here of the universal qualifier 'all'. All leaves no exceptions, accepts no equivocations. On Whitehead's terms (as on Leibniz's) there can be no characteristic of anything at any time, no matter how complex, which the deity does not behold prior to its appearance. It follows that there can be no novel entities. Creativity must be understood as a choice between pre-existing 'possibles'.

For both Bergson and Deleuze the opposite is true. That is, for both, the possible does not precede the actual. Events, rather, create new 'possibilities' which are then projected back onto an illusory past. Prior to the emergence of Romantic poetry, for example, there was no phalanx of Romantic 'possibles' hovering over history, waiting their turn to ingress. There were, no doubt, vague tendencies, unclear suggestions and confused 'hunches'. But it took the genius of the poets to produce the new poetry. *Then* it could be projected onto the past as something which somehow had always 'been there'. Bergson outlines his rejection of metaphysical 'possibles' in his essay 'The Possible and the Real' (Bergson, *Creative Mind,* pp. 107–25). Deleuze's entire philosophy continues the rejection. His fundamental distinction between the virtual and the actual embodies it. For both, but in ways very different from Sartre, existence precedes essence and gives birth to it.

Notes

1. Bergson's footnote at this point it is as follows: 'Especially Newton, in his consideration of *fluxions*.'
2. The translation of *An Introduction to Metaphysics* in *The Creative Mind* is not an authorized translation. I have corrected this translation here, making it clear that for Bergson both integrations and differentiations are considered to be qualitative.
3. Here too the translation of *An Introduction to Metaphysics* is partly misleading. The translator gives us the end of the last sentence in this work as 'the whole of experience (l'expérience intégrale).' I translate it as 'integral experience'.
4. Here is Bergson's actual text: 'A surveyor measures the distance to an unattainable point by taking a line on it, now from one, now from the other of two points which he *can* reach. In our opinion this method of intersections is the only one that can bring about a decisive advance in metaphysics' (Bergson, 1935, p. 237).
5. In fact, Deleuze does cite this passage in Bergsonism, but relegates it to a footnote. (B121n) He also refers to it in passing in his lecture on chapter 3 of *Creative Evolution*, p. 178.

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10
A Whiteheadian Chaosmos?

Tim Clark

The main purpose of this chapter is to establish a fundamental difference between the speculative systems of Deleuze and Whitehead by way of the distinction between a cosmology and a chaosmology. At its most simplistic, the difference in play is that between a cosmos in which order is imposed on a primordial chaos 'from outside', or transcendently (as when Form is imposed on matter by the Platonic demiurge, or harmony established *a priori* by the Leibnizean deity), and a chaosmos in which order is generated 'from within', by a wholly immanent process of self-organization. In these very general terms, perhaps the closest approximation to a chaosmology among Whiteheadian thinkers is to be found in Donald Sherburne's vision of 'a Whitehead decentered … a Whitehead without God … a neo-Whiteheadian naturalism'. From this perspective, as from Deleuze's, 'there is no one overarching center of value, meaning and order'; rather, 'patterns of meaning and order emerge gradually, fitfully, and unevenly from [a] churning multiplicity of value centers' (Sherburne, 1986, pp. 83, 92). Thus – or so it would seem – the term 'chaosmology' is simply a fancy neologism for speculative naturalism, for a cosmological system which lacks a God.

This simple picture, however, is more than a little complicated by the fact that Deleuze himself – in his one and only sustained discussion of Whitehead's philosophy (Deleuze, 1993, pp. 76–82) – suggests the possibility of a chaosmology within which Whitehead's God would have a positive, indeed an essential, role to play. My aim here is twofold: first to argue, *pro* Sherburne and *contra* Deleuze's reading, that there is no place for God – even for Whitehead's God – in a chaosmos worthy of the name; but second, following Deleuze and departing from Sherburne, to outline one way in which the operation of 'decentering Whitehead' might lead to somewhere other than to a naturalism. The argument,

in short, is that while Whitehead's God may, *ex hypothesi*, be surplus to requirements, it is not possible to remove altogether a certain divine *function*, at least not if the problem is one of thinking the conditions for the production of novelty in the most primitive metaphysical terms. To this end, I shall focus almost exclusively on a singular and sensitive point in the Whiteheadian system: that moment at which 'the barren inefficient disjunction of abstract potentialities' – the disjunctive multiplicity of eternal objects – 'obtains efficient conjunction of ideal realization' within the primordial nature of God (cf. Whitehead, 1978, p. 40).

I

In the following passage from *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, Deleuze sets out what he takes to be the key difference between the Leibnizian and the Whiteheadian cosmologies:

> For Leibniz … bifurcations and divergencies of series are genuine borders between incompossible worlds, such that the monads that exist wholly include the compossible world that moves into existence. For Whitehead, on the contrary, bifurcations, divergences, incompossibilities, and discord belong to the same motley world *that can no longer be included in expressive units*, but only made or undone according to prehensive units and variable configurations. In a same chaotic world divergent series are endlessly tracing bifurcating paths. It is a 'chaosmos' … [in which] even God desists from being a Being who compares worlds and chooses the richest possible. He becomes Process, a process that at once affirms incompossibilities and passes them through.
>
> (Deleuze, 1993, p. 81)

This passage concludes Deleuze's brief account of the difference between Leibnizian monads and Whiteheadian actual entities (or prehensive units). As he suggests, while it is true that

> the two instances … have no windows … for Leibniz, [this] is because the monad's being-for the world is subject to a condition of closure, all compossible monads including a single and same world. For Whitehead, on the contrary, a condition of opening causes all prehension to be *already* the prehension of another prehension. … Prehension is naturally open, open to the world, without having to pass through a window.
>
> (Deleuze, 1993, p. 81)

Our question then is this: is the (undeniable) fact that Whitehead's prehensive units are naturally open sufficient grounds for describing the Whiteheadian universe as a chaosmos? Might it not still be the case that, given his *theology*, his universe remains 'semi-open and partially predictable' – as George Kampis has suggested – in explicit contrast to the closed, predictable Leibnizian system on the one hand, and to the open, unpredictable, unfinished-in-every-dimension system of Bergson on the other? (Kampis, 1991, p. 462). The answer will depend (as Deleuze clearly recognizes), not simply on an analysis of the nature of monadic units, but on confronting the issue at its most primitive point, namely, with respect to the difference between the Leibnizian God, who 'compares and chooses', and the Whiteheadian God, who 'affirms incompossibles and passes them through'.

In his comprehensive study of Whitehead's metaphysics, William Christian offers an interpretation which prefigures that adopted by Deleuze. Like Deleuze, he recognizes that the crucial distinction lies between the Leibnizian and Whiteheadian conceptions of divinity:

> Whitehead's God, like Leibniz', envisages all possible worlds. Unlike the God of Leibniz' system, Whitehead's God does not choose *any* of the possible worlds. Rather he values them *all,* even though they are not compossible. Thus … the function of his primordial nature is to hold the possible worlds together by his appetition for them all, so that all are relevant in one way or another, to any particular world which occurs in the course of nature. From the lack of a final and necessary order of eternal objects in the primordial nature of God it follows that there is no final order of nature.
>
> (Christian, 1959, p. 276)

In other words, so Christian argues, the lack of a fixed, necessary or preformed order of potentiality follows from the principle that God affirms (or values, to use Whitehead's term) all incompossibles. But if this is the case, what are we to make of those passages in which Whitehead speaks variously of an '*inevitable* ordering of things, conceptually realized in the nature of God' or of '*the* eternal order which is the *final* absolute wisdom'? (Whitehead, 1978, pp. 244, 347; emphasis added). Indeed, Christian himself suggests that we understand the 'fixed and necessary order' which appears in chapter 10 of *Science and the Modern World* as 'describing eternal objects as they exist in the primordial vision of God' (Christian, 1959, pp. 259, 262). Should we identify here a contradiction that vitiates the Whiteheadian system as a whole, or is it the case that

a more careful reading of Whitehead's theology is called for? The same question might be raised on the basis of Deleuze's own remarks. In *The Logic of Sense* he makes it quite clear that what he calls the 'immanent consistency' of the chaosmos necessarily excludes the 'coherence' traditionally supplied by a transcendent God (Deleuze, 1990, p. 176). And yet, in his commentary on Whitehead, he seems to hold open the possibility of a chaosmos that would include a divine element. Again, if this is not a simple case of self-contradiction, does it suggest a reading of Whitehead's theology which would render it compatible with a Deleuzean chaosmology? My attempt to resolve these issues will involve a detailed examination of Christian's defence of Whitehead's non-Leibnizian God, together with an interpretation of Deleuze's highly paradoxical notion of 'disjunctive synthesis'.

II

One significant point of agreement between Deleuze and Whitehead concerns their critique of Aristotelian systems of classification within which a concrete individual is conceived as being merely a member of a certain class or an instance of a certain kind. Christian formulates Whitehead's view as follows:

> an individual is something more than a member of a species. The principle of classification is inadequate to account for real individuals. A principle of synthesis is needed. This principle is 'creativity' … 'that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively'.
>
> (Christian, 1959, p. 251; the cited passage is at Whitehead, 1978, p. 21)

Insofar as the 'many' refers to the disjunctive multiplicity of eternal objects it is not representable in terms of a logic of genera and species. The many of pure potentiality constitutes a multiplicity within which 'there are no ultimate exclusions, expressive in logical terms', for the simple reason that 'such exclusions are decided by the finitude of circumstance' (Whitehead, 1938, pp. 75–6). The error of the principle of classification lies in its tendency to posit an exclusiveness of pure potentials among themselves without recognizing that such incompatibilities are established through, or decided by, the negative prehensions which

are constitutive of actual entities. Similarly from a Deleuzean perspective, the error of such classification lies in its failure to recognize that the exclusiveness of incompossibles is a feature unique to the actual, a feature for which there is no precedent in pure potentiality. As Deleuze puts it in *The Logic of Sense*: 'Would two events [pure potentials] be contradictory because they were incompatible? Is this not a case, though, of applying rules to events, which apply only to concepts, predicates and classes?' Rather, 'incompatibility is born only with [the] individuals and worlds in which events [pure potentials] are *actualized* but not between events themselves' (Deleuze, 1990, pp. 170, 177; emphasis added).

Given the Whiteheadian doctrine that the exclusiveness of incompossibles is logically dependent on the decisions made by actual entities, the question then becomes: what effect does the 'initial decision' made by God, the ultimate actual entity, have on the logical status of pure potentiality? There can be no doubt that God makes decisions apropos the disjunctive multiplicity of eternal objects; the difficulty is to establish in precisely what sense these divine decisions are distinguishable from the choices and calculations made by the Leibnizian deity. Whitehead's dilemma seems to be this: on the one hand, the principle of classification is to be challenged by positing the primordiality of a world of eternal objects that knows 'no exclusions, expressive in logical terms'; on the other hand, positing pure potentiality as a 'boundless and unstructured infinity' (Christian, 1959, p. 252) lacking all logical order would seem to be precisely that conceptual move which renders it 'inefficacious' or 'irrelevant'. Over and above the 'special relevance' which selected eternal objects may have in relation to particular, finite actual entities, it is necessary that there be a kind of 'relevance in general', a real togetherness of all eternal objects among themselves, effected by an eternal, infinite actuality: 'Transcendent decision includes God's decision. He is the actual entity in virtue of which the *entire* multiplicity of eternal objects obtains its graded relevance to each stage of concrescence' (Whitehead, 1978, p. 164). The question is whether this transcendent decision necessarily involves that element of limitation and exclusion characteristic of decisions in general (Whitehead, 1978, p. 164: 'The limitation whereby there is a perspective relegation of eternal objects to the background is characteristic of decision'). Christian thinks not, and Deleuze appears to follow him.

Clearly, everything turns on the nature of 'synthesis', i.e. on the precise manner m which incompossible potentials are 'held together'. Deleuze distinguishes between two kinds of synthesis: the conjunctive and the disjunctive; and within the latter he distinguishes between two uses of

disjunction: an immanent use, at once inclusive, non-restrictive and affirmative, and a transcendent use which is exclusive, limitative and negative (cf. Deleuze, 1990, pp. 172, 176). Following Leibniz, both Deleuze and Whitehead agree that the actualization of individuals and worlds is subject to a condition of conjunctive synthesis, conceived, in Deleuze's terms, as 'a method of constructing convergent series' (Deleuze, 1990, p. 174) or, in Whitehead's terms, as 'that principle by which the many (disjunctively) become one (conjunctively)' (Whitehead, 1978, p. 21). Nor would there be any disagreement over the fact that, *once an actual world has been formed,* limitation, opposition and negation become characteristic features of the world as it is actualized. But the whole question is to know whether such factors are also primary,or whether they are merely the secondary effects of an originary movement of 'disjunctive synthesis', that is, a synthesis which somehow holds incompossibles together; but does so without limitation, opposition or negation (i.e. a synthesis of 'total affirmation'). It is in relation to this question that Deleuze's distinction between the two uses of disjunction is most pertinent. If, as Whitehead *at times* suggests, principles of limitation, exclusion, etc. are indeed operative in creating the conditions for the production of novelty, then the disjunction involved here cannot be 'properly speaking a synthesis, but only a regulative analysis at the service of conjunctive synthesis, since it separates the nonconvergent [incompossible] series from one another' (Deleuze, 1990, p. 174). But if, as Deleuze insists, that factor he calls 'Difference in itself' creates the requisite conditions for novelty, then the disjunction involved will be a genuinely affirmative synthesis within which 'divergence is no longer a principle of exclusion, and disjunction no longer a means of separation. Incompossibility is now a means of communication' (Deleuze, 1990, p. 175). Furthermore, as Deleuze goes on to make explicit, any attempt to introduce a principle of limitation into pure potentiality itself will require appeal to the 'form of God [as] guarantee [of] disjunction in its exclusive or limitative sense' (1990, p. 176). This is the truth Deleuze uncovers in Kant's discussion of 'The Ideal of Pure Reason' in the first *Critique*. In a manner which to some extent prefigures Whitehead's own recasting of traditional theology (God, not as creator, but as the first accident of creativity), Kant's God is here

> at least provisionally, deprived of his traditional claims – to have created subjects or made a world – and now has what is but an apparently humble task, namely, to enact disjunctions, or at least to found them. … God is defined by the sum total of possibility, insofar as this

> sum constitutes an 'originary' material. … The reality of each thing 'is derived' from it: it rests in effect on the limitation of this totality.
> (Deleuze, 1990, pp. 295–6)

It is precisely *this* God, along with his humble task, which are together excluded from the chaosmos theorized by Deleuze, and it is the very same deity which appears in Whitehead's 'first reference to the conception of God he will later elaborate and defend' (Christian, 1959, p. 262). The task appointed to God in chapter 11 of *Science and the Modern World* is nothing less than that of instituting 'an antecedent limitation among values, introducing contraries, grades, and oppositions' into the totality of possibility (the realm of eternal objects): 'Thus this first limitation is a limitation of antecedent selection' (Whitehead, 1985, p. 221). Since the God that appears here is patently a reincarnation of Kant's 'master of the exclusive disjunction', it follows that any attempt to interpret the system of *Process and Reality* as representing a nascent chaosmology will have to demonstrate that the theology developed in the later work positively *supersedes* and *excludes*, rather than, as Christian claims, 'elaborates and defends', the theology of the earlier. Christian does, however, present a strong case for an element of elaboration by showing how, between the two works, the realm of eternal objects ceases to be a realm in any meaningful sense, since they are no longer 'related in any single fixed order' (Christian, 1959, p. 277). His conclusions are presented as follows:

> I suggest that the primordial nature of God orders eternal objects in the sense, and only in the sense, that in God's envisagement eternal objects are *together* … God excludes *no* possibilities and for this very reason does not *order* possibilities, in the strong sense of 'order' [i.e. fixed a priori] … Therefore it is truer to say that God envisages possibilities of order than that God envisages an order of possibilities.
> (Christian, 1959, pp. 276, 277–8; emphasis added)

Two objections to this solution might be raised. First, given that the characteristic feature of decisions in general is limitation (following Whitehead, 1978, p. 164), Christian still has to make sense of Whitehead's reference to the 'transcendent *decision* of God' apropos pure potentiality. Second, there is an element of near-tautology affecting the formulation of the solution, specifically in the first sentence: 'order', in its 'weak' (non-Leibnizian) sense, is to be defined *only* in terms of 'togetherness' (on this Deleuze could perhaps agree); but the difficulty is to know how *togetherness* (synthesis) is to be defined (since it cannot be

defined in terms of 'order' without collapsing into bare tautology) – that is, to know precisely *how* incompossibles are held together through an analysis of the exact mechanism involved, and this Christian does not provide.

The first objection refers back to the question I raised earlier: precisely how does the transcendent decision of Whitehead's God differ from the choice/selection made by Leibniz's deity? Although he does not address this question explicitly, the rudiments of an answer are implicit in the passage cited earlier: 'Unlike the God of Leibniz's system, Whitehead's God does not *choose* any of the possible worlds. Rather he *values* them all, even though they are not compossible' (Christian, 1959, p. 276; emphasis added). Thus, if God's transcendent decision refers *only* to this operation of evaluating incompossible worlds while refraining from selecting any one of them, then it does indeed make sense to speak here of a 'decision' which is not yet a 'choice'. The question then arises as to whether this non-selective decision still involves any necessary element of limitation or restriction. Given that the decision is one of *value*, the answer can only be yes, as Whitehead himself clearly recognized:

> Restriction is the price of the value. There cannot be value without antecedent standards of value, to discriminate the acceptance or rejection of what is before the envisaging mode of activity. Thus there is an antecedent limitation among values, introducing contraries …
>
> (Whitehead, 1985, p. 221)

Prima facie, this would seem to be the end of the line for Christian's argument in favour of a divine 'total affirmation': Whitehead's God holds incompossibles together, and excludes none, simply because he values them all; but if *restriction* and *limitation* are the conditions of value, then it would appear that even here God is still required to enact, or at least to found, disjunctions which are not yet positively synthetic or wholly affirmative. The element of choice (or selection) may have been removed, but the element of *comparison* remains (standards of value implying comparisons of better and worse), and thus at least one aspect of the role Leibniz attributes to his God is still in operation.

Nonetheless, Christian can call on some powerful evidence from the later work which would militate against this conclusion, most notably on Whitehead's remark that precisely 'because it arises out of no actual world [the primordial nature] has within it no components which are standards of comparison' (Whitehead, 1978, p. 47). Clearly, the problem now

becomes: how to square *this* claim with the earlier doctrine according to which God provides the necessary antecedent standards of value. Following Lewis Ford, there is an apparently simple solution: interpret the earlier passage in such a way that it does not (or at least not only) refer to God, but rather (or also) to the complex of relations an individual actual occasion has with past actual occasions and eternal objects (Ford, 1984, p. 116). Ford's general and surely correct thesis is that between *Science and the Modern World* and *Process and Reality* there is a shift from monism to pluralism, a devolution of creative power from a Spinozistic substantial activity to the self-creating activity of actual occasions. It would then be wholly consistent for a similar shift to have taken place with regard to the sources of value. Nonetheless, even taking this devolution into account, the precise role that God plays in the process of evaluation remains unclear. *Pace* Donald Sherburne's solution (ditching God altogether, positing the multiplicity of actual entities as the *only* source of a plural 'order, meaning and value'), one possible response might run as follows: in the primordial nature there are no general (fixed a priori) standards of value, there is only the capacity to offer 'guidelines' relative to already individuated worlds, This, or something very like it, seems to be the solution implicitly adopted by Christian when he says of the primordial nature:

> It is not a teleological arrangement of eternal objects into a single hierarchy. It is rather a matrix for those orderings effected by particular actual occasions m the course of nature. … Any particular ordering of divine appetitions in God is relative to a particular instance of becoming. … In the primordial nature, taken in abstraction from acts of becoming … eternal objects have *togetherness but not gradations of importance*.
>
> (Christian, 1959, pp. 274, 275; emphasis added)

This certainly gets rid of the last element of divine limitation, but at what cost? If it is true that God can find within himself no standards of comparison, then his capacity to evaluate becomes wholly parasitic on actual worlds, and Sherburne's naturalism beckons. But the most immediate problem here is that raised by our second objection to Christian's solution: specifying precisely *how* incompossibles are held together. If the requisite disjunctive synthesis cannot be explained by appeal to the doctrine that God *values* all possible worlds, this is not so much because evaluation is logically dependent on gradations of importance, but because (accepting Christian's explanation of the *absence* of such

gradations in the primordial nature) the logic of the doctrine itself entails that God be inextricably involved in the formation of actual worlds as 'circles of convergence', i.e. in 'the orderings effected by individuals in the course of nature'. And thus, at least with regard to the process of evaluation, God is always already functioning at the service of *conjunctive* synthesis, i.e. providing 'guidelines' with a well-meaning regard for what is actually compossible.

The very best evidence Christian has for his interpretation – that 'God's … conceptual experience is … limited by no actuality that it presupposes. It is therefore infinite, *devoid of all negative prehensions*' (Whitehead, 1978, p. 345; emphasis added) – remains subject to a similar qualification: all negativity may have been removed *de jure* from the primordial nature, but is this sufficient? If, stripped of all technical connotations, we take the term 'prehension' to mean simply 'holding', then the phrase 'infinite, non-negative prehension' informs us *only* that nothing is 'held negatively' – that is, nothing is effectively excluded or 'relegated to the background' – but this still does not explain precisely how everything is positively 'held together'. In short, removing the element of limitation/negation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the theorization of disjunctive synthesis.

If the concept of evaluation is, at least on the argument presented above, inadequate to the problem, are there any other viable alternatives? Christian makes use of two other terms which are themselves near-synonyms: 'entertainment' and 'envisagement': incompossibles are held together simply because they are all entertained or envisaged within the primordial nature. One immediate (and seemingly intractable) problem arises: even Leibniz's God '*envisages* all possible worlds' (Christian, 1959, p. 276). But the main problem here is the more general issue of vagueness or imprecision. Once again, the only definite content registered by these concepts is that the operation involved is *distinct* from that of conjunctive synthesis. As Ford puts it: 'Since to envisage means to confront, face, what is envisaged is that which the occasion has before it to synthesize. To envisage is not to [conjunctively] synthesize, to bring into prehensive unity, but to entertain as an ingredient for such prehension' (1984, p. 110). Even so, in deploying the terms 'envisage' or 'entertain', nothing definite is said about the non-conjunctive mechanism involved in the primordial act of holding-together-without-bringing-into-overarching-unity. Perhaps the reason these terms remain indefinite and unexplicated is that within the system as a whole they are absolutely *primitive*.

Does Deleuze's system fare any better at this point? This is the question we shall now address, confronting essentially the same problems, but with different primitives.

III

If, as I have tried to show, the Whiteheadian God is not fully adequate to the ultimate role required of him, is this the cue for developing a wholly naturalist cosmology which excludes, in principle, all traces of the divine? Not quite, at least not as far as Deleuze is concerned. While for him, as for Whitehead, the Spinozist option remains excessively monistic (one way or another, Spinozism must be 'pluralized'), it is nevertheless possible to discern, in outline, what a 'Deleuzean' deity would look like on a monotheistic model. To fulfil the role ascribed to him, to perform the requisite function of total affirmation, Whitehead's God would have be profoundly *schizoid*, in the precise sense set out in Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*:

> The schizophrenic … does not substitute syntheses of contradictory elements for disjunctive syntheses; rather, for the exclusive and restrictive use of the disjunctive synthesis, he substitutes an affirmative use. He is and remains in disjunction: he does not abolish disjunction … instead he affirms it *through a continuous overflight spanning an indivisible distance* …
>
> (1984, p. 76)

Torn out of context, the phrase 'continuous overflight' can be read as functionally equivalent to Whiteheadian 'envisagement': incompossibles are held together, the affirmation is effected, 'through a continuous overflight'. The term is, no doubt, just as vague and uninformative as its Whiteheadian counterpart; nonetheless, any attempt to construct a Deleuzean theology would have to begin by substituting the disjunctive syntheses of a divine 'schizo' for the disjunctive analyses of that primordial rational Being in whose 'very nature it stands to divide Good from Evil', and to establish Reason 'within her dominions supreme', as Whitehead so unequivocally puts it (1985, p. 223). Such a substitution forms the first principle of 'the new critique of Reason' that Deleuze and Guattari discern in the work of Pierre Klossowski:

> The schizophrenic God has so little to do with the God of religion, even though they are related to the same syllogism. In *Le Baphomet*

> Klossowski contrasts God as master of the exclusions and restrictions of the disjunctive syllogism, with an antichrist who is the prince of modifications, determining instead the passage of a subject through all possible predicates.
>
> (1984, p. 77)

The same point is made in *The Logic of Sense*: 'disjunction posed as a synthesis exchanges its theological principle for a diabolic principle', ensuring that

> instead of certain number of predicates being excluded from a thing in virtue of the identity of its concept, each 'thing' opens itself up to the infinity of predicates through which it passes, as it loses its center, that is, its identity as concept or as self.
>
> (Deleuze, 1990, pp. 176, 174)

While these comments are clearly posed against Leibniz, the point can be restated in Whiteheadian terms simply by substituting 'actual entity' for Deleuze's 'thing', and then calling on Whitehead's cosmological theory of propositions in which actual entities form the 'logical subjects' and eternal objects the 'predicates' (Whitehead, 1978, p. 186). This puts us in a position to assess Deleuze's specific claims concerning Whitehead's system, namely that it theorizes 'a world of captures rather than closures', a chaosmos in which 'beings [actual entities] are pushed apart, kept open through divergent series and incompossible totalities that pull them outside, instead of being closed upon the compossible and convergent world that they express from within' (Deleuze, 1993, p. 81). To my knowledge, the best approximation to this view is once again to be found in Christian, insofar as what basis there is for Deleuze's interpretation would have to rest on the following principle:

> To say that there is a general scheme of relatedness among eternal objects is only to say that *all relations are possible*. If some certain eternal object were actualized [for a particular actual entity], then *all* other eternal objects would be relevant in *some* way or other [to that entity].
>
> (Christian, 1959, p. 274)

Now to say that, in principle, and apropos of the logical subjects of the system, all relations are possible and all eternal objects relevant,

is *almost* to say that Whiteheadian subject-units are 'pulled outside', 'decentred', kept open to the infinity of predicates through which they (virtually) pass. But the question is: what is Whitehead's own explanation of how this is possible? 'His ultimate explanation is that each [actual entity] in its initial phase prehends God', as it must do, because only through the mediation of the divine nature is there an 'envisagement of the *entire* multiplicity of eternal objects' (Christian, 1959, p. 269). But if, as I have argued, Whitehead's all-envisaging God is incapable of performing the strange kind of synthesis required, then the God that appears in *The Fold* as 'affirming incompossibles and passing them through' must be precisely Deleuze's own: the Divine Schizophrenic. And it is this God who consistently fails to appear in *Process and Reality*, other than as a negative or a kind of after-image. (Except once, in a mythic aside: Whitehead cites from Milton, *Paradise Lost*, Book II, and then adds: 'the fact of Satan's journey through chaos helped to evolve order; for he left a permanent track, useful for the devils and the damned' [Whitehead, 1978, p. 96]. In Klossowski's terms: a track left by the 'prince of all modifications', first servant of the inclusive disjunction.) On this basis then, I would suggest that – on his own terms – we must rule out Deleuze's sketch of a specifically *Whiteheadian* chaosmology and conclude that within Whitehead's system the universe remains, in principle, semi-open and partially predictable. Of course, Deleuze is correct to say that *by contrast with the monads* Whiteheadian subject-units are radically open. But the system as a whole remains subject to an 'initial condition', which Deleuze himself consistently demands be excluded.

But what are we to make of Deleuze's own account of how the requisite synthesis of pure potentiality comes about? Is he seriously suggesting that for the 'God of religion' we substitute an equally primordial (and mythic) Divine Schizophrenic, an 'Antichrist', Satan himself? No such supremely individuated Being appears in the system of *Difference and Repetition*; in fact, any form of monotheism is ruled out in principle by the operation referred to above as 'pluralizing Spinozism'. Nonetheless, as I suggested earlier, Deleuze's anti-theism by no means leads us straight to a naturalism, for while it certainly ensures that pure potentiality is not to be identified with God, it nonetheless maintains that '*the energy sweeping through it is divine*. … Hence the sole thing that is divine is the nature of an energy of disjunctions' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, p. 13). But, to put to Deleuze the question we posed to Christian: What precisely is this nature?What is the precise mechanism involved in this 'disjunctive' synthesis? In fact, as will become all too clear, Deleuze's

response to this problem is often no less vague, obscure, at times near-tautologous, than Whitehead's own. Here is how he faces up to it:

> The most important difficulty, however, remains: is it really difference which relates different to different in these intensive [purely potential] systems? … When we speak of communication between heterogeneous [incompossible] systems … does this not imply … an agent which brings about the communication? … what is this agent, this force? Thunderbolts explode between different intensities, but they are preceded by an invisible, imperceptible *dark precursor*, which determines their path in advance but in reverse, as though intagliated …
>
> (1994, p. 119)

I am not sure that it is possible to 'explicate' this impenetrably dark notion of the 'dark precursor'. Suffice it to say, 'it' is that element which functions as the agent of communication between incompossibles, as the immanent operator of disjunctive synthesis. Almost immediately, Deleuze poses the crucial problem for himself: 'The question is to know in any given case *how* the precursor fulfils this role' (1994, p. 119; emphasis added). A few lines later, the semblance of an answer is offered:

> Given two heterogeneous series, two series of differences [incompossible potentials], the precursor plays the part of the differentiator of these differences. In this manner, by virtue of its own power, it puts them into immediate relation to one another it is the in-itself of difference or the 'differently different' – in other words, difference in the second degree, the self-different which relates different to different by itself.
>
> (1994, p. 119)

One might not unreasonably object to this formulation, pointing out that in order to deal with the problem Deleuze has reverted to a tortuous syntax that could fairly be described as Hegelian dialectic 'with one term missing'; in other words, by making his primitive concept of difference do *all* the work, the inevitable result is mere vacuous repetition, empty tautology. It is indeed at this point that Deleuze, self-confessedly, attempts to think something 'contrary to the laws of thought' (1994, p. 227), and thereby risks that lapse into vacuity for which Kant condemned all of metaphysics. But the lines that immediately follow attempt to explain why – at least within the terms of the Deleuzean

chaosmos
itself – this moment of attempting to 'think the unthinkable' is, at the limit, ineliminable:

> Because the path it [the dark precursor] follows is invisible and becomes visible only in reverse, to the extent that it is travelled over and covered by the phenomena it induces within the system [i.e. within an actual world], it has no place other than that from which it is 'missing,' no identity other than that which it lacks: it is precisely the object = x.
>
> (1994, pp. 119–20)

Thus Deleuze presents his speculative, and distinctly Platonic, hypothesis: the visible, actual world is an effect of this invisible 'reversion' of the potential, the infinitely rich sediment it leaves in its track. As the object = x, the (path of the) dark precursor is that virtually *unintelligible* object which corresponds to the thought of Difference 'in itself'. Necessarily unintelligible insofar as the very conditions for the production of novelty (viz. disjunctive syntheses of incompossibles) entail that intensive (potential) differences will always already be cancelled within the novel extensities and qualities in which they are actualized (through the conjunctive syntheses of compossibles; in Whitehead's terms: through a demand for 'balanced complexity' – the integration of incompatibilities into realizable contrasts [cf. Whitehead, 1978, p. 278]). As such, the object =x is inevitably occulted by the forms of representation (categories, concepts and laws) under which the actual, extensive, *contrasting* 'phenomena' are thinkable, and by which their behaviour is explained. Thus, Deleuze concludes, 'it is not surprising that, strictly speaking, difference [in itself] should be 'inexplicable' … For difference, to be explicated [actualized] is to be cancelled' (Deleuze, 1994, p. 228).

Deleuze notes that 'given the variety among systems', the role of the dark precursor must be 'fulfilled by quite diverse determinations' (1994, p. 119). It is possible to discern in this principle not only a pluralizing of Spinozism (or perhaps a modest homage to Hume: though why not a whole team of gods?), but also an implicit answer to Plato when, in the *Sophist*, he raises the question of synthesis/analysis apropos the Forms (or 'genera'):

> Now since we have agreed that the classes or genera also commingle with one another, or do not commingle, in the same way must he not possess some science and proceed by the processes of reason [he]

> who is to show … whether there are *some elements extending through all and holding them together so that they can mingle, and again, when they separate., whether there are other universal causes of separation*.
>
> (Plato, *Sophist* 252D, 253; cited by Whitehead [brackets and emphasis his], 1948, p. 129)

In other words, as Whitehead notes, for Plato 'determinations of incompatibilities and incompatibilities are the key to coherent thought' (1967, p. 147). If Deleuze's thought of the difference-which-relates-different-to-different is not 'coherent', it is because its 'objects' are precisely those elements which run through the incompossible series simultaneously effecting *both* a holding together (synthesis) *and* a holding apart (disjunction); thus it is one and the same 'universal cause' in each case: 'The affirmative synthetic disjunction … consists of the erection of a paradoxical instance, an aleatory point with *two uneven faces*, which traverses the divergent series as divergent and causes them to resonate through their distance and in their distance' (Deleuze, 1990, p. 174; emphasis added). 'Paradoxical instance', 'aleatory point', 'dark precursor': these borderline-intelligible concepts operate as metaphysical primitives in Deleuze's chaosmology, 'savage concepts' resonating with 'things in their wild and free [not yet actualized] state' (Deleuze, 1994, p. xx).

IV

For Deleuze, then, the sole thing that counts is the chaosmological *function* instantiated or exemplified by his various primitives. As such, in the Deleuzean chaosmos, several factors (several features of God and of his various roles, both traditional and Whiteheadian) putatively necessary for the production of novelty are eliminated. Three might be singled out as pertinent. First, no supreme individual or being is required to perform the divine function, only 'individuating acts' (multiple synthesizing agents, lacking an identity, always missing) distributed within an impersonal and pre-individual field of pure potentiality. And ruled out categorically is any infinite Being 'existing for its own sake' (Whitehead, 1978, p. 88), but entrusted with the benign task of 'federating' differences between finite beings and worlds. Second, it is no longer the case that 'multiplicity requires that any unity it may have be established for it by some outside agency' (Henry, 1993, p. 120); it requires only a 'mobile, immanent principle of auto-unification' (Deleuze, 1990, p. 102) through disjunctive synthesis. Third, the chaosmos need not 'include

a *stable actuality* whose mutual implication with the remainder of the things secures an inevitable trend towards order' (Whitehead, 1967, p. 115); rather the 'system, is neither stable nor unstable, but "meta-stable", endowed with a potential energy [the so-called divine energy of disjunctions] wherein the differences between series are distributed' (Deleuze, 1990, p. 103).

Were such consequences to be accepted, a process metaphysics could indeed dispense with Whitehead's God, although not with that singular divine function of 'total affirmation' which Whitehead – the weight of onto-theological tradition bearing down upon him – valiantly attempts to grant him. However, as I have tried to show, while in Deleuze's metaphysics we find something like Whiteheadian pure potentiality reappearing in a radically decentred form, the net result is less a neo-Whiteheadian naturalism than a chaosmic vision of multiple 'little divinities' (diverse determinations of the dark precursor) effecting disjunctive syntheses of differential elements within an immanent space of incompossibility; an unqualified affirmation of the endless, goalless productions of productive Difference. But, it might be asked, is not precisely this Difference-in-itself in essence the 'big divinity', the very *substance*, of which the so-called 'little divinities' are but the expressive *modes*? In other words, has Deleuze really succeeded in pluralizing Spinozism, understood as the necessity of 'making substance turn around the modes', or does the very notion of 'productive Difference in itself' simply reinstate a substantive monism in an appropriately dynamized but still essentially monotheological form? Such are the kind of questions posed by Peter Hallward (2006) in his meticulous reconstruction of Deleuze's philosophy of creation, questions to which in closing I shall offer a brief reply, by way of testing a final link with Whitehead.

For Hallward, Deleuze's metaphysical primitives – the dark precursor, the aleatory point, the object = x, etc. – function as so many synonyms for 'the one and only force that is itself displaced and renewed through each of Deleuze's texts – the unilaterally and immediately determining force of absolute creation as such' (2006, p. 158). Behind the primitives, then, lies the primitive of primitives: 'creativity' understood as a dynamic force which is essentially One. A counter-question might be posed as follows: if, as seems undeniable, Deleuze's chaosmology does indeed effectively divinize creativity or 'Difference in itself', what exactly is the primordial nature of that which has been so divinized – is it a substance or a function, a force or a principle? It is here that Whitehead's own positing of creativity as primitive may be of relevance. For Whitehead, creativity, as one-third component of the 'Category of the Ultimate', is

to be understood as 'the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact. … that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively'. Creativity is thus 'the principle of *novelty*' (Whitehead, 1978, p. 21).

We might then suggest a final positive contrast as follows: if creativity or Difference has been divinized, is what has been divinized best understood as a substantial force (Bergsonian 'vitalism') or as a universal principle (Whiteheadian 'rationalism')? If the former, then 'Difference' names an essentially monistic, dynamic prime mover. If the latter, then 'creativity' simply describes a function which is universal, a function which just happens to operate everywhere and every time with qualitatively different results. On that basis, Difference or creativity *is* nothing more and nothing less than the ('divine') function of disjunctive synthesis, that primitive operation or ultimate principle by which the many, disjunctively, become one, conjunctively, in the production of empirical novelty. On this Whiteheadian modification of Deleuze, which accepts the necessity of postulating a contingent universal of universals as primitive, there can be no actual unity, no 'one', which is not already empirical. Behind this there is no one, only the universal function of disjunctive synthesis, posed as the very principle of novelty.

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11

'O bitches of impossibility!' Programmatic Dysfunction in the Chaosmos of Deleuze and Whitehead

Roland Faber

I begin with a poem. It is by Tristan Tzara and is part of the *Dada Manifesto on Feeble and Bitter Love*:[1]

> this is the song of a dadaist
> who had dada in his heart
> he tore his motor apart
> he had dada in his heart
> the elevator lugged a king
> he was a lumpy frail machine
> he cut his right arm to the bone
> sent it to the pope in rome
> that's why later
> the elevator
> had no more dada in its heart
> eat your chocolate
> wash your brain
> dada
> dada
> gulp some rain

Is Whitehead Dada? you may ask. Is Deleuze Dada? And I will answer: Yes! In a certain sense they are, in that 'functioning' seems to be a very dubious thing; in the sense that the way we organize our thought is politically revealing (AO XIII); in the sense that to subject ourselves to any system in order to gain security or control is a way of suppressing life (N 143).[2] In this sense, the protest against any kind of imperialist occupation of the *ever-flowing multiplicity of Life* may begin with the liberation from the hysteria of seeking function, organization, system, subjection and control (N 32) – that is what dada was all about.

Dada in their hearts

In pursuing this line of thought, I attempt to transverse Deleuze and Whitehead not by comparing 'systems' (PR 3; N 32), but by brushing over some *cracks* in the broken surface of the continuum of thought (LS 155; N 143), the problematic *folds* in the web of ideas, where the *abyss* 'rises to the surface' and integrity 'decomposes' (DR 28). We may find profound resonances in their philosophies by tracing their thought *to the point of impasse*, where the *impossible* comes forth (PR 3) and the *heteron* arises (DR 64), where simple *contrasts* fail (PR 22, 348) and the 'disjoined multiplicity' (PR 21) radiates, where 'Discord' (AI 257) reveals a *resistance* against systematization and control. In short, I look at their body of ideas as *maps of problems* (DR 63) exhibiting *programmatic dysfunction* (N 146).

It is as with Tzara in the *Dada Manifesto*: When we take the 'organ-machines' (AO 9) apart, we find 'dada in their hearts' – as long as we do not sell out to any power that seeks to control the machine from inside or outside (D 129). Its 'heart' (AO 8) is its *unconquerable Life* (E XXXVII) and it reveals itself only in the *dysfunction* of the philosophical machine (E XIII). When we fall in love with the machine *itself*, however, its suggestive wholeness, its pretty surface, its magic, we might already have sold its ecstatic soul (PR 104) – to an instance that functionalizes everything in order to control its organization for its own interests (AO 13).

> he cut his right arm to the bone
> sent it to the pope in rome
> that's why later
> the elevator
> had no more dada in its heart

Accordingly, the following is only a *collage* (DR XXI), 'cutting and cross-cutting' (Ph 16) *slices* (Ph 208) that could be pasted and re-cut indefinitely (TP 250) through the knotted maps of Whitehead's and Deleuze's thought, which as *clouds* (E 170) wander 'dimly in the infinitude of things'.[3]

Be … multiplicities!

Indeed, I think, *Life* names this Dada heart of the philosophies of both Whitehead and Deleuze (PR 7; N 143). When Whitehead's 'art of life' (FR 4; N 118) encounters the 'chaos' of Pandora (PR 72), and Deleuze's 'conception of life [appears] as non-organic power' (E XIII), their philosophies

inherently express a *dys*function that approaches Life as *unconquerable multiplicities in becoming*.[4]

> Be neither a One nor a Many, but multiplicities! [proclaims Deleuze] … Don't arouse the General in yourself! … Make maps, not photographs or drawings. Be the Pink Panther, and let your loves be like the wasp and the orchid, the cat and the baboon.
>
> (TP 25)

Because 'Life refuses to be embalmed alive' (PR 339), there cannot be any 'system' of programmatic 'system failure'. Hence, Life will appear in *dys-structures* like *plateaus*, which cannot be organized by hierarchical stratification, and which do not exhibit 'any orientation toward a culmination point or external end' (TP 22); or in conceptual multiplicities like *interstices* (PR 105), in which in any organization, if at all, Life, the *unabridged multiplicity of becoming* (PR 108), may break through.

The liberation of multiplicities, however, is dangerous (Ph 41). Life will conjure up Foucault's 'wild outside' and Deleuze's *non-philosophical* (Ph 218), the monstrosity (DR 29), in which multiplicities in becoming lurk; Whitehead's 'dim … feelings of derivation' (AI 213) from '[e]ternal anarchy amidst the noise [o]f endless … confusion' (PR 96). Here we *are* in the Dada heart of philosophy, at the '(non)-being' (DR 203), the 'non-sense' (DR 153), the *outside* that 'does not exist outside' (Ph 41), but *insists* from within (LS 34) – disturbing, dysfunctioning (AO 8; AI 259). We might be too weak when Life overwhelms us (LS 151; N 143).

Nevertheless, the search for programmatic dysfunction that liberates multiplicity does not suggest exchanging Kant's rational extinction of metaphysics for Rorty's ironic detachment; rather, it opens up a gap in between in which Bergson's *élan vital* appears (MT 29; Ph 16). Whitehead and Deleuze *affirm* metaphysics, but – in light of power-occupying unifications (PR 343) – as a de*con*structive activity of both the 'critique of abstractions' (SMW 75; N 145) and the 'creation of concepts' (Ph 9; AI 236–7), *depriving* the folds of multi*pli*cities from the monadic One (AO 13; DR 191; AI 169) and *transforming monadic* wholes into *events* of *nomadic* multiplicity (TP 380; Ph 15–16; E XXVIII; DI 252–61; AI 159).

… intermezzo …

A Deleuzean paradigm for *programmatic dysfunction* is the *rhizome*. It is a flat, horizontal multiplicity that can connect indefinitely at every point, and has no hierarchical centre of control. As a philosophical and political

metaphor, it is set up to oppose the model of 'the tree', which symbolizes hierarchical structures, strongly ordered stratification and linear, unilateral or top-down vertical thinking (TP 3–25).

Against the 'illusion of transcendence' (Ph 49) of higher reason, a controlling power, a determining God or a unifying subject, a rhizome shows the world to be an interrelated network of bifurcating series of events, of constantly moving multiplicities, which cannot be analysed in systems in which the 'movement of the infinite is stopped' (Ph 47) to represent truth, reason or ground. In the rhizomatic paradigm, the notion of a unified 'World' vanishes and a living assemblage of heterogeneous connections appears (Ph 42). This ever-changing web of relations (PR 7) shifts the quest for 'reality' to *the creative space in between* all constructions (PR 105; TP 380).

> Form rhizomes and not roots, never plant! … A rhizome doesn't begin and doesn't end, but is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, *intermezzo*.
>
> (TP 25)

This is what Deleuze saw in Whitehead: becoming, the *intermezzo*, the event, a creative space of dysfunction (DR 284–5; TF 81; E 2; N 160). In a creative world, unification is always the fold of multi*pli*cation (PR 21), where 'every fold originates from a fold, *plica ex plica*' (TF 13), infinitely 'folding, unfolding, refolding' (TF 137). 'We begin with the world as if with a series of … events: it is a *pure emission of singularities*' (TF 60; AI 144–5) – multiplication, difference (N 146, 154).[5]

Reading Whitehead with Deleuze, there is, indeed, no unification that is not a *finite* force and a *death* (PR 80), that *must* lead to, and always *is*, differenciation (PR 21, 25; DR 207) in and beyond itself (PR 26). In the web of rhizomes, there is always a *rivalry among multiplicities* (PR 244), never forming a structure we might wish to call 'reality', but always leading to a 'disorder' that de/constructs cosmos (PR 91). The only *form* of unification is *process* (SMW 179). As a consequence, there is no metaphysical or political construction that is not part of, and will not be surpassed by, evermore vast *dysfunctional difference* in becoming (PR 7; DR 64).

Warps, maps

For Whitehead, there is no 'perfected metaphysics', there is only *dysfunctional metaphysics* (MT 173; FR 37–8), which, protesting 'The Dogmatic

Fallacy' (AI 144–5; DR 131), ever diverges into a 'discordance of competing philosophical systems' (AI 144), manifesting the movement of heterogeneous multiplicities (TP 250), which make us think of philosophy as a 'society of "friends", of the community of free citizens as rivals' (Ph 9) hich *in their rivalry* continuously produce concepts (Ph 8). Against systematic closure, rival 'conceptual personae' (Ph 61) populate the maps of their thought in a 'transversal movement that sweeps one way and the other, a stream without beginning or end, which undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle' (TP 25).[6]

Permanently writing into, and rewriting, the traditional body of philosophical texts 'from Plato to Bergson' (Ph 16; DR XXI; PR 39), Whitehead and Deleuze engage in de/constructive, creative *resistance* against a power of unification that really disposes for a manipulation of the powerful (N 151; AI 228). Their chaosmic river is filled with conceptual *nomads* in a *monadic* society, standing 'in opposition against the law or the *polis*' (TP 380) and its *logos* (TP 369–70) – as non-sense, liberated from function, organization, structure and eternal power (DR 153).

'Make maps, not photographs or drawings' (TP 25): Plato vs. Newton, Descartes vs. Foucault, Spinoza vs. Leibniz, Nietzsche vs. Hegel, Hume vs. Kant – Whitehead's and Deleuze's surprisingly similar negotiations with personae of the philosophical tradition reveal the warped maps with their meandering rivers within which they are paddling. Immanence vs. transcendence, substance vs. event, rhizome vs. tree, potentiality vs. possibility, *fundamentum* vs. *khora*, virtuality vs. pre/formation, subject vs. superject – conceptual rivalry everywhere. We hear the humming through their philosophical creatures like bees around their hives and as hives out in the open, '*heterogeneous components traversed by a point of absolute survey at infinite speed*' (Ph 21; PR 25: CatExpl XXII).

At certain points, these folds and interstices and dysfunctions appear *in the same* concepts, expressing nothing less than the *impossible*, the in*com*possible (TF 60) heterogeneous rivalry as *hecceity* (TP 261; N 141): creativity, the pro/found, the virtual, occasion, event, concept, rhizome, nomad, singularity, immanence – they all are concepts *of* rivalry, *per se* conceptual hive-monsters, operating as *chaotic nuclei of dysfunction*, manifesting *non-sense* – following *Alice in Wonderland* (LS 1, E 21–3) rather than the *Principia Mathematica*.

Food, robbery …

'Life lurks in the interstices' (PR 105), says Whitehead, where we encounter the *dysfunctional liberation from structure* (PR 339, FR 5).

Contrary to the obvious – the tendency for 'rationalization' (PR XII; MT 174) – *Life* for Whitehead does *not* appear within the hierarchies of the organization of organisms, but at their edges (FR 4). 'Life is a bid for freedom', not captured by 'permanent characteristics', but set free by 'originality' (PR 104). It transcends Whitehead's 'organisms' (PR 18) and manifests precisely at the point where these organisms fail to connect functionally correctly: at the *interstices* of functional unifications – where they *dys*function and become *intermezzo*; where unconquerable multiplicity appears; where the Fold explodes; where the Chaos lurks (PR 72).

For Deleuze this is 'the explosive internal force that life carries within itself' (CDB 93), and for Whitehead the 'happenings wandering in "empty" space amid the interstices' (PR 339) express the 'nature of life' as beyond 'some society of occasions' with its 'defining characteristic'. Life is 'not social', devoid of form, 'entirely living' (PR 106–7). In *ecstasy*, Life disturbs or even destroys structures and overturns 'organisms' (PR 106); the 'depth of originality … spell[s] disaster' (PR 106). For Whitehead, Life is, and happens as, an *ecstatic event*:

> It toils not, neither does it spin. It receives from the past; it lives in the present. It is shaken by its intensities of … feeling, adversion or aversion … Its sole use … is its vivid originality: it is the organ of novelty.
>
> (PR 339)

This is the Life of *intensities* (DR 139; TP 479).[7] Events of Life move as *forces* of self-creativity in rivalry, in and as *dysfunctional nexûs* in which structures must be seen to be embedded, transformed and destroyed as 'living things let [them as] their food swim in them' (FR 7); their 'interplay takes the form of robbery' (PR 105). The *dysfunctional intermezzo* of intensities is *not* pre-stabilized harmony (AI 133), but, indeed, a monstrous connex in which 'destruction' and 'dissolution' take place; in which the 'structure is breaking down' (PR 106), and all structures 'which it destroys are its food' (PR 105). The incompossible, divergent multiplicities of Life only materialize in hives of rovers, in piracy boarding every ship on the high sea for food. Infinite Life manifests monsters, like the *Enneamorphos* of the Egyptian papyri.

With Nietzsche, for Deleuze *all* events of Life are *forces*, self-activating virtues/potentials that, in their 'will to power', map a dysfunctional space of becoming singularities in rivalry (NPd 88, 129; DR 258–9; DI 117–27). The same is true for Whitehead: He accepts the Platonic hint that 'being is

simply power' (AI 120; PR 58) as basic for self-creative occasions and their 'struggle' of diversity in their nexus-fields (AI 198; TF 78). Since there is no vertical justification of true order from 'outside' (PR 4), no transcendent Law (AI 121) or imposing *Logos* (DR 62; Pd 85), for both the non-vertical maps of these dysfunctional hives have *only one* master – the *Chaos* from which there is no salvation. '[A]part from some notion of imposed Law', says Whitehead, 'the doctrine of immanence provides absolutely no reason why the universe should not be steadily relapsing into lawless chaos' (AI 115).

… Chaos, or nearby …

Famously introducing Whitehead in the midst of his Leibniz book *The Fold*, Deleuze characterizes his world as 'Chaosmos', a 'motley world' of 'bifurcations, divergences, incompossibilities, and discord', where Life fluctuates in 'prehensive units' (TF 81), events that swim in, and create, a 'chaotic world [of] divergent series [that] are endlessly tracing bifurcating paths' (TR 81). 'Chaos' here is a conscious conceptual expression of profound programmatic dysfunction in the midst of their philosophical conceptions, manifesting Life at their interstices; creating events as *intermezzo* in virtual fluctuation. Chaos might be the *sophia* of which we are ever-ignorant com/partners and inter/players, *mezzo* figures of cruelty and love; the '*philia*' for which she only appears in *rivalry* (Ph 9).

Chaos, as infinitely encompassing all incompossibilities to the infinite (Ph 42) by enfolding everything (DR 124), *threatens* as 'undifferentiated abyss or ocean of dissemblance' (Ph 207); be it as the abyss of creativity, rhizomatic fluctuation and freedom, *or* as the abyss of dissolution, food and robbery (PR 105). Life only appears in this *interstitial space*, 'along the borders of [this] chaos' (PR 111), where all structures are rhizomatically connected and broken, where they become *maps* (E 63; N 33) with *cracks* (N 143).[8]

Fluctuating multiplicity can only proliferate when Chaos is not feared, but when we rigorously remain its truthful friends, trusting the abyss. Both Deleuze and Whitehead push us right into the infinite pool of Chaos to let us know that we can swim, and we never have to leave this sea, hopping 'from island to island ' (Ph 105), if only we lose the anxiety of encountering groundless depth, because depth and surface coincide (LS 7, 37, 102; DI 281–3). In which case, how can we drown?

For Deleuze, to live within Chaos we must *transform* its abyss of 'infinite speed of birth and disappearance' (Ph 118), with which it 'undoes every consistency' (Ph 42), into 'consistency without losing infinity' (Ph

42; TF 76). Where the 'great work which contains all the complicate series … at once' (DR 123) is sieved into 'plains of consistency' (TP 9), Chaos radiates as 'unlimited All-One, an "Omnitudo" that includes all' (Ph 35). In a corresponding move, Whitehead reviews the 'lawless chaos' (AI 115) as pure relatedness, 'bare of all forms' (AI 295), expressed by the Platonic *khora*, the 'Space' and 'Receptacle' of existence, the 'natural matrix of all things', and 'medium of intercommunication' (AI 134), an empty *nexus de*fined only by 'mutual immanence' (AI 168; PR 72).[9]

Formless Chaos allows for an *unoccupied multiplicity of intensities* (AI 295; TP 479). Where the *khora*, the All-One, the rhizomatic space of the desert (TP 382; N 146) become its icon, its 'wholeness' becomes a *moving, anarchic openness*, *subversive* of structural totality (C I, 25; FR 33). Because it is devoid of structure, order, function and form, nothing transcends the matrix. Because there is no imposing, preformed *Logos* (Pd 85), it is the liberation of nomadic fluctuation, rhizomatic *nexūs* and interstitial inter-being, from monadic imposition (TF 137). Chaotic Life is free from *transcendent unifications* that paralyse flux for power, truth or certainty (N 146). 'The choice is between transcendence and chaos' (Ph 51).

… without exit: immanence

Since the flux of multiplicities of chaosmic *fluvia* (TF 79) on shifting plains of, or slices though, chaotic infinities (Ph 44–9), is infinitely *pro/found* in itself (DR 229), for Deleuze 'everything bathes in' (DR 243) *inexplicable groundlessness* (Ph 67) of becoming and perishing, love and war, the *tehom* (Gen 1:2), the 'open sea' (Ph 208), the 'unlimited All-One' (Ph 35). Whitehead again, in defying Descartes' *fundamentum inconcussum*, appropriates Plato's theory of chaos as *thoroughgoing becoming*: We can neither transcend it by appealing to eternal Being, nor are we allowed to delegate it to an initial creation by the fiat of a creator. What remains is only the 'evolutionary doctrine' that the origin of every structure is the 'aboriginal chaos' (PR 95), which again does not mythologize a 'primal state' of matter, but expresses the refusal to refer to any foundation of becoming in non-becoming. Chaos is *becoming without exit*. It is *pure immanence* (PR 4; TP 266).

Nothing is *beyond* immanence, thinks Whitehead, not even God (PR 93).[10] And with his 'insistence on immanence' (RM 71), a revolt against transcendence began, which directly resurfaced in Deleuze's attack on transcendence as *the 'original sin' of philosophy* – the desire for identity, structure, order, certainty under the rule of the delusional *Logos* and transcendent One (Ph 49). Appropriating Spinoza's *natura naturans*,

both Whitehead (SMW 124; PR 93) and Deleuze (TP 154; SP 14; B 93) reside in the pro/found, foundationless immanence of becoming that empowers an infinite wealth of unconquerable singularities. Now, 'Being is univocal' (DR 35)![11] Devoid of transcendent occupation, it 'speaks with one voice', as 'one underlying activity' (SMW 123), distributed among all actualities in infinite differentiation of multiplicity (DR 36; LS 102; PR 7).

'Immanence' shines in Whitehead's 'creativity' and Deleuze's 'difference'. 'Creativity', when it finally appears de/constructed of any substantial remaining, means 'an ultimate which is [only] actual in virtue of its accidents' (PR 7), signifying *nothing but* the power of transient *self*-creativity of actual events (PR 21).[12] 'Difference' again replaces any reference to 'identity' and 'ground' as representing subjective, monadic and transcendent unification (DR XIX), now meaning *nothing but* 'universal *ungrounding*' (DR 67), distributed among multiplicities of nomadic singularities in rhizomatic heterogeneity (DR 1; TP 7–8, 166).

Resonating with Derrida's *différance*, Deleuze's and Whitehead's concepts for pure immanence – Life, univocity, activity, creativity, difference, *Omnitudo*, chaos, *khora*, receptacle, virtuality – are *but* paradoxes (LS 16) that *extinguish* themselves when 'substantialized' as to represent the 'identity' of *ultimate reality*. Immanence always *withdraws* for multiplicities in becoming, interstitially circumventing unification by the significant *One*. Because it cannot be hierarchically reconstructed, but only rhizomatically traced (TF 35), it clears a *chaotic, rhizomatic, interstitial space* for the unconquered multiplicity of becoming (N 146), 'a moving desert that [multiplicities of events] … come to populate' (Ph 41).

… so protest the One!

Deleuze's flux of immanence (TP 25) does not 'describe' metaphysical reality, but *liberates* multiplicities from 'imperial or barbarian transcendence' (E 136). 'Be neither a One nor a Many, but multiplicities' (TP 25)! This is a profoundly *subversive* move: 'rhizomatics, stratoanalysis, schizoanalysis, nomadology, micropolitics, the pragmatic, the science of multiplicities' (TP 43) – they all want 'to free life from what imprisons it' (N 143) – monadic, monistic, monotheistic, mono-logical or logocentric powers (TF 73). There is only the desert of infinite shades, ever-multiplying maps of 'becomings that can't be controlled' (N 152) by substantialized, rationalized, transcendent identifications.

Whitehead, at first glace, seems to offer a more 'rationalist', impartial cosmological view (PR 3). On the other hand, his *insistence* on

immanence (RM 71), and his disgust at transcendence as sublimely barbarian and oppressive (AI 169) resonates with Deleuze's First Commandment of *pure immanence* (Ph 49). Hence, Whitehead's peak counter-concept of 'immanent creativity' is laden with the gesture of liberation: against the *One*, the 'external Creator, eliciting … final togetherness out of nothing' (AI 236). There is

> *nothing* in the Universe other than instances of this passage and components of these instances. … Then the word Creativity … if guarded by the phrases Immanent Creativity, or Self-Creativity … avoids the implication of a transcendent Creator.
>
> (AI 236)

Nothing in the Universe transcends Self-Creativity![13] All speaks with one voice; multiplicities of singular folds everywhere! The protest against God, the *One*, is directed against the occupation of multiplicities by generality, abstraction, character, gestalt, reason or power. 'Don't arouse the General in yourself! … Be the Pink Panther …' (TP 25). Isn't this Whitehead's ever-revolutionary war-cry against the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness (SMW 51, 58)? If we lose the 'one voice' (DR 35), if we grant 'eminent reality' (PR 342) to empower it with 'metaphysical compliments' (SMW 179), then we initiate 'processes of subjectification' (N 151), *abstractions* in the name of knowledge, power, identity, security or control. We lose the Pink Panther! To protest against the *One* is to protest against oppressive abstractions that take Life out of the Chaos and impose the *Logos* (N 145–6; AI 130).

Deleuze's revolt against monadism is *directed at a dysfunctional liberation of multiplicity*: The *One*, says Deleuze, 'is merely identical. The … identical always moves toward the absence of difference' (DR 65). Conversely, 'monadology becomes a nomadology' where 'the compossible and convergent world [of] … the monadic subject … [is] torn apart and kept open through the divergent series and incompossible ensembles [of] … the nomadic subject' (E XXVIII–IX). There is 'nothing transcendent, no Unity, subject … Reason; there are only processes' (N 145).

From this point, we might read Whitehead's critique of monotheism as the apex of his negotiations with the philosophical tradition (PR 144–57), now suddenly appearing as an attempt to *dysfunctionalize* God (SMW 179) as the *One* from the *ultimate foundation* in philosophy (PR 343; AI 133). Because this *initiated* the 'bifurcation of nature' (CN 26) in the first place, and, in seeking identity, *legitimized* a *substantialized subject* (PR 157), 'the history of modern philosophy is a story of attempts to

evade the inflexible consequences' (PR 157). Liberated, however, from this tyranny of the *One* (PR 7) – be it God or the subject – we awake in a 'pluralistic universe' (PR 79), in the midst of 'nomadic processes of liberation' (N 153).[14]

Oh, and Bergson …

Nothing transcends Self-Creativity! For Deleuze, with Whitehead, seeking the 'conditions … for a … production of novelty, that is, of creation' (TF 79), philosophy 'is in its nature creative … because it's always creating new concepts' (N 136). It is a *hive-cloud of the creation of concepts* (Ph 8; N 147) – not 'describing' the World, but producing 'imaginative constructions' (PR 5) of/for multiplicities in becoming. Since c*reating concepts is creating events* (Ph 144), they do not indicate the *Logos* (PR 46), but *becoming images of becomings*; 'maps of intensity', ever folding by fortune, desire and rival powers (Ph 32); 'affective constellations' (E 64) of pre-individual singularities without ontological identity (DR XIX), ever moving about, distancing and overlapping in what they hold together at 'infinite speed' (Ph 21, 32; DI 22–31).

Bergson is an ignition: With his *élan vital* – itself pregnant with the creative flux of 'coexistent multiplicities' (D 15; TP 483) – *Life* is in the 'heart' of the philosophies of creativity and difference of Whitehead and Deleuze – from *Concept of Nature* (CN 54; TF 79) (1920) and 'La conception de la différence chez Bergson' (1956) on. Their 'vitalism' (SMW 79; N 143), however, does not erect the *One* again, but indicates immanence, Chaos, *self-actualizing difference* (CDB 93; PR 25), becoming-multiplicity and 'the becoming itself' as 'real' (TP 238: PR 209). Their concepts indicating Life – Chaos, Receptacle, Immanence, Virtuality, *Omnitudo*, Creativity, Difference – are *simulacra* (DR 126) that gain fire as they 'revolve around the different' (DR 67). *Dysfunctioning*, they *liberate multiplicities* from the One, the original, identity, structure, control; they stir up the 'difference in itself from which flows … dissimilitude' (DR 128); they *are* multiplicities of multiplicities.[15]

Here we are directed to Deleuze's *transcendental empiricism* (DR 147): that the condition of conceptualization is the *actual becoming-multiplicities itself* in which the impossible happens.[16] 'O bitches of impossibility!' (DR148) shocking our concepts, which are based only on *dysfunctioning images* of the *pre-conceptual difference* (DR 28–69); of the non-philosophical, insisting (Ph 41). Whitehead resonates with his *critique of pure feeling* (PR 113) for which conceptualization is always abstraction in the *self-creative* stream of becoming (PR 18;

N 145–6), which rises into concepts only by *dysfunctioning feelings of disjoint multiplicities in becoming* (PR 21, 25; DR 194).

Whitehead's Creativity (PR 20–2) and Deleuze's Difference *of* itself (DR 34), which map becoming-multiplicities, reveal philosophy to be *infected* by the pre-conceptual monster. This is anti-rationalism, but it is not what Whitehead defines as Bergsonian 'anti-intellectualism' for which 'intellect is intrinsically tied to erroneous fictions' (AI 223). Contrarily, philosophy is '*creative* fiction', 'science fiction', a 'detective novel' (DR XX), 'poetry' (MT 174), 'fabulation' (E XLV) – productive of dysfunctional constructions that 'trace out' (N 145) multiplicity (TF 81; N 137; PR 4–6). Its *phantasms* (DR 127) come from neither scepticism nor mysticism; and they are *not* – as in Derrida – 'negative theology'. On the contrary, they are *pure affirmation* of the becoming-Ocean (DR 304), 'a becoming-mad, or a becoming unlimited … a becoming subversive' (LS 258), a becoming impossible (LS 259–60).

… incompossible … insisting

'Creative construction' of infinite spaces of *constellations* of singularities (LS 103) or *assemblages* of multiplicities (MT 3) is *dysfunctioning* when we are forced to realize the *impossibility* of appropriation, or better, it is an *appropriation to the impossible*. The impossible is unthinkable, and for Deleuze, thinking the unthinkable, the impossible, is philosophy. '[E]verything begins with misosophy', 'the destruction of an image of thought' (DR 139) by which philosophy looks into the impossible in which *becoming insists* (LS 34).

When for Whitehead the '*function of Reason is to promote the art of life*' (FR 4), reason is a *function* of Life as self-functioning self-creativity (PR 25) which, in turn, is *essentially dys*functional to reason (MT 109). In light of this becoming-multiplicity 'for its own sake' (MT 109), 'philosophy may not neglect the [impossible] multifariousness of the world – the fairies dance, and Christ is nailed to the cross' (PR 338). In philosophy, Life appears as dysfunction raising the impossible (TP 150).

Whitehead and Deleuze exercise this *multifariousness* by appropriating conceptual personae like Socrates or Giordano Bruno, who became 'martyrs' of 'free imaginative speculation' (SMW 1; AI 51). Bruno's 'execution … was an unconscious symbol' of the 'distrust' (SMW 1) for 'free speculation' (AI 51) that in its dysfunctioning is 'subversive of the communal life' (AI 54; SP 4), because it reflects the impossible (PR 45) or affirms the heterogenic (DR 64). But with dysfunctional concepts like Bruno's *complication* (DR 123; LS 260), philosophy trusts the

in*com*possible that *insists* (Ph 218; DR 280) – on indefinite heterogeneous series (LS 160), or 'indefinite progression' of the *dys-harmonic* 'contrasts of contrasts' (PR 22; AI 259).

Indeed, both Whitehead and Deleuze swim in heterogeneous series of concepts/events/contrasts/singularities (LS 103): Subject/superject, occasion/nexus, private/public, immediacy/immortality, becoming/being, immanent and transcendent creativity; or smooth and metric spaces, difference/identity virtual/possible; or *Aion/Chronos* (LS 62; PR 338), *Spatium/Extensio* (LS 106 ;PR 69), *Logos*/Chaos – all naming the impossible (LS 102-3). We also find these rare concepts *of incompossibilities*, filled with 'duality in the contrast between unity and multiplicity' (AI 190; TP 20–1), like *event*, impossible, but actual (PR 85; Ph 156); *body without organs*, decomposing the organic, but living from it (TP 150; PR 106); *satisfaction*, fulfilment and loss (PR 26; TF 78; TP 154); or the *Fold*, *implication* and *explication* at the same time (DR 123; PR 214–15). They all are *phantasms* of becoming-unlimited (DR 128; LS 258), wherein all 'coincide[s] … like a … unique "total" moment, simultaneously a moment of evanescence and production of difference' (DR 42) of the ever-*becoming* hive-cloud of the Chaosmos (AI 263–4).[17]

Most paradoxically, however, despite Deleuze's endorsement of Nietzsche's Death of God, which has opened the free horizon of the infinite Ocean (DR 58), he *affirms* Whitehead's concept of God as *the emblem of the incompossible*: 'God desists from being a Being who compares worlds and chooses the richest compossible … becom[ing] … a process that at once affirms incompossibilities and passes through them' (TF 81). For Whitehead, the 'concept of "God" is' indeed, 'the way in which we understand this incredible fact – that what cannot be, yet is' (PR 350). With this 'God', who does not name the *One*, but multiplicity; not the compossible (LS 259), but the incompossible – becoming-multiplicity insists.

… orgiastic bodies …

In Whitehead's philosophy the *basic incompossibility* of becoming-multiplicity is produced by divergent series: First, by the *generality* inherent in his metaphysical interpretation of every experience, which then is a mere instantiation of a general scheme (PR 3); and second, by the *singularity* of becomings for which these metaphysical rationalizations are always mere abstractions (PR 20, 230; SMW 30, 248). Deleuze corresponds with the series of *individuals* as subject to a *general law*, and

that of 'non-exchangeable and non-substitutable singularities' (DR 1; N 146), of themselves being *universal* (DR 70–128).[18]

Here is a point of bifurcation in Whitehead's and Deleuze's philosophies: While the first series defines metaphysics as *system* (PR 3), in which its 'logic of unity' still follows the One and its formative *Logos* (AI 135, 203), the second series leads directly to Deleuze's de/constructive definition of philosophy as the 'logic of multiplicities' (N 147) with its *rhizomatic constellations* on multiple *planes of immanence* within Chaos (Ph 35–60; AI 158). While Whitehead is well known for the first series – his *organic* philosophy (PR 18) – we can, however, trace the 'logic of multiplicities' in his multiple *phantasms of Life that speak of the becoming-multiplicities*. In Deleuze's eyes, here philosophy becomes *orgiastic* (DR 42).[19]

Deleuze's *phantasm* for philosophy-becoming-orgiastic is the 'Body without Organs' (TP 149–66) in which every organization is de/ constructed as rhizomatic, spontaneous and nomadic Life (B 38; AO 8), 'full of gaiety, ecstasy, and dance' (TP 150). *Organic* structures extinguish singularities, leaving only parts of general systems, which 'exist' only by participating within a common form (PR 34) or the judgement of God (TP 158). Thereby, a *highest* principle of identity (LS 78) is enthroned, misconceived as creator of the multiplicity (AI 212; AO 13), the *One* that 'uproots it from its immanence and makes it an organism, a signification, a subject' (TP 159). So, we lose our

> 'body without organs' that God has stolen from us in order to palm off an organized body without which his judgment could not be exercised. The body without organs [however] is an effective, intensive, anarchist body that consists solely of poles, zones, thresholds, and gradients.
>
> (E 131)

Recovering the *orgiastic* body is for Deleuze the 'greatest effort of philosophy' (DR 262), because 'it discovers the infinite in itself', that is, 'it discovers in itself the limits of the organized; tumult, restlessness and passion underneath apparent calm. It rediscovers monstrosity' (DR 42). Deleuze expresses this 'becoming unlimited' (LS 258) by *orgiastic correspondences* (DR 64) like Cosmos = Chaos (DR 123, 299), Pluralism = Monism (TP 20), or *Omnitudo* = the BwO (TP 157–8) – which are *not* organic 'equations' of 'indifferent oneness' and 'identity' (DR 66). While the *organic* 'moves toward the absence of difference' (DR 65), *orgiastic* bodies, depriving of the One and of forms of sameness

or resemblance, are liberated to *dissimilarity* granting heterogeneity of speed, potentiality, and intensity (TP 260).[20]

In Whitehead, the *orgiastic* body appears in his bold concept of the 'entirely living nexus' (PR 103–7), which is a chaotic overflow of organic structures (PR 104; N 143), a '*de*-forming' de/construction of organisms by Life (PR 339; AI 295), thereby 'answer[ing] to the notion of "chaos"' (PR 72). The Category of the Ultimate (PR 21–2) implicates/explicates *orgiastic series of correspondences*: Creativity = the universals of universals = matter (PR 31) = pure activity; or activity = receptivity = unification = multiplication; or system = event (PR 36) = process = the form of the unity of the Universe (AI 179). Finally, Whitehead in his articles from 1941 makes a radical move: He de/constructs *all* of his *organic* categories – creativity, forms, God – rendering 'becoming unlimited' (LS 258), and producing an *orgiastic* body by 'cutting and cross-cutting' (Ph 16) infinity and finitude as unfolding/refolding *infinite multiplicity* – the becoming-Universe (MG 105ff; Imm. 79ff), *one* orgiastic BwO, with God as immanent abstraction (Imm. 80)![21]

Desiring … Life …

'The BwO is desire' (TP 165) – desiring multiplicity, heterogeneity, intensity, rather than identity, homogeneity or persistence, because the 'art of persistence is to be dead' (FR 4).[22] The BwO 'is the model of Life itself, a powerful non-organic and intensive vitality that traverses the organism; by contrast, the organism, with its forms and functions, is not life, but rather that which imprisons life.' (E XXXVII). The 'BwO is the *field of consistency* of desire, the *plane of consistency* specific to desire (with desire defined as a process of production without reference to an exterior agency . . .)' (TP 154). As *Omnitudo*, the BwO is *immanent* desire without a *Logos*, without external law of 'pure form' (E 32) 'imposed by Divine decree' (AI 131).[23]

But the BwO is *impossible*! 'You can never reach the Body without Organs … it is a limit' (TP 150). Everyone, who desires to 'realize' the BwO, will die! If we become obsessed with the BwO, it will change into a 'full body without organs', which 'desires death' (AO 8). When we surrender to it and 'inscribe' us in it (AO 13), it loses its immanence and becomes 'Numen' (AO 13). While the BwO is Life as long as it is 'right there where it is produced' (AO 8) *with* organisms, as Death it *transubstantiates* into 'original nothingness' or 'a lost totality' (AO 8), transcendence, fullness, *prima causa*, the One, a God (TF 73).

For Deleuze, the mechanism of 'inscription' is a 'transformation of energy' (AO 13) by which that which is 'unproductive' is given the productive energy from the becomings and is revered *as if* it was the *productive origin* of the becomings. They surrender their creativity and mutate into creatures of a creator! The *transcendent* BwO becomes '*Omnitudo realitatis*, from which all secondary realities are derived by a process of division. Hence the sole thing that is divine is the nature of an energy of disjunction'. Everything now is created by an act of *self*-division of God (AO 13).

This self-differentiating God, however, is not very far from Deleuze's own affirmative reference to Duns Scotus, Bruno, Spinoza and Bergson, appropriating their pantheistic language – univocity, complication, field of immanence, difference in itself. It reflects his own vitalism (CDB 93; DR 123; LS 28, 260; N 143). So, let me end with *my* 'Memories of a theologian' (TP 252–3).[24]

Memories of a theologian

Deleuze affirms Whitehead's God. Why? Because like the BwO, *this* God is *impossible*, the limit! In resisting to establish God as a *full* BwO, Whitehead's God 'becomes Process' itself (TF 81). This God *is* a BwO; but because 'absolute immanence is in [only] itself' (IMMd 30) God is God's *own* BwO, never that of the world (AI 136)! For Whitehead, not God, but *Creativity* is the BwO of the World *and* God – relentlessly transforming Chaos into an All-One that is Life in its 'heart' (PR 244, 348; E XLI).

For Godself (PR 105), however, God is the BwO of the infinite, non-organic becoming-multiplicity of the World: a *chaotic wealth of desires* without *Logos* (PR 31; 348) *and* the *chaotic wealth of the dead* (PR 345), de/constructing both of them into God's own 'entirely living nexus' (PR 346), a becoming-multiplicity of singularities – a BwO as *Peace* (AI 285). Correspondingly, Whiteheads concept of God progressively dissolves into a *rhizomatic multiplicity of incompossibilities*: a Supreme Adventure, the Universe as One, the Great Fact, the Receptacle, Final Beauty, the Harmony of Harmonies, Peace, Eros (AI 295–6). His concept of God becomes a *hive-cloud, naming the Im-possible, the Dys-possible, the Dys-functioning*. But why *creating God* (PR 348) when desiring Life? Because Whitehead believes in the *Impossible* as the *condition* for becoming-multiplicities (PR 350). When he proposes 'Eros [to be] include[ed] … in the concept of the Adventures in the Universe as One' (AI 295), this is because Eros 'is the living urge towards all possibilities' (AI 295), towards Chaos (TF 77). However, when the 'immanence of God gives reason for the belief

that pure chaos is intrinsically impossible' (PR 111), God-talk is about the *immanent desire* for 'the evocation of intensities' from the ever new 'coordination of chaos' (PR 112) aiming at immanent 'depth of satisfaction' (PR 105; TP 154). Then 'God' is a *phantasm* that refers to the event of *infinite dissimilitude* (DR 128), the *infinite limit* (LS 258), the *dys-possible* BwO of 'non-human life' (TP 150; N 143), the 'unique 'total' moment, simultaneously a moment of evanescence and production of difference' (DR 42; PR 350) – the *dys*-event of *in/difference*.[25]

If, in this sense, 'philosophy is mystical', as Whitehead thinks (MT 174), God means the *dys*-possible 'mystery of a formless, nonhuman life' (E 77; PR 351), a 'satisfaction deeper than joy and sorrow' (AI 172) that 'never really is' (PR 85; PR 27–8: CatOblg IX; TF 79), a *dys*-satisfaction that always *insists* 'in difference' (PR 350-1), empowering *dys*-harmony, the Adventure (AI 295-6) – a 'polyphony of polyphonies' (TF 82; PR 105).

Notes

1. Cf. T. Tara, *Seven Dada Manifestos and Lampisteries* (London: Calder, 1981).
2. I will quote Deleuze's and Whitehead's works with abbreviations listed below. If a direct quotation has two references or more, the first refers to the place quoted, the second and third related texts refer to similar texts in the works of the same or, more often, the other philosopher.
3. This is from a letter of Whitehead's currently in Harvard's Houghton Library: MS Am 1850.
4. Cf. C. Keller and A. Daniell (eds), *Difference and Process. Between Cosmological and Poststructuralist Postmodernism* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002).
5. Cf. A. Badiou, 'Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*', in C. V. Boundas and D. Olkowski (eds), *Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 51–69.
6. For the more 'classical' view of Whitehead, see E. Kraus, *The Metaphysics of Experience: A Companion to Whitehead's* Process and Reality (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998).
7. See D. W. Smith, 'Deleuze's Theory of Sensation. Overcoming the Kantian Duality', in P. Patton (ed.), *Deleuze: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 30–1.
8. Cf. C. Keller, *Face of the Deep: A Theology of the Becoming* (New York: Routledge, 2003).
9. See J. Derrida, 'Chora', in: J. Kipnis (ed.), *Choral Works: A Collaboration Between Peter Eisenman and Jacques Derrida* (New York: np, 1993).
10. See J. Bradley, 'Transcendentalism and Speculative Realism in Whitehead', in *Process Studies* 23(3) (1994): 155–91.
11. See T. May, 'Difference and Unity in Gilles Deleuze', in C. V. Boundas and D. Olkowski (eds), *Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy* (New York: Routlege, 1994), pp. 38–9.

12. See W. Garland, 'The Ultimacy of Creativity', in L. Ford and G. L. Kline (eds), *Explorations in Whitehead's Philosophy* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1983), pp. 212–38.
13. See R. Faber, 'De-Ontologizing God: Levinas, Deleuze and Whitehead', in C. Keller and A. Daniell (eds), *Difference and Process. Between Cosmological and Poststructuralist Postmodernism* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002), pp. 209–34.
14. See R. Faber, ' "The Infinite Movement of Evanescence" – The Pythagorean Puzzle in Plato, Deleuze, and Whitehead', in *American Journal of Theology and Philosophy* 21(1) (2000): 171–99.
15. See M. Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (Minnesota: Minnesota University Press, 1995).
16. See B. Baugh, 'Deleuze und der Empirismus', in: F. Balke and J. Vogl (eds), *Gilles Deleuze – Fluchtlinien der Philosophie* (München: np, 1996), pp. 34–54.
17. See R. Bogue, *Deleuze and Guattari* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 62–3.
18. See R. Faber, 'Whitehead at Infinite Speed: Deconstructing System as Event', in C. Helmer, M. Suchocki, and J. Quiring (eds)., *Schleiermacher and Whitehead: Open Systems in Dialogue* (Berlin: de Gruyter 2004), pp. 39–72.
19. See A. Badiou, *Deleuze: Clamor od Being* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 9–18.
20. R. Bogue, 'The Betrayal of God', in: M. Bryden (ed.), *Deleuze and Religion* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 9–29.
21. See R. Faber, *Prozeßtheologie. Zu ihrer Würdigung und kritischen Erneuerung* (Mainz: Grünewald, nd).
22. See St. Best and D. Keller, *Postnodern Theory: Critical Interrogations* (New York: Guilford Press, 1991), pp. 85–104.
23. See T. Lorain, *Irigaray & Deleuze: Experiments in Visceral Philosophy* (New York: Cornell Univesity Press, 1999).
24. See R. Faber, *Gott als Poet der Welt: Anliegen und Perspektiven der Prozesstheologie*, second edition (Darmstadt: WBG, 2004).
25. See R. Faber, ' "Gottesmeer" – Versuch über die Ununterschiedenheit Gottes', in Th. Dienberg and M. Plattig (eds), *'Leben in Fülle': Skizzen zur christlichen Spiritualität* (Münster: np, 2001), pp. 64–95.

Abbreviations for Whitehead's works

AI *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: Free Press, 1967)
CN *Concept of Nature*, repr. 1964 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)
FR *Function of Reason* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958)
IM *An Introduction to Mathematics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958)
Imm 'Immortality', in *Essays in Science and Philosophy* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 77–96
MT *Modes of Thought* (New York: Free Press, 1966)
MG 'Mathematics and the Good', in *Essays in Science and Philosophy* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 97–113
PR *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*. Corrected edition. Ed. D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1978)
RM *Religion in the Making* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1996)
SMW *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Free Press, 1967)

Abbreviations for Deleuze's (and Guattari's) works

AO *Anti-Oedipus* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1996) (with F. Guattari)
B *Bergsonism* (New York, 1988)
E *Essays: Critical and Clinical* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997)
CDB 'La conception de la différence chez Bergson', in *Les études bergsoniennes* 4 (1956), 77–112.
C I *Cinema 1: Movement-Image* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1986)
D *Dialogues* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) (with C. Parnett)
DI *Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974* (Paris: Semiotext(e), 2004)
DR *Difference and Repetition* (New York: np, 1994).
IMMd 'Immanence: A Life …', in G. Deleuze, *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life* (Zone Books, 2005); here: 'Die Immanenz: Ein Leben …', in: F. Balke and J. Vogl (eds), *Gilles Deleuze – Fluchtlinien der Philosophie*, (München: np, 1996), pp. 29–33
LS *Logic of Sense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

N *Negotiations 1972–1990* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990)
NPd N*ietzsche und die Philosophie* (Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1991)
Pd *Proust und die Zeichen* (Merve: np, 1993).
Ph *What is Philosophy?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) (with F. Guattari)
SP *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (London: Zone Books, 1992)
TF *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1992)
TP *A Thousand Plateaus* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) (with F. Guattari)

Glossary of 25 Key Terms

Abstraction

For Deleuze, Whitehead and Bergson (hereafter DWB) there is both a critical and creative sense of abstraction. First, philosophy must be, as Whitehead says, 'the critic of abstractions'. Abstractions are not false, but present a limited and narrow aspect of the object. Plato's Forms serve as an example here. Plato begins with the abstract forms and asks how they are realized, or 'participate', in the object world. In so doing concrete reality is measured in relation to an abstract 'essence' or 'Idea'. For DWB it is a mistake to attempt to explain the concrete by appeal to the abstract since 'the abstract does not explain but itself be explained'. The real philosophical question becomes: 'how can concrete fact exhibit entities abstract from itself and yet participated in by its own nature?' (PR: 20). The answer leads us to the creative sense of abstraction. Behind Plato's Forms we find an indeterminate abstract space of 'process' (q.v.), 'duration' (q.v.) or 'difference' (q.v.) that submits its elements to creative actualization. Prior to forms DWB thus posit an abstract yet real space that conditions actuality (q.v.). One crucial difference here will be how each philosopher understands the relation of creative abstraction to actuality.

Actuality

The product of the process of creative abstraction. Actuality is 'existence' in the fullest sense of this term. For DWB actuality is to be contrasted with potentiality and/or virtuality (q.v.). In general terms one can say that, for Deleuze, potential is virtual, pure or eternal rather than actual; for Whitehead there is both actual and eternal potential, whereas Bergson is the most consistent in thinking of potential as only ever actual. Actuality, then, appears to have a different status and value for each, although determination of the actual is given by potential. Arguably, Deleuze more consistently aligns actuality with the negative, identity, 'representation', lack and loss of potential in favour of the reality of the 'virtual', whereas Whitehead and Bergson are more positively 'actualist' in the sense that creativity and potentiality can only be actual or understood in relation to an actual (for Whitehead the 'eternal' can only

be described in relation to actuals). However, both Whitehead and Bergson allow – indeed require – non-actual elements in their metaphysics, but the nature, role and purpose of these is the subject of much debate and controversy.

Actual entity/actual occasion

This is perhaps the central concept of Whitehead's metaphysics, with nothing in either Deleuze's or Bergson's metaphysics that closely corresponds to it (this fact raises important questions about the 'rhizomatic connections' between DWB and the nature of all the important terms in this glossary). Actual occasion is first used in *Science and the Modern World* (1925) and then throughout *Process and Reality* (1929) to refer to the atomic or 'epochal' unit of becoming, the final 'real' activity of which the world is made up. Each actual occasion is a 'drop of experience', a metaphysical 'organism' that grows, matures and perishes. *Process and Reality* offers a detailed description and analysis of each phase of this process. Opposed to philosophies of 'substance', the actual occasion in Whitehead's process metaphysics is not a 'thing' that becomes, but the 'subject', 'prehension' (q.v.) or 'occasion' of its own becoming. As Whitehead describes it, each occasion 'feels' the multiplicity of 'data', 'objectifies' it and internalizes it (see 'concrescence') into one complex integrated feeling or 'satisfaction'. Following satisfaction the actual occasion is now 'superject' and 'objectively immortal', a determinate fact available in 'transition' (q.v.) for prehension (q.v.) by other actual entities.

Becoming

One of the central concepts that DWB share. Challenging the 'static' 'substance–predicate' view of reality made up of unchanging substances and changing predicates, DWB each develop an idea of the real as a perpetual becoming. Becoming is the dynamic movement of temporalization and change that never 'is' but insists in between the 'no longer' and the 'not yet', pulling in both past and future directions at once. Becoming is a pure or empty time that has no real beginning or point of termination, no subject or object. There is no progress or regress in becoming, and no thing that becomes or fails to become, only a pure passage or continuity. Thus, at one level DWB all agree that becoming is the continuous process of temporalization. However, each offers a different interpretation of becoming and continuity and the relation between

them as each of their systems evolved. In general, however, we can say that for Deleuze and Bergson there is a continuity of becoming, but for the later Whitehead there is a becoming of continuity. The differing emphases in the relation, and which term has precedence, reflect not only the evolution of their thought, but also their differing responses to Zeno's paradoxes. For the later Whitehead, unless we posit something like a 'unit' of becoming where we differentiate the 'act' of becoming from what becomes, then Zeno is unanswerable since determining a 'before' or a 'next' would be impossible. In *Process and Reality* Whitehead requires this 'atomism' to account for the 'serial' nature of continuity ascribed to the relation of occasions. For Deleuze and Bergson, by contrast, it is by appealing to the continuity of becoming (of difference or duration) that Zeno's paradoxes are dissolved as a false problem (of representation or intellect).

Concrescence

Concrescence is literally a becoming concrete, a 'growing together' or a synthesis and is an important term in Whitehead's metaphysics, equivalent to actualization in Deleuze. First used in *Process and Reality*, concrescence is a process by which the 'many' acquire determinate unity in the 'one'. It is the 'real internal constitution' of an actual occasion and in *Process and Reality* concrescence is divided into several phases for the purpose of analysis (the question of whether the phases are 'in time' is of some interest among Whitehead scholars). In general terms concrescence begins with the 'reception' of 'data': there is something to be received and an act of receiving or grasping (see prehension below). Concrescence describes the 'form' of that reception, how the data are received, 'directed' and integrated into the becoming of the occasion. In a first phase multiple, 'simple' or physical feelings are felt in 'conformity' with another. In later phases these conformal feelings are integrated into a developing 'conceptual' reaction and fused with a 'decision' about what will be received in the immediate future. Concrescence is a process of prehensions (q.v.) and is to be contrasted with 'transition' (q.v.).

Creativity

One of the most important concepts in the metaphysics of DWB informing each of their respective understandings of being, thinking and life.

For Whitehead creativity (a term invented by Whitehead[1]) is the 'category of the ultimate'. It is the reality involved in every new unity that emerges out of the many in accordance with the principle of novelty. Creativity is an energy individualizing itself into actualities. For Bergson creativity is driven by the *élan vital* which re-ascends the incline that matter descends. All the divergent lines of life are created in the tension between an impetus to accumulate energy and a resistance to that impetus that would discharge itself as a 'canalization' in myriad forms. For Deleuze similarly, creativity is simply the actualization of the virtual, a repetition of difference, the production of the new. One important question for DWB here is the implications of an ontology of creativity for politics and ethics.

Difference

DWB all have important uses for this term, but Deleuze, along with Jacques Derrida, is rightly regarded as the primary philosopher of difference. In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze challenged the philosophical tradition's subordination of difference to identity and resemblance by attempting to give difference its own concept, an 'internal' difference that would differ only from itself rather than an 'external' difference that provides a measure of similarity between things or states. By coupling difference with repetition (which for Deleuze was also thought of in relation to identity and the same), Deleuze was able to show how difference and repetition could be thought outside of the philosophy of representation and the dogmatic 'image of thought' that grounds it. Even in 'infinite' representation (Deleuze gives the examples of Hegel and Leibniz) difference remains unthought in itself since infinite representation fails to capture or 'express' the sub-representational source or 'problem' from which difference comes. Deleuze's great project in *Difference and Repetition* was to think this problematic groundlessness of difference outside of representation with the help of a whole array of new 'notions': virtual ideas and problems, intensities, singularities, individuations, series, spatio-temporal dynamisms, and their actualization in qualities and extension.

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[1] I thank Steven Meyer who persuaded me of this. See his introduction to the special issue of *Configurations: A Journal of Literature, Science, and Technology*, 13(1) (Winter 2005) on the thought of Alfred North Whitehead.

Duration

Bergson's term for the lived movement of temporality and used by both Deleuze and Whitehead. In science and philosophy Bergson claims that the intellect tends to 'spatialize' time, reducing it to a 'freeze-frame', or static representation, of the present. Indeed, occasionally Bergson suggests that time cannot be thought at all since the intellect and its modes of conceptualization are incapable of thinking a pure mobility. (This is why both Russell and Whitehead claimed that Bergson was 'anti-intellectual'.) Within our categories of thought, time is made homogeneous, divisible and quantitative, a dead juxtaposition of points and units in space. Duration, by contrast, is heterogeneous, qualitative, continuous and interpenetrating, the creative dynamism and indivisible movement of 'the time of life'. Bergson does come up with numerous 'images' of duration, but all must be qualified by the idea that duration is imageless, the mobility of time itself.

Élan vital

First **i**ntroduced in Bergson's *Creative Evolution*, *élan vital* is the vital impetus or force that propels life forward from its beginnings and through all its varieties and forms. Although *élan* is described as 'one' and 'whole' and accounts for the unity of life, the impetus also provides the basis for its own dissociation and division. Thus, the impetus is one that divides or dissociates itself, but actual divisions and creations are unpredictable. In his *Bergsonism* Deleuze connects the vital impetus to the idea of the 'virtual' (q.v.) that forms the whole of duration. *Élan* would be the actualization of the virtual according to lines of differentiation all the way up to 'man', where the vital impetus achieves self-consciousness.

Empiricism

DWB all appeal to a transformed empiricism as a crucial method for thinking concrete reality, whether in the form of 'transcendental empiricism', 'speculative empiricism', 'true empiricism', etc. Following on from William James' critique of the atomistic and abstract basis of traditional empiricism and the development of his own 'radical empiricism', DWB each value empiricism as a method for accessing the richness and continuity of lived experience beyond the merely pragmatic or utilitarian. In Deleuze, for example, empiricism is tied to a logic of 'multiplicities' (q.v.) which make up the very becomings of the real. Rather than any direct

appeal to historical empiricism and the textbook claims about it (empiricism as the doctrine that the intelligible is derived from the sensible) Deleuze finds in empiricism an experimentation and creation of concepts that correspond with multiplicities. Whitehead's empiricism follows a similar route where one begins not with abstractions but with experience. Empiricism becomes 'speculative' by generalizing from experience in search of concrete principles not discoverable by abstract reason. Similarly in Bergson 'true empiricism' would be the 'sympathetic' intuition of all duration, the extension and overlapping of smaller durations within larger durations that would encompass the whole.

Eternal object

In order to avoid any misleading suggestions that the use of Plato's Forms or the terms ideas, essence and universals might give, Whitehead comes up with the concept of eternal objects as one of the formative elements of his philosophy. Eternal objects are first used in *Science and the Modern World* and then systematically in *Process and Reality*, where they are described as a 'fundamental type of entity' in Whitehead's cosmology. Indeed, eternal objects are given 'categoreal' definition in *Process and Reality* where they are described as 'pure potentials' for the specific determination of fact. Eternal objects are the potentiality of the universe and when actualized become 'forms of definiteness'. Eternal objects are abstract and unextended and neither change or endure. However, objects do reflect a 'permanence' that is unaffected by their 'adventures' in the world of process. Thus, although they are 'real', eternal objects are not actual or temporal and could be usefully compared with Deleuzian 'Ideas'. Eternal objects are the potential for actual entities and function through 'ingression' (with its various modes) or 'participation' in the becoming of each actuality. Apart from the determination by eternal objects, actuality is devoid of character. Thus eternal objects are thoroughly indeterminate 'pure possibilities' and express a general potentiality unconstrained by any states of affairs, but when actualized or ingressed they instantiate fully determinate facts or forms of definiteness.

Event

Another central concept shared by DWB and an important concept in twentieth-century philosophy (in both analytic and continental traditions) as well as numerous other disciplines in the humanities and the sciences. In general we can say that 'events' are the principal constituents

of ontology in DWB, replacing any primary appeal to 'substances'. Substance has played a central role in Western metaphysics as the fundamental reality qualified by predicates. Substance ontologies underpin the common-sense view of the world as made up of individual material objects that endure in space and time. If events are allowed in this view, they are occurrences that happen to things or that things undergo or experience. In event ontologies, by contrast, events are fundamental and things or substances can be variously viewed as 'effects', 'products' or temporary 'structures' of events, simply sets of properties or patterns recognizable in events. In the event ontology of DWB events are relational and interlocking 'movements' of activity out of which the actual makes itself. In this sense events do not 'exist' as such and are never 'present', although each will offer differing accounts of this as their thought develops. In Whitehead's *Concept of Nature*, for example, the relationality of events is given by extension. Events are relational in that they extend over each other in a continuous becoming. Later Whitehead realized that extension was derivative from 'process' and that process comes in 'drops' or 'occasions' of experience. In Deleuze the activity of the event is described as dynamic and intensive. Events have no plenitude, are 'incorporeal', and are said to 'insist' or 'subsist'. All events 'communicate' virtually and acquire determinate qualities actually. Deleuze marks this in language by appealing to the infinitive verb, rather than nouns, in describing events. Thus, there is a 'double' structure of the event in Deleuze which remains in place, although described differently, in much of his work. Insofar as Bergson opposes duration to a world defined spatially and pragmatically the event in Bergson could also be described, like Deleuze, as an immanent doubling.

Fold

Deleuze continues Heidegger's and Merleau-Ponty's fascination for *le pli* and its cognates (retained in English as complicate, replicate, explicate, perplicate, etc.) as evidenced in several texts, including *Difference and Repetition*, *Foucault* and, of course, his 'return' to Leibniz in *The Fold*. Although inflected (or folded) differently in each text the fold appears as an important term for the activity of being and in each case is a different element that is folded from subjectivity to thought to life. In the fold of subjectivity, for example, Deleuze says that the outside is folded onto the inside, creating the possibility of new subjectivities. In the fold of the event Deleuze contrasts Leibniz's 'baroque' condition, in which serial

divergences mark the borders of incompossible worlds, with the 'neo-baroque' condition of Whitehead, in which bifurcations are no longer excluded from monads but opened to and captured within prehensive relations. The fold also signals the continuity of becoming in Deleuze's thought, acting as yet another figure for the repetition with a difference of 'becoming', 'event' 'multiplicity', 'sense', 'simulacrum' and, of course, 'difference in itself'. The fold is thus a rich and dense concept for Deleuze and operates on multiple levels and registers. One important question here is the *specificity* of the fold and the work he has it do on Leibniz, Foucault and Whitehead raising important questions about the nature of Deleuzian readings and the rhizomatic connections between authors.

Intuition

An important term in Bergson's metaphysics and often misunderstood as in opposition to 'method', 'rationality', etc., Bergson defines intuition as a 'reversal' of the normal workings of the intellect. Rather than the indefinite division of things in accordance with pragmatic need, in Bergson intuition becomes a method for entering into the undivided flow of duration itself. First introduced in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, and although opposed to 'analysis', intuition remains for Bergson an arduous form of 'reflection' or 'thinking' in which mind attempts to directly 'see' into itself and its own internal duration. From its beginning in consciousness and the experience of our own 'inward' duration, Bergson suggests that intuitive effort can be enlarged and extended to other durations in an experience of the very inwardness of life. Thus, in *Creative Evolution* intuition is developed in the context of biology both as 'instinct' become self-conscious and sympathy generalized. Intuition may then be placed to show how the binary oppositions of the intellect can be transcended into sympathetic communication with all the durations of life and their 'endlessly continued creations'.

Multiplicity

Although used by DWB in strikingly similar ways, multiplicity is, according to Deleuze, not 'part of the traditional vocabulary at all'. Derived from Riemann's 'discrete' and 'continuous' multiplicities in mathematics, it is Husserl and Bergson who are among the first to deploy the concept philosophically and Badiou the most recent. For DWB multiplicity replaces 'essence' with a new kind of dynamic structure which cannot be understood axiomatically or typologically. Deleuze describes

the dynamism and force of 'multiplicity' by defining it as a 'substantive' in which multiple is no longer thought as a predicate of the one. Thus, a multiplicity is a 'structure' that cannot be referred to a preceding unity or described adjectivally as 'of' an existing form. Whitehead also says this when he describes eternal objects as a multiplicity which have that unity which derives from 'some qualification which participates in each of its components severally' but is not a unity derivative 'merely from its various components'. Whitehead, like Bergson and Deleuze, defines at least two types of multiplicity. The first we can call 'genetic' or intensive multiplicities which correspond to Bergson's durational multiplicity; the second is 'coordinate' or extensive multiplicity and corresponds with Bergson's spatial multiplicities. Deleuze develops this distinction further by distinguishing among intensive, continuous, virtual multiplicities and extensive, numerical, actual multiplicities. Extensive multiplicities can be divided into their (spatial) parts and 'regions' and acquire determinate properties. By contrast, intensive multiplicities are 'flat', fill all of their dimensions, are internal to the process of their 'becoming', have no additional or supplementary 'dimension' to which they could be referred and cannot be divided without changing in nature. For Deleuze virtual multiplicities are real but not 'actual', and express the pure potentiality of the actual to become other.

Potentiality

Potentiality is an important concept in the Western tradition at least since Aristotle, who brings potentiality together with actuality (q.v.) to explain change and movement. Although DWB each think potentiality in slightly different ways, for each being is potentiality. For Whitehead there are different forms of potentiality. 'Real' potentiality relates to the inherited world of actual occasions and the restriction and limitations this places on pure potentiality. The first determination of real potentiality is referred to by Whitehead as the 'extensive continuum' (this is his rendering of the Platonic 'receptacle'). The continuum functions as that barest 'screen', filter or order between 'chaos' and general potentiality. General potentiality is the pure possibility, without restriction or limitation, given by the multiplicity of eternal objects. For Deleuze and Bergson potentiality is either virtual or actual and so resembles Whitehead's general and real. However, Deleuze's descriptions involve complicated (and sometimes convoluted) transformations of traditional concepts and their reworking through a structuralist vocabulary and scheme (for example, Deleuze's reworking of Kant's notions of Idea, concept and schema).

Actual potential for Deleuze (like Whitehead's 'real' potential) refers to the world of bodies, state of affairs and their mixtures, of potential actualized in the 'flesh of the world'. To 'counter-actualize' is to tap the potential of body, to further express 'what a body can do' by invoking the 'problem' to which it was the 'solution'. To release or realize its potential the actual event must be mimed or 'repeated' virtually. Virtual or ideal potential is given by 'Ideas' and their mode is the 'problematic'. Here Deleuze borrows and transforms 'Ideas in the Kantian sense', retaining the Kantian link between Ideas and the posing of 'problems' (and Kant's rigorous distinction between ideas and concepts). Ideas are indeterminate 'multiplicities' (q.v.) or 'regions' of pure differences constituted by differential elements, relations and singular points. This content is potentiality and is differentiated and actualized in accordance with the conditions of a problem.

Prehension

Prehension is first used in Whitehead's *Science and the Modern World* to indicate a non-cognitive (compare with 'apprehension') taking account of that constitutes the basic elements of actual occasions. Prehension is thus the primary form of relatedness in and between actual occasions. Deleuze and Guattari use the term in *A Thousand Plateaus* and *What is Philosophy?* (as does Deleuze in *Leibniz and the Baroque*) to indicate an open passage of perceptions as an increase or decrease in potential (q.v.). Technically, prehension is the reaching out, grasping and 'seizing' of different types of objects (as data, which come from the past objective world and objects as eternal) which are then incorporated through processes of concrescence (q.v.). Prehensions have three characteristics: a 'subject' of prehension; a 'datum' to be prehended; and a form which shapes how that subject will prehend that datum. Prehensions are both physical and conceptual, positive and negative. As physical, prehensions correspond to the first phase of concrescence where 'data' from the world ('objective' actual entities) are grasped or prehended; as conceptual, prehensions are given a 'form' that will shape how the data are prehended through the selection of eternal objects. As positive, prehensions are 'feelings' that are received into the developing subjective occasion and integrated or synthesized with it; as negative, prehensions exclude or refuse the integration of data (but only the data given conceptually – one cannot exclude a physical prehension). In *Process and Reality* Whitehead develops the concept (with other distinctions, including pure, impure and hybrid prehensions) into a full-blown

'theory' of prehensions. Although in some ways close to Leibniz, Whitehead's theory of prehensions is one of his most original and important contributions to philosophy.

Process

In philosophy there is a long tradition of thinking about 'process' that reaches back to the pre-Socratics. In the twentieth century Whitehead is the thinker most closely associated with the concept of process, especially given the title of his magnum opus *Process and Reality*. Yet the idea is also ubiquitous in numerous thinkers, including of course Deleuze and Bergson. DWB all agree that being is change and becoming and, to account for that, we need an ontology that includes events and processes as primary (with things, persons and substances as dependent). Yet each offers a different view on the nature and significance of the processes and events (q.v.) involved. Whitehead describes process as a 'complex of activity with internal relations between its various factors' and he divides this one complex activity of process into 'two species': a 'microscopic' process that corresponds with 'concrescence' (q.v.) and a macroscopic process of 'transition' (q.v.). It is 'creativity' (q.v.) that brings these processes into communication. If for Whitehead process appears to have both an internal order and a direction, for Deleuze and Bergson this 'complex of activity' has internal order within processes of open-ended becoming. In Deleuze we could here refer to virtual and actual processes, static and dynamic genesis. Perhaps Deleuze's most important contribution to a theory of process would be showing how process can be thought 'differentially'.

Rhizome

Deleuze and Guattari's now well-known term for sheer connection, open proliferation and undirected movement. In *A Thousand Plateaus'* they define rhizome in six principles which we can summarize as follows. Rather than the tree or root which moves from one fixed point to another in regulated order, the rhizome potentially connects any point with any other, crossing heterogeneous domains. By cutting across domains rhizomes are necessarily made up of relational mixtures of signs and signifying parts, some of which stratify while others may form new lines and mixtures. As a multiplicity (q.v.) rhizomes are neither one nor multiple but composed of dimensions which grow from the middle and expand with each increase in connection, forcing the rhizome

to change its nature. Rhizomes operate via variation, expansion, capture, offshoots. Unlike 'tree' structures, rhizomes are not 'reproduced' but must themselves be produced or constructed as a map that is revisable and modifiable with multiple entryways. Rhizomes are 'anti-memory' or function non-genealogically so as to free becomings from points of arborescence.

Simulacrum

An important concept for Deleuze used in both *Difference and Repetition* and *Logic of Sense* for 'reversing' Platonism. In the 'official' view of Platonism the simulacrum is a copy of an original, but a poorly founded copy since it almost escapes the action of the Idea. Deleuze finds, especially in *The Sophist*, that there are moments when the simulacrum functions not just as a poor copy but as an 'ungrounded' image without resemblance which operates in accordance with an altogether different 'model': not the model of the 'same' but the 'model' of the different. Here the simulacrum is its own model in absolutely dissimilarity from itself, an otherness which internalizes a dissemblance. In its internalization of a disparity or divergence the simulacrum harbours a positive power. This positive power, says Deleuze, enables 'the triumph of the false pretender'. But the false pretender is not 'false' in relation to a model of truth. It is rather a positive power of the false, a power of disguise, where behind each mask lies yet another. This is for Deleuze the meaning of the Nietzschean 'eternal return'. The manifest content of eternal return 'of the same' gives way to the latent content of return of difference. Eternal return is not an order opposed to the chaos but is the 'chaosmos'. It is the 'being' of the simulacrum. It is also selective, but for Deleuze not in the manner of Plato's selection. What does not return are the originals and copies, the Same. What 'returns' is the world of simulacra and differences. Although Deleuze claims (in his 'preface' to Jean-Clet Martin's book) to have abandoned the concept of simulacrum this is somewhat disingenuous. The notion of 'the power of the false' continues throughout his work and continues to play a prominent role – for example, in the *Cinema* volumes.

Singularity

Another notion that Deleuze takes from mathematics (especially Lautman) and puts to work as a philosophical concept. Indeed, the theory of singularities could, for Deleuze, challenge (perhaps replace) the

epistemological and ontological importance of 'true' and 'false' in philosophy (unless true and false are understood in terms of 'problems'). Singularities can be thought of as inhabiting a complementary dimension to differential relations in Deleuze's system, both components of the idea or virtual multiplicity (q.v.). In *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze describes singularities as pre-individual, non-personal and aconceptual. In contradistinction from 'ordinary' or 'regular' points, singularities are points of fusion and inflection, critical turning points, moments of 'bifurcation' and divergence of series. They are 'ideal events' or 'primary predicates' (and, in this sense, close to Whitehead's eternal objects (q.v.) and see 'potentiality' above) that form the elements of a virtual Idea. In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze offers the example of learning to swim as the effort of composing the singularities of our bodies with another element (the differential elements of the water that enter into a relation) that propels us into a world of unknown problems.

Spatialization

To be compared with Whitehead's 'fallacy of simple location' and Deleuze's 'representation', Bergson criticizes modern science and philosophy for treating time as a form of space. For Bergson our scientific and philosophical concepts of time are premised on a model of time as discrete units and separable instants. This assumes that time is a series of discontinuous breaks that can, for example, be plotted on a graph as t1 … t2 and given a measure. Perhaps 'clock-time' is *the* model of 'spatialization' for Bergson with its second, minute and hour units. Spatialization is extremely useful, but for Bergson an all too partial and restricted slice of reality. Our spatializing habits may regularize and help control our experience of the object world but, for Bergon, they also obscure a more profound experience of time. If we attend closely to the phenomenology of our inner mental life, we experience a flow of the past into the immediate future like notes in a melody or a snowball on a gentle slope. This is what Bergson calls *durée*. (see 'duration'). In *Creative Evolution* Bergson moves beyond phenomenological experience and extends *durée* to the evolution of life.

Subject

The concepts subject and subjectivity are important for DWB and are rethought in different ways by all three. For DWB the subject can no

longer function metaphysically as a *hypokeimenon*, an underlying permanent 'foundation' or fixed substance, as in the Cartesian and Kantian traditions. Nor can it work as the opposing term to 'object' in all its various epistemological permutations (although Whitehead will rework the subject–object relation as a metaphysical process). But, if there is something of a critique and 'deconstruction' of the subject in DWB there is also a 'construction'. Although all three have different things to say about subjectivity at different points in their work we can say that all posit a subject as 'in process', as always 'incomplete' and ever unique. In this respect both Deleuze and Bergson talk of a 'virtual' subject. In Bergson this refers to the radically open-ended creativity that characterizes the 'continuous melody of our interior life'. In Deleuze interiority or personal identity is swallowed up in the 'crack' of differences or later the 'fold' of a 'dissolved self' or subject that is time. Thus, whereas Bergson retains the idea of subjectivity as oneself, as an enduring interiority, albeit a 'self' that does not underlie the 'enduring' but *is* the enduring, which then opens onto 'other' durations, Deleuze tends to refer immediately to a 'reduced' subjectivity, a minimal, vanishing or 'virtual' subject as time already dispersed in an 'ocean' of difference out of which emerges variously what is referred to as 'larval' or 'molecular' subjects, which are then actualized in 'molar' form'. Although Whitehead, like Bergson, retains a place for personal identity in the unity of the enduring subject, his metaphysical conception, in contrast to Deleuze's, entails an enlargement or 'generalization' of subjectivity out of which the epochal occasion is formed as 'subject-superject'. Thus DWB each recast the notion of subject as itself a process of construction and an activity of becoming, but each use different, perhaps even opposed, strategies for doing this.

Transition

In *Process and Reality* Whitehead describes transition as one of the major processes through which actual occasions are produced. Transition is described as the 'macroscopic' process that complements 'concrescence'. It is the phase in the becoming of the occasion which provides the 'datum' or actual past from which the novel concrescence will emerge. Thus transition plays an important double role in transitioning to and from occasions. This double role can be seen in Whitehead's descriptions of transition as both 'perpetual perishing' and as an 'origination' in the present that conforms to the past. As 'subject' the occasion 'perishes', but as objective the occasion forms a past from which the new occasion

will originate. Transition is then a repetition of the past that provides the conditions for novelty.

Virtuality

A very important term in both Deleuze and Bergson, and one could argue for its usefulness in Whitehead too. The virtual, which must not be confused with any technologically defined 'virtual reality', has a long history in philosophy and Bergson and Deleuze draw on aspects of that history, especially Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition*. As Alain Badiou has said, the 'virtual is …the principal name of being in Deleuze's work' and it is of course to Bergson's deployment of the virtual that Deleuze turns to think the principal name of being. Utilizing Bergson's critique of the possible as the source of false problems, Deleuze will distinguish the virtual from the possible. The possible is said to be opposed to real in contrast to the opposition of the virtual and the actual. The possible may be actual but it has no reality, whereas the virtual is not actual but is real. In another sense the possible can be 'realized' and the process of realization takes place through resemblance and limitation. The real is in the image of (resembles) the possible and merely has existence added to it. In addition, possibles are said to pass into the real through limitation. In contrast, the virtual is not realized but actualized, and the principles of actualization are not resemblance and limitation but difference and divergence. Thus, the possible for Deleuze's Bergson is a false notion. It shows nothing of the mechanism of creation since it is based on a 'theological model' in which all is given. In actualization (see 'actuality') the virtual differentiates itself in the creation of a novel actuality that does not resemble its virtual conditions.

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